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Abstract 
 
Hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) are a big threat to the well-being of patients and 
place a heavy burden on hospital resources. The thesis provides the first attempt to 
apply agent-based simulation (ABS) to describe the transmission dynamics and 
evaluate the intervention policies of HAIs in general and Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in particular.  
 
Based on the proposed taxonomy of potential methods for modelling HAIs, the 
relative advantages of ABS compared to other modelling methods are investigated. 
The comparison provides a theoretical justification to the use of ABS. The main 
methodological issues, including the representation of patient agents and the 
modelling of the transmission process, are discussed and a framework of applying 
ABS on HAI modelling is proposed.  
 
Guided by the framework, a MRSA model is built and validated using observed data 
from an empirical study. The model is more realistic and flexible than previous 
MRSA models and embeds intervention policies that have not been systematically 
studied such as the turnaround time and frequency of screening tests and the 
decolonisation treatment. Various interventions and influencing factors are 
systematically evaluated by formal experimental design methods including the 
fractional factorial design and the response surface design. 
 
The experimental results indicate that the use of rapid screening tests with shorter test 
turnaround time is the most effective policy to reduce MRSA transmission in the 
hospital setting. The introduction of admission and repeat screening is another 
effective policy; however, the effectiveness is not linear and may depend on patients’ 
lengths of stay. Providing more isolation facilities is also an effective policy but its 
effectiveness is significantly dependent on the efficacy of isolation. 
 
To demonstrate the potential and flexibility of ABS, the MRSA model is extended to 
include a competitive infection, to include multiple hospital units and HCW agents, 
and the wider community.  
 xix
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The main theme of the thesis is to apply agent-based simulation (ABS) to model the 
transmission dynamics of hospital-acquired infections (HAIs) and to use the model to 
evaluate a range of intervention policies aiming at preventing and controlling the HAI 
of interest. ABS is a type of modelling and simulation technique which has been 
applied to many domains. HAIs, on the other hand, are a major threat to patients in the 
hospital and have been extensively investigated by clinical and, in recent years, by 
modelling studies. The main task of the thesis is to link the two topics and make a 
contribution both to extend the application area of ABS and to develop the 
understanding of HAIs so that the infectious diseases can be better managed in the 
hospital setting. 
 
This chapter sets the background for this thesis. It describes the threat and distinctive 
features of HAIs. The potential intervention policies to prevent and control HAIs, and 
the problem areas facing HAI management are summarised. Then, ABS is introduced 
regarding its definition, features and applications to infectious diseases. Finally, the 
Birmingham Heartlands Hospital case study is introduced based on which the ABS 
model in the thesis is built and validated against. This chapter forms the basis on 
which later chapters will build. 
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1.2 Hospital-acquired Infections 
 
1.2.1 Threat of Hospital-acquired Infections 
 
Infectious Diseases 
Infectious diseases have been a threat to people’s survival, health and well-being since 
human life began (Department of Health 2002). In one of the most notorious 
epidemics in human history, around 25 million people died, out of a population of 
roughly 100 million, from bubonic plague in Europe in the fourteenth century. In the 
UK, more than 68,000 people died during the 1665 plague epidemic in London. Even 
in the early twentieth century, it was estimated that Russia suffered about two and a 
half million deaths from typhus between 1918 and 1921; and 20 million people were 
estimated to have died during the world epidemic of influenza in 1919. 
 
Currently, many infectious diseases, such as smallpox, are almost eradicated or 
successfully contained in the developed world and increasingly in the developing 
world. The main reasons for the success may be attributed to the scientific 
advancement, most importantly the development of vaccine against many infectious 
diseases and the successful vaccination programme for a large proportion of human 
population, especially new-born babies. Another important reason for the success is 
the improved living standard of most parts of the worlds as reflected by higher 
standards of hygiene, access to clean water and better nutrition (McNeill 1976; 
McKeown 1979).  
 
Despite of the significant advances in the human’s battle against infectious diseases, 
there is still and will always be a threat from the infectious diseases for the well-being 
of the human race. Emerged in the twentieth century, the human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) has become a big healthcare, as well as economical and political problem 
for the developed and developing world alike. Worldwide, nearly 25 million people 
died from HIV from 1982 to 2007 and the number of people living with HIV in 2007 
is 33.2 million, among which 2.5 million are children (World Health Organization 
2007). The situation in developing countries, especially African, are worse than 
developed countries (Morgan and Whitworth 2001). Apart from HIV, many infectious 
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diseases, such as tuberculosis and malarias, are still posing a tangible risk to millions 
of people in the developing world where the living standard is low and mass 
vaccination programme can not be effectively delivered. According to the Department 
of Health (2002) in the UK, infectious diseases account for 41% of the global disease 
burden with infections such as HIV, tuberculosis and malaria accounting for millions 
of deaths in the world’s population each year; and in England which is one of the 
wealthy industrialised countries, 40% of people consult their doctors every year 
because of an infection and infections account for 70,000 deaths each year. 
 
Hospital-acquired Infections 
HAIs, or nosocomial infections, can be defined as infections acquired in a hospital by 
a patient who was admitted for a reason other than that infection (World Health 
Organization 2002). HAIs made resurgence during the last three decades of the 20th 
century and are now a major problem for the National Health Service (NHS) in the 
UK (Department of Health 2002) as well as around the world. Healthcare associated 
infection is an even wider term which includes infections acquired not only in 
hospitals, but also in the primary care, community clinics, nursing homes and other 
healthcare facilities. In this thesis, the research is focused on HAIs that can be 
transmitted among patients in the hospital setting either through direct patient-to-
patient contacts or by cross transmissions which are facilitated by healthcare workers 
(HCWs) or other human (e.g., visitors) or non-human (e.g., medical equipment) 
vectors. Transmissible HAIs are caused by contagious or communicable pathogens, 
and in most cases the pathogens are in the form of bacteria or viruses. 
 
Impact of hospital-acquired infections 
HAIs can severely detriment patient welfare and place heavy burdens on healthcare 
resources (Plowman et al. 1999). HAIs add to functional disability and emotional 
stress of the patient and may, in some cases, lead to disabling conditions that reduce 
the quality of life. HAIs are also one of the leading causes of death. Each year in the 
UK, around 5,000 deaths might be primarily attributable to HAIs and in a further 
15,000 cases HAIs might be a substantial contributor (Department of Health 2002). A 
prevalence survey conducted under the auspices of World Health Organization in 55 
hospitals of 14 countries showed an average of 8.7% of hospital patients had HAIs; 
and at any time, over 1.4 million people worldwide suffer from infection 
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complications acquired in a hospital (World Health Organization 2002). In the UK, 
about 9 percent of patients in the hospital have a HAI, making an estimated total of 
100,000 patients a year; and the cost of increased length of stay and treatment is 
thought to be about £1,000 million a year (Noah 2006). Increased length of stay 
accounts for most of the extra financial cost, with the average increase for surgical 
wound infections to be 8.2 days (Coello et al. 1993).  
 
Types of hospital-acquired infections 
Currently, the widely known and studied HAIs in the UK and around the developed 
world include Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Clostridium 
difficile (C. difficile). Staphylococcus aureus is normally susceptible to methicillin 
and several other antibiotics. It is a common cause of skin, wound and most seriously 
blood stream infection. MRSA which is first documented in 1960s, on the other hand, 
is resistant to methicillin and also to many other anti-staphylococcal antibiotics that 
makes it very difficult to treat. In 1997, the first strain of MRSA resistant to 
vancomycin, the drug usually kept in reserve for treating highly resistant strains, was 
reported in Japan (Hiramatsu et al. 1997). MRSA has become endemic in the UK, the 
USA, some other European countries, and elsewhere. MRSA as a proportion of all 
Staphylococcus aureus causing blood stream infections has risen from abut 2% in 
1990 to more than 40% in 2000 (Johnson et al. 2005).  
 
It was estimated that MRSA infections, on average, may increase patient’s length of 
stay by two days and incur an extra cost of £6,916 per infection in a UK hospital 
(Cosgrove et al. 2005). MRSA is important also because staphylococci are virulent 
and they are associated with high fatality rate. In England and Wales, the number of 
deaths involving MRSA increased from 51 in 1993 to 800 in 2002; and the mortality 
data was matched by an increase in laboratory reports of MRSA bacteraemia, 
increasing from 210 reports in 1993 to 5,309 reports in 2002 (Griffiths et al. 2004)  
 
C. difficile is the leading cause of nosocomial infectious diarrhoea in adults and it is 
responsible for large outbreaks (Cartmill et al. 1992). It can be transmitted by hands 
of HCWs, other patients, medical equipment and simply the background environment. 
In most cases C. difficile infection is asymptomatic, and overt infection may be 
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triggered by antibiotics and the presence of risk factors such as age, anti-diarrhoeal 
drugs and insertion of tubes/enemas into the gastrointestinal tract (Noah 2006).  
 
Apart from the type of pathogen that causes the infection, HAIs can also be classified 
based on the clinical body sites of the infection. The main body sites that are 
susceptible to HAIs include blood, urinary tract, respiratory tract, surgical site and 
gastrointestinal tract. Blood stream infections account only for about 5 percent of 
HAIs but have a high mortality rate, and are mostly associated with an intravascular 
device and the admission to intensive care units (ICUs) (Noah 2006). Urinary tract 
infections are the most common type of HAIs and are also commonly associated with 
indwelling catheters. Pneumonia is the second most common HAI and it has a high 
fatality rate; and patients who are intubated or on ventilators are at a higher risk. 
Surgical site infections include wound infections or deep cut infections; and both 
patient and surgical factors may affect surgical site infections. Although almost all 
gastrointestinal organisms transmissible among people may cause HAI, the most 
common pathogens are C. difficile, rotavirus, norovirus and salmonella. 
 
1.2.2 Key Features of Hospital-acquired Infections 
Compared to non-HAIs (i.e., community-acquired infections), HAIs have some 
distinctive characteristics. Because of these special features, the clinical study 
methods, the prevention and control policies, and the analytical and modelling 
methods which are designed for community-acquired infections (e.g., HIV, malaria 
and various sexual-transmitted infections) may not be appropriate to be directly 
applied to infections in the hospital setting.  
 
Rapid Patient Turnover 
One of the distinctive features of HAIs compared to community-acquired infections is 
the rapid turnover of patients in the hospital. The actually length of stay may vary for 
patient with different diseases and risk factors; however, patients normally only stay 
in a hospital for a couple of days, or few weeks at most (Austin and Anderson 1999; 
Cooper and Lipsitch 2004). For example, the average length of stay in the UK is about 
6.8 days in year 1999-2000 (Black and Pearson 2002). 
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The rapid turnover of patients has many implications for the transmission dynamics in 
the hospital. On one hand, the positive effect is that, even without specific 
intervention policies, colonised or infectious patients who have the ability to transmit 
the pathogen may leave the hospital system in a few days (i.e., discharged) and no 
longer pose a threat to other susceptible patients in the hospital. On the other hand, 
even with every possible and effective intervention policy, new cases of infection may 
still be constantly introduced to the hospital by admitting patients from the 
community who have already been colonised with the pathogen. The rapid turnover of 
patients also indicates that some intervention polices to combat HAIs must be prompt 
relative to the patients’ lengths of stay; otherwise, patients may be discharged before 
the intervention policy takes effect. For example, screening tests for identifying 
MRSA colonised patients which take seven days to obtain the results may have 
limited value to patients who stay in the hospital for less than a week (which may 
include most of the patients in the hospital).  
 
Small Patient Population 
Another special feature of HAIs is the small patient population in the hospital setting. 
When studying community-acquired infections, the population size is normally in the 
order of tens of thousands of people for a town, millions for a city, or tens of millions 
or even billions for large-scale national or international studies. For HAIs, the patient 
population size is much smaller. A big hospital may at most have few thousand in-
patients at the same time. For many studies which focus on a single hospital unit, the 
patient population normally ranges from less than 10 for an ICU to about 40 for a big 
surgical or medical ward.  
 
It is common to observe big fluctuations of infection prevalence (i.e., the proportion 
or the number of people with the infectious diseases) in a small patient population and 
stochastic chance effects may dominant the transmission dynamics within a small 
population (Austin and Anderson 1999; Cooper et al. 1999; Pelupessy et al. 2002).  
 
Due to the randomness and chance effects, an outbreak of HAI may happen and 
prevalence may be high even when effective interventions are implemented. On the 
other hand, even with ineffective interventions or no interventions at all, there may be 
a chance that an outbreak does not happen and the prevalence is low for a certain 
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period of time. Therefore, conclusions drawn from a single observation or even a 
couple of observations within a shorter period of time may not represent the true 
nature of the transmission dynamics of the HAI of interest. The modelling methods to 
study HAIs should be able to handle stochastic systems, either analytically or through 
simulation replications. 
 
Asymptomatic Carrier 
Many HAIs, such as MRSA and C. difficile, may stay in a healthy people for a long 
time without causing any clinical recognisable symptoms, but still have the ability to 
transmit to other susceptible patients (Austin and Anderson 1999; Cooper and 
Lipsitch 2004; Smith et al. 2004). Due to asymptomatic carriers, unless pre-emptive 
screening tests are carried out in the hospital, it is very difficult to identify and 
consequently prevent these patients from transmitting the pathogen to other 
susceptible patients. The existence of asymptomatic carriers and the lack of pre-
emptive screening strategy in most hospitals imply that detailed transmission 
dynamics of HAIs are normally a hidden process and are difficult to observe. 
 
In epidemiology, asymptomatic carriers are normally known as colonised patient 
while clinical symptomatic carriers are known as infected patients. Colonisation is 
important since it may be transmitted to other patients and can lead to infections 
which may have serious consequences. Since the focus of the research is to study the 
transmission of HAIs, the term ‘colonised patients’ are used hereafter in the thesis to 
refer to both colonised and infected patients who have the capability of transmitting 
the pathogen to susceptible patients. 
 
Endemicity in the Hospital 
Some HAIs, such as MRSA and C. difficile, are endemic in hospitals in many counties 
because of the large reservoir built up in the community. Once a significant 
proportion of people in the community are colonised with a certain type of HAI, 
asymptomatic carriers may bring the pathogen to the hospital and become a constant 
source of threat to susceptible patients in the hospital through new hospital admissions. 
 
For counties where certain types of HAIs are endemic, it is unrealistic in the short-
term to totally eradicate the pathogens in the hospital setting. Alternatively, the focus 
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of intervention policies should be how to prevent new secondary transmission cases 
(i.e., patients who do not have a certain HAI on admission, who acquire the infection 
during their stay in the hospital), and how to identify and treat primary case patients 
(i.e., patients who have already been colonised with a certain HAI on admission). In 
the long term, these interventions should gradually reduce the community reservoir of 
asymptomatic carriers and eventually eradicate the HAI from the community and the 
hospital. 
 
1.2.3 Intervention Policies for Hospital-acquired Infections 
There are many intervention policies that have been implemented or are proposed to 
control and prevent HAIs. One popular strategy which has been proved effective both 
in theory (Bootsma et al. 2006) and in practice (Cooper et al. 2004) to combat HAIs 
such as MRSA is the “Search-and-Destroy” (S&D) strategy. The fundamental idea of 
the strategy is to pre-emptively “search” patients who are colonised with a pathogen 
through screening tests followed by measures to “destroy” (e.g., isolation and 
decolonisation treatment) the pathogen so that these identified patients can not 
transmit the pathogen to other susceptible patients. The S&D strategy may include the 
following detailed policies: 
• “Search” policies: 
o Screen all or high-risk patients on admission; and 
o Screen all or high-risk patients repeatedly during their hospital stay. 
• “Destroy” polices: 
o Isolate identified colonised patients; 
o Pre-emptively isolate high-risk patients on admission;  
o Decolonise identified colonised patients; and 
o Apply barrier precaution measures (e.g., the use of single-used gloves) 
for identified colonised patients. 
 
Apart from the aggressive and dedicated S&D strategy, there are many general 
policies which are recommended to be carried out in hospitals to prevent and control 
HAIs. These general measures may include: 
• Hand-washing by HCWs before and after contacts with patients; 
• Standard contact precautions with patients; 
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• Disinfect medical equipment, especially invasive medical devices; 
• Use invasive medical devices only when necessary and keep the devices in for 
as short as possible; 
• Ward cleaning and decontamination; 
• Antibiotic prescription policy (i.e., restrict the use of antibiotics); 
• Education of healthcare staff; and 
• Ward closure. 
 
In the UK, the healthcare authority (i.e., the Department of Health) has outlined in the 
Health Act not only general measures to prevent and control HAIs, but also specific 
policies aiming at MRSA and C. difficile (Department of Health 2006). To control and 
prevent MRSA, following policies must be carried out in NHS hospitals in the UK: (1) 
admission screening for all elective patients (by March 2009); (2) provide screening 
to emergency patients as soon as is practical, (3) decolonisation treatment for 
identified colonised patients; (4) isolation for identified infected or colonised patients; 
(5) transfer infected or colonised patients within NHS hospitals or to other healthcare 
facilities; and (6) antibiotic prophylaxis for patients who undergo surgery. For C. 
difficile, the code specifies the following policies: (1) active surveillance; (2) isolation 
for infected patients or cohort nursing; (3) environmental decontamination; and (4) 
antibiotic prescribing policies. 
 
1.2.4 Problem Areas for the Management of Hospital-acquired Infections 
Due to the distinctive features of HAIs, namely the rapid turnover of patients, the 
small patient population, asymptomatic carriers and the endemicity in hospitals, and 
numerous dedicated or general intervention policies, the management of HAIs is a 
complex and challenging issue. The special characteristics of HAIs mean that the 
findings and recommendations to deal with community-acquired infections, which 
have been the main areas of epidemiological study in the past, may not be directly 
applied to HAIs. The abundant choices of intervention policies further complicate the 
management of HAIs because the effects of different policies may be entangled with 
each other which make it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of a single policy and 
to determine the interactions among different policies. Consequently, taking into 
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account of chance effects and randomness, some of the main problem areas of the 
management of HAI include:  
• How to evaluate the effectiveness of a single intervention policy to prevent 
and control HAIs without confounding with other policies which may be 
implemented at the same time; 
• How to evaluate the interactions among different intervention policies, and 
how to determine the most effective intervention strategy which involves a 
number of intervention policies;  
• How to quantify the impact and sensitivity of the uncontrollable influencing 
factors that may have a big impact on the transmission dynamics of HAIs; and 
• How robust is each single intervention policy and is each feasible intervention 
strategy, taking into consideration of the influencing factors. 
 
 
1.3 Agent-based Simulation 
 
1.3.1 Definitions of Agent-based Simulation 
Partly as a result of the different names such as agent-based modelling, bottom-up 
modelling, multi-agent systems and individual-based modelling, there is no 
universally agreed definition for ABS. Wooldridge (200) defined multi-agent systems 
as systems composed of multiple interacting computing elements, known as agents. 
Sanchez and Lucas (2002) defined ABS as a simulation made up of agents, objects or 
entities that behave autonomously, and these agents are aware of and interact with 
their local environment through simple internal rules for decision-making, movement 
and action. Macal and North (2006) deemed ABS as a new approach to model 
systems comprised of interacting autonomous agents. There is no attempt to propose a 
new definition for ABS in this thesis; instead, a loose definition is given which 
satisfies most previous definitions. In this thesis, ABS is defined as a computer 
simulation made up of multiple autonomous agents who can interact with each other 
and with the system environment according to their behaviour rules. 
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1.3.2 Features of Agent-based Simulation 
ABS is founded on the notion that the whole of many systems is greater than the 
simple sum of its constituent parts, and the systems must be understood as collections 
of interacting components, each of which has its own rules (North and Macal 2007). 
Consequently, the aggregate behaviour of the simulated system is the result of the 
dense interactions of relatively simple behaviours of the individual simulated agents 
(Sanchez and Lucas 2002). Compared to traditional modelling approaches, such as 
mathematical modelling, SD and DES, the key features of ABS is a bottom-up, rather 
than top-down, modelling approach and the focus is on defining the attributes, states 
and behaviour rules of individual agents. 
 
Compared to the traditional top-down modelling approach from the perspective of the 
overall system, the bottom-up modelling approach adopted by ABS has the following 
characteristics: 
• Regarding model developments, the building of the model normally starts 
from defining the attributes, states and behaviour rules (e.g., how the agent 
changes state, how agents interact with each other, and how the agent interacts 
with the environment) of different types of agents; 
• Regarding model dynamics, the model is driven by the dynamics of each 
individual agent and the interactions among them, and system behaviour 
naturally emerges from the collective behaviours of locally defined agents; 
and 
• Regarding model contents, the representation of the attributes, states and 
behaviour rules of agents constitutes the main part of the model, and requires 
most of the efforts and time to develop the model. 
 
1.3.3 Type of Agents 
Agent is the core and most important element for ABS. There is a general consensus 
that the agent needs to be autonomous but there is little agreement beyond this 
because the potential properties vary in their importance in different domains 
(Wooldridge 2002). Bonabeau (2001) considered any type of independent component 
to be an agent, allowing an agent’s behaviour to range from primitive reactive 
decision rules to complex adaptive intelligence. Jennings (2000), from the perspective 
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of computer science, suggested that the only fundamental feature of an agent is the 
capability to make active independent decisions. Casti (1997) argued that agents 
should not only contain base-level behaviour rules but also should be subject to rules 
which can change over time due to experience and memory (i.e., be adaptive). 
Mellouli et al. (2003) also recommended that a component’s behaviour must be 
adaptive in order for it to be considered as an agent.  
 
Macal and North (2006) defined an agent as potentially having the following five 
properties: (1) an agent is an identifiable and self-contained discrete individual with a 
set of rules governing its behaviours and some decision-making capability; (2) it is 
situated in an environment within which it interacts with other agents as well as the 
environment; (3) it may be goal-directed which means it can compare the outcome 
with its goals; (4) it is autonomous and can function independently in the environment; 
and (5) it may have memory and learn and adapt its behaviours based on experience. 
They also argued that agents may have some but not all of these properties and, in 
order to be deemed as an agent, the model should be structured in such a way that 
missing features can be easily added within the established modelling framework 
(North and Macal 2007). Drogoul et al. (2003) also argued that many agents in real-
world ABS applications only use a weak notion of agent and do not have goals or 
memories, and can not adapt based on experience.  
 
In this thesis, the concept of agent fits in with Macal and North. In the context of HAI 
modelling, patients and potentially HCWs are the most important types of agents. The 
basic requirements of patient or HCW agents are that they need to be self-contained 
independent individuals who are situated in the hospital environment and may interact 
with other agents and the hospital environment. Apart from the basic requirements, 
the patient or HCW agents may or may not have more advanced features such as goal-
directed, having memory and being adaptive. Therefore, depending on the 
assumptions of the model, patient or HCW agents may range from simple reactive 
agents to sophisticated intelligent agents. 
 
1.3.4 Applications of Agent-based Simulation to Infectious Diseases 
In epidemiology modelling, most existing individual-based models focused on 
community-acquired infections such as HIV, influenza and various types of sexual-
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transmitted diseases. There are only a few individual-based models that studied the 
transmission of HAIs (see Section 2.3). People or patients in these models are 
represented as identifiable and self-contained discrete individuals who have some 
states and who can change their states according to some rules. They may be labelled 
as ABS according to the definitions of ABS and agents adopted by this thesis (see 
Section 1.3.3). However, it is not until recently that some of these models used the 
term “agent-based simulation” or “agent-based modelling”. Some of the early 
individual-based models labelled themselves as “micro-population model/simulation” 
or “discrete individual model”. 
 
Ackerman et al. (1990) proposed a micro-population model to simulate the epidemics 
of influenza. In the model, the disease progression of each person was updated on an 
individual basis and complicated assumptions regarding mixing, disease progression 
and individual heterogeneity were made. A stochastic model to study the dynamics of 
HIV in central African cities was built by Auvert et al. (1990). Each individual in the 
city population was separately represented. The birth and death, sexual behaviour, 
injections and transfusions and HIV development were discretely evolved by 
examining each individual at each successive step. The model also applied a flexible 
Monte-Carlo method. Ghani et al. (1997) applied a stochastic individual-based model 
to study the role of sexual partnership networks in the transmission dynamics of 
gonorrhoea. An individual-based micro-population model was proposed by Van Der 
Ploeg et al. (1998) to study the transmission, consequences and intervention policies 
of HIV and sexually-transmitted infections. The model was applied to an empirical 
study in Nairobi, Kenya.  
 
Some individual-based simulators were proposed to study the transmission of 
community-acquired infections in general. Peterson et al. (1993) proposed VESPERS 
(Viral Epidemic Simulation Programs for Epidemiological Research Studies), a 
stochastic micro-population simulation platform for the modelling of community-
acquired infections. Individuals in VESPERS can move through various states and 
may have individual demographics, susceptibility and infectivity. The platform also 
supports mixing groups. Adams et al. (1998) proposed HIVSIM, an individual-based 
modelling environment developed in C++ and based on previous micro-population 
simulation platforms, to evaluate HIV vaccine trial designs. Another simulator, 
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GERMS (Geographic-Environmental Re-infection Modelling Simulator), was 
proposed by Adams et al. (1999) to model the transmission of sexually-transmitted 
infections. The simulator has the ability to represent heterogeneous individuals with 
different social and geographic characteristics, interactions among individuals, 
transmission probabilities, infection duration, and contact and infection histories.  
 
More recent studies began to label the individual-based models as ABS or agent-
based model. Bagni et al. (2002) proposed an ABS model to study the spread of 
Bovine Leukemia, a pathogen which exclusively infects cattle in dairy farms. The 
model was built in both the Swarm environment (a collection of libraries written in C 
language to build ABS models) and Java. The model was event-driven and has the 
capability of event-scheduling. In the proposed model, it is possible to trace the 
evolution of the clinical states of each animal (e.g. healthy or infected). Spatial 
movements of the animals may also be represented.  
 
A general agent-based spatially explicit epidemiological model was proposed by 
Dunham (2005). The model structure is embedded within social networks. Classic 
epidemic models, such as SIS (susceptible-infected-susceptible) and SIR (susceptible-
infected-removed), were implemented and tested under this framework. The 
framework is suitable for community-acquired epidemics with large numbers of 
agents. The model was built in the MASON toolkit which is a set of non-
commercially available Java-based ABS libraries. 
 
A large-scale and distributed ABS model was developed by Parker (2007) which is 
capable of simulating hundreds of millions of agents and can be distributed to several 
compute nodes to share the burden of enormous computing requirements. The study 
focused on solving computational and technical problems of dealing large number of 
agents in connected compute nodes. Bobashev et al. (2007) proposed a hybrid agent-
based and equation-based modelling approach in order to combine the advantages of 
both modelling paradigms. The study recognised that ABS model is powerful in 
describing epidemiological processes involving human behaviours and local 
interactions. The fundamental idea of the hybrid approach is to apply ABS model at 
the start of the epidemic and switch to equation-based model after the number of 
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infected individuals is large enough to support population-averaged equation-based 
approach. 
 
1.3.5 Other Applications of Agent-based Simulation 
ABS has been widely applied to different domains which include financial market 
(LeBaron 2002), supply chain management (Nilsson and Darley 2006; Albino et al. 
2007), human resource allocation (Marin et al. 2006), retail management (Siebers et 
al. 2007), electricity market (Bunn and Oliveira 2007), digital market (Lopez-Sanchez 
et al. 2005), social science (Gilbert and Terna 2000), general economics (Sprigg and 
Ehlen 2007) and general management research (Robertson 2005).  
 
 
1.4 Empirical Case Study 
The building of a simulation model was originally part of a research study (Hardy et 
al. 2007), funded by the Department of Health in the UK, to test whether screening 
MRSA using a rapid Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test, which may provide 
results within a day, is more effective and cost-effective than the established culture 
test which may take up to four days to obtain the results. The main research study was 
carried out at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital, a typical large general teaching 
hospital in the UK which has more than 1,000 beds. The project involved seven 
surgical wards and lasted for sixteen months. Detailed description of the research 
project is discussed in Section 4.2.1. The research study provides the background to 
build the ABS model of MRSA in the thesis. The proposed MRSA model is also 
configured with and validated against observed data from the empirical study.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Modelling Hospital-acquired Infections 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Modelling is a valuable tool to study the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases. 
There have been plenty of previous studies applying various techniques to model the 
transmission of HAIs. A systematic review of the literature will identify potential gaps 
in existing research and justify the contributions of the thesis.  
 
 
2.2 An Introduction to Infectious Disease Modelling 
 
2.2.1 Developments of Infectious Disease Modelling 
There is a long history of applying mathematical models to study the spread of 
infectious diseases. The first work can be dated back to the eighteenth century 
(Bernoulli 1760) who used a mathematical method to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
variolation techniques against smallpox. However, it was not until the early nineteenth 
century that dynamical system approaches were applied to epidemiology. Since then, 
the application of mathematical models to study epidemiology has witnessed 
numerous significant conceptual and technical developments in the early twentieth 
century. For example, Brownlee (1906) fitted Pearsonian frequency distribution 
curves to a large series of epidemics. Hammer (1906) suggested that the course of an 
epidemic depends on the rate of contact between susceptible and infectious 
individuals which later became one of the most important concepts in epidemiology 
modelling: the “mass action” assumption in which the net rate of spread of infection is 
assumed to be proportional to the product of the density of susceptible individuals 
times the density of infectious people. In another milestone work, Kermack and 
McKendrick (1927) established the well-known threshold theory according to which 
the introduction of a few infectious people into a community of susceptible people 
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will not incur an epidemic outbreak unless the density or the number of susceptible 
people is above a critical value. Hamer (1906), Ross (1911) and Moshkovskii (1950) 
applied quantitative methods to study the regular recurrence of measles epidemics and 
the relationships between numbers of mosquitoes and the incidence of malaria. 
According to Anderson and May (1992), they were the first to formulate specific 
theories about the transmission of infectious diseases in simple but precise 
mathematical statements, and along with other studies (Ross and Hudson 1917; 
Kermack and McKendrick 1927; Soper 1929) they provided a firm theoretical 
framework for the investigation of observed patterns of  infectious diseases. 
 
Since the early beginnings, there was a steady growth in the literature concerning 
epidemiology modelling. More research areas were explored including the stochastic 
treatment of the models, the spatial spread of diseases, the importance of 
heterogeneity in the transmission, and the study of intervention policies. A full review 
of the recent development of modelling community-based infections is out of scope of 
the thesis. For a comprehensive review of the development of infectious disease 
modelling, please refer to texts by Bailey (1975), Anderson and May (1992), Grenfell 
and Dobson (1995), Daley and Gani (1999) and Hethcote (2000).  
 
2.2.2 Values of Modelling as a Decision Supporting Tool 
There are many reasons why modelling can be a useful tool to support the decision 
making of preventing and controlling infectious diseases. These values can be applied 
not only to infectious disease modelling in general, but also to the modelling of HAIs. 
The values of modelling these systems include the following aspects: 
 
Real experiments are not practical 
One main reason why models are built to study biological systems is that real 
experiments to study infectious diseases can be time-consuming, costly and even 
unethical to carry out (Peck 2004). This is particular true for the studies of rare 
infections and those studies that focus on the evaluation of intervention policies such 
as vaccine programme, screening programme and isolation. Modelling, under such 
circumstances, can be the economical or even the only option to conduct the research. 
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Disclosing the transmission dynamics 
One of the basic functions of the infectious disease models is to disclose the 
transmission dynamics of the disease under study (Koopman 2004). For example, an 
influenza model can reveal the number of people in a city who will catch the virus 
during the winter; a MRSA model can describe the changing numbers of colonised 
patients and the occupancy of the isolation rooms in the hospital through time. The 
transmission dynamics can be presented mathematically by analytical solutions or, 
increasingly, by diagrams based on numerical simulations. Some advanced simulation 
techniques, such as visual interactive interface and virtual reality, may help to 
communicate the transmission dynamics more effectively to the audience. 
 
Quantitative predictions and quantify the effectiveness of intervention policies 
Models can normally provide quantitative predictions about the spread of the 
infectious diseases such as the number of susceptible and colonised patients through 
time. If models have enough detail and are properly verified and validated, they can 
provide reasonably reliable predictions. The effectiveness of various interventions can 
also be quantified through systematic model experimentations, if the intervention 
polices can be embedded into the model and the observed data are available. Bonten 
et al. (2001) suggested that the use of a theoretical framework to conceptualise the 
underlying process of infection transmission and its subsequent modelling formulation 
may help the quantification of the transmission process and the effectiveness of 
infection control measures.  
 
Focus on key factors and relationships 
The modelling practice itself will force the researchers to focus on the most important 
factors and relationships that affect and define the transmission dynamics, and to 
ignore the less important ones. As Cooper (2007) argued that mathematical infection 
models simplify the system being studied to only the most essential characteristics 
and as a result can yield the most profound insights about the factors determining a 
system’s behaviour. 
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2.3 Previous Hospital-acquired Infection Models 
Although the modelling study of infectious disease has a long history, these early 
studies generally focused on community-based infections rather than HAIs. The 
theory developed based on community-based infections may not be directly applied to 
HAIs due to the distinctive natures of HAIs such as the rapid turnover of patients, the 
small patient population, the asymptomatic carriers and the endemicity in the hospital 
(see detailed discussion in Section 1.2.2). This section reviews the previous studies on 
HAI modelling. 
 
2.3.1 First Attempts 
 
Mathematical Compartmental Models 
The first modelling study on HAIs appears to be carried out by Massad et al. (1993) 
who investigated the evolution of antibiotic resistance in the hospital setting based on 
the classical SIR (susceptible-infected-removed) model which was previously used to 
study community-based infections. The model only considered the patient population 
which was divided into three compartments: susceptible, infected by antibiotic 
sensitive strain and infected by antibiotic resistant strain. A system of three ordinary 
differential equations, which describes the dynamics of the number of patients in each 
compartment, was evaluated deterministically by both analytical and numerical 
methods. Equilibrium analysis was performed to study which strain of the pathogen 
would dominate, and observed data from other studies were used to configure and 
validate the model. The authors admitted that the model is a very crude description of 
the real world and the weakest point of the model is the assumption of homogeneous 
mixing of patients and the resultant mass action assumption on the infection 
transmission. 
 
Sebille et al. (1997) described the outbreak of a nosocomial pathogen in a hospital 
ICU using a mathematical compartmental model. Not only patients, but also HCWs as 
intermediate human vectors (HCWs get transiently or permanently colonised from a 
patient and pass the pathogen to other patients) were explicitly represented in the 
model. Both patients and HCWs were divided into three compartments: uncolonised, 
colonised with sensitive strain and colonised with resistant strain. Two transmission 
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routes were explicitly modelled: patient-to-patient direct transmission and cross 
transmission between patients through HCWs. Compared to the previous study, 
although the model was also treated deterministically, the objectives of the model 
included the evaluation of some intervention policies such as hand-washing 
compliance among HCWs, antimicrobial policy and reducing the admissions of 
patients who are already colonised with the pathogen. The study suggested that 
modelling appears to be a valuable tool for the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
various intervention policies. 
 
Austin and Anderson (1999) proposed a series of mathematical models to study the 
emergence and spread of antibiotic resistance pathogens, such as MRSA and 
vancomycin resistant enterococci (VRE), on scales ranging from within the patient, in 
hospitals and within communities. The hospital-level model consisted of both patients 
and HCWs who were classified as either colonised or uncolonised. Transmission 
dynamics were also described by a system of four ordinary differential equations, 
each representing the change in the number of paitents/HCWs in one compartment. 
Notably, the model was not only treated deterministically, but also stochastically by 
both analytical method and numerical realization. The model was applied to the 
spread of VRE in an ICU, and the main objective of the model was to assess the 
relative merits of different intervention policies including hand-washing compliance, 
HCW-patient ratio, and single and multiple drug therapies for decolonisation. The 
model was not configured with observed data. 
 
In a separate paper of the same year, Austin et al. (1999) described in detail the 
application of a mathematical compartmental model on VRE in a hospital ICU setting. 
The model structure and features were similar to the aforementioned study of Austin 
and Anderson (1999), but the model was configured mainly with observed data from 
an American hospital and the model results were compared favourably with 
observation. The Monte Carlo technique was applied to simulate the stochastic 
process and multiple replications were performed to estimate the mean and confidence 
interval of model results; this has become the standard practice for subsequent studies 
when the model is treated stochastically. The model estimated that the basic 
reproduction number (i.e., the number of secondary transmissions cause by a typical 
primary case in a large population of susceptible patients) for VRE in the hospital was 
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approximately 3-4 without intervention and 0.7 when infection control measures were 
implemented.  
 
Almost in parallel, Cooper et al. (1999) proposed a similar mathematical 
compartmental model to study the transmission of hand-borne HAIs in the hospital 
unit setting. Like the one proposed by Austin et al. (1999), the model explicitly 
considered both patients and HCWs and classified them as either colonised or 
uncolonised. Stochastic simulation with multiple replications was carried out to 
measure the effectiveness of various intervention policies under different scenarios. 
The intervention policies and influencing factors considered in the model include the 
transmissibility of the pathogen, the probability of colonisation on admission, 
patients’ lengths of stay, hand-washing frequency and infection detection rate. Direct 
observed data were not applied to configure or validate the model. Among other 
findings, the study concluded that chance effects are likely to be the most important 
factor in determining the course of an outbreak in the hospital setting with a small 
patient population.  
 
Lipsitch et al. (2000) appears to switch back the focus to the problem of antibiotic 
resistance. Two mathematical compartmental models were built to identify effective 
intervention polices to control HAIs and to reduce the antibiotic resistance of the 
pathogens. HCWs were not explicitly considered in the model. One model divided the 
patient into three compartments: susceptible, infected with sensitive strain and 
infected with resistant strain. The other model further divided each compartment into 
two sub-compartments depending on patients’ antibiotic treatment history. The model 
was evaluated only deterministically. Several interesting and yet paradoxical 
conclusions were drawn from the model, e.g., the use of an antibiotic for which 
resistance is not yet present will be positively associated with the carriage of pathogen 
resistance to another antibiotic at the individual patient level, but negatively 
associated at the population level. The model was configured with data from other 
studies and the model predictions were compared with previously published data. 
 
Bonten et al. (2001) summarised and reviewed some of these early HAI modelling 
studies. The review suggested that the use of mathematical modelling to understand 
the transmission dynamics of HAIs in the hospital setting was still in its early stages 
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and concluded several potential benefits of the modelling study: (1) models can 
provide a theoretical basic for evaluating interventions to control the infection 
transmission and the development of antibiotic resistance, (2) models can suggest 
explanations of observations that have not been explained yet, (3) models can help 
illustrate the range of stochastic variation and chance effects, and (4) models can 
suggest standards for the evaluation of alternative intervention policies. 
 
Individual-based Models 
Among the early studies to model HAIs, there is only one study that adopted 
individual-based modelling technique rather than the prevailing mathematical 
compartmental models. Along with one study (Sebille et al. 1997) which applied 
mathematical compartment model to study the transmission of nosocomial pathogens 
in a hospital ICU, Sebille and Valleron (1997) also applied an individual-based model 
to study the same subject in another paper. Most notably, compared to mathematical 
compartmental models, the model allowed for the representation of every individual 
patient and HCW. The authors argued that the model offered a new approach to model 
the spread of nosocomial pathogens in a hospital unit. The Monte Carlo technique was 
used to evaluate the model stochastically and the model, which consists of seven 
modules, was written in the C language.  
 
Although the model adopted an individual-based modelling method, it did not fully 
use the potential of the different modelling paradigm and still had many restrictive 
assumptions associated with mathematical compartmental models. The model still 
assumed a constant number of patients and HCWs and 100% occupancy, and the 
length of stay was still assumed to follow an exponential distribution. The patients’ 
locations and movements were not represented in the model. Both patients and HCWs 
had limited behaviour rules and only a few attributes which were considered by 
previous mathematical models. Furthermore, no direct observed data were applied to 
configure or validate the model. Nevertheless, this study is valuable in the sense that it 
is the first attempt to apply individual-based models to study HAIs. 
 
Summary 
Even though the number of studies was limited, these early studies give a 
comprehensive picture of the modelling of HAIs: 
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• In terms of modelling methods, although one study applied an individual-
based model, most of these early studies adopted mathematical compartmental 
models which is still the dominant modelling method; 
• Models can be treated both deterministically and stochastically. From these 
early studies, a trend which favours stochastic treatment through the Monte 
Carlo technique can be spotted; 
• Regardless of individual-based or mathematical compartmental models, there 
are studies that do not explicitly represent HCWs while others do. The 
difference may affect the way the model is structured and the way the 
transmission of the pathogens is modelled; 
• The scope of the model can be a single hospital unit (normally an ICU), the 
whole hospital or the hospital together with its community; 
• The modelling exercise itself can be independent and separate from observed 
data, though studies do try to configure and validate the model using observed 
data when possible; and 
• Early studies tend to focus on the problem of antibiotic resistance, however, 
the objectives of the study have gradually shifted to the evaluation of various 
intervention policies aiming to prevent and control HAIs.  
 
2.3.2 Recent Developments 
 
Mathematical Compartmental Models 
Following the early studies, for a while, the focus of the HAI modelling study 
switched to the fitting of mathematical models to observed data to estimate the 
underlying transmission parameters. Grundmann et al. (2002) fitted a stochastic 
mathematical compartmental model to the MRSA observed data in a hospital adult 
ICU. The fitted model was then applied to evaluate the effectiveness of control 
policies of hand-washing, HCW-patient ratio and staff cohorting (i.e., grouping 
patients with a given infection in an isolated area and assigning dedicated staff). 
Pelupessy et al. (2002) also fitted a stochastic Markov model, which was based on 
previous mathematical compartmental models, to the observed data of two hospital 
pathogens, VRE and Pseudomonas aeruginosa, in a hospital ICU. The purpose of the 
model fitting was to evaluate the relative importance of two possible colonisation 
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routes: exogenous cross-transmission by HCWs and endogenous acquisition due to 
the use of antibiotics. Only patients, who were classified as either colonised or 
uncolonised, were explicitly represented in the model. Similarly, Cooper and Lipsitch 
(2004) applied a stochastic hidden Markov model to fit the observed data of three 
types of hospital pathogens: MRSA, VRE and Gram-negative rods. Key 
epidemiological parameters, such as the transmission rate and the endemic setting, 
were estimated by the model fitting process. The model classified patients as either 
colonised or uncolonised. Forrester et al. (2005) fitted a stochastic mathematical 
compartmental model to the observed data of MRSA in a hospital ICU. Like other 
model fitting studies, only patients were explicitly represented in the model. However, 
apart from colonised and uncolonised patients, isolation patients were also represented 
as a separate compartment in the model. The model assumed three sources of 
transmission: background contamination, non-isolated patients and isolated patients. 
The aim of the study was to quantify the transmission rates from these different 
sources. 
 
A mathematical compartmental model was proposed by Cooper et al. (2004) which 
not only considered the hospital, but also the corresponding community. Only patients 
were explicitly represented in the model. Apart from colonised, uncolonised and 
isolated patients in the hospital, people in the community were also grouped into four 
compartments depending on their colonisation status and re-admission rate to the 
hospital. The model was evaluated mainly through stochastic Monte Carlo simulation 
technique. MRSA was the hospital pathogen under study and, for the first time, the 
effectiveness of isolation as an intervention policy was investigated. Due to the 
inclusion of the hospital community, the study revealed that although local 
interventions may control the spread of the pathogens successfully within the hospital 
in the short-term, the fact that potentially colonised patients can accumulate in the 
community reservoir and re-admit to the hospital multiple times may lead to long-
term control failure. 
 
Raboud et al. (2005) applied the model proposed by Austin and Anderson (1999) to 
study the transmission of MRSA in a hospital general medical ward using very 
detailed observed data. The model was evaluated using the Monte Carlo method, and 
the effectiveness of various intervention policies was evaluated. Most noticeably, 
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screening test as an intervention policy was evaluated and the study found that 
screening patients on admission can reduce MRSA transmission.  
 
Bootsma et al. (2006) proposed what seems to be the most complicated mathematical 
compartmental model so far. The model comprised three hospitals and each hospital 
had 36 general wards and 5 ICUs. Both patients and HCWs were represented. Patients 
were classified as colonised, uncolonised or isolated, and a small proportion of 
colonised patients were further classified as “super-spreaders”. There were two types 
of HCWs: one type only interacts with patients in the same hospital unit, while 
another type interacts with patients in the whole hospital. Regardless of the type, 
HCWs were classified as colonised or uncolonised. The community of each hospital 
was also represented in the model. The three-hospital model was evaluated by the 
Monte Carlo simulation while a single hospital model was evaluated deterministically 
by analytical methods. The model was applied to quantify the effectiveness of MRSA 
intervention policies, in particular a rapid screening test. Other interventions evaluated 
by the model include isolation upon detection, pre-emptive isolation, screening for 
suspected HCWs, ward closure and decolonisation treatment. Many of these 
intervention policies such as pre-emptive isolation, screening for HCWs and ward 
closure were considered for the first time. Noticeably, patient movements within the 
hospital were captured in the model. Observed data were applied to configure the 
model when possible. The study suggested strong causality between the S&D strategy 
and low MRSA prevalence. 
 
Robotham et al. (2006) applied a stochastic mathematical compartmental model based 
on the one proposed by Cooper et al. (2004) to compare and investigate the impact of 
two screening strategies, random screening (i.e., screening patients randomly during 
their hospital stay) and admission screening, on controlling MRSA. Apart from the 
seven compartments in the original model, an additional compartment was included to 
represent patients who are detected as colonised with MRSA but unable to be isolated 
due to constrained isolation facilities. The model was configured with data from 
previous studies. The conclusion of the model was that screening strategies have a 
significant impact on controlling MRSA, and among the two screening strategies 
considered, random screening is more efficient than on admission screening.  
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Boldin et al. (2007) built a mathematical compartmental model to evaluate the relative 
effects of barrier precautions and topical antibiotic treatments on HAIs in the hospital 
ICU setting. HCWs were not represented in the model. The model considered both 
exogenous cross-transmission and endogenous within-host transmission between 
different parts of the body sites, including skin, gut and lungs, due to selective 
pressure. Therefore, besides uncolonised compartment, colonised patients were 
further divided into seven compartments depending on which part(s) of their body 
were colonised. No particular hospital pathogen was considered and no observed data 
were used to configure the model. The study suggested that routine use of topical 
antibiotics for infection control is not effective and should not be practiced. 
 
The latest modelling study was conducted by McBryde et al. (2007). The authors 
applied a mathematical compartmental model not only to estimate the transmission 
rate of MRSA in a hospital ICU using observed data, but also to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various intervention interventions including hand-washing, 
decolonisation, HCW-patient ratio and cohorting. The model was based on many 
previous studies which explicitly represented patients and HCWs. A Bayesian 
framework, which allows the incorporation of unseen events such as the timing of 
actual MRSA transmission, was adopted to help quantify the transmission rate. The 
study concluded that, for the specific case study, MRSA was only sustained through 
the admission of new colonised patients since the ward reproduction number was 
below unity.  
 
Individual-based Models 
Probably the first modelling study applying individual-based model on HAIs was 
done by Sebille and Valleron (1997), and it is only about a decade later Hotchkiss et 
al. (2005) adopted the method again. They developed a spatially explicit discrete 
element model to study the transmission dynamics of HAIs in the hospital ICU setting. 
Each individual patient and HCW was represented in the model, and as a significant 
improvement compared to the previous individual-based model, each patient also had 
his/her own explicit location which was represented as a node of a two-dimensional 
lattice.  
 
Modelling Hospital-acquired Infections 
 
 27
However, like the previous study, the model did not make full use of the potential 
advantages that the individual-based approach provides and still has many of the 
restrictive assumptions of the mathematical compartmental model. For example, 
although patients had their explicit locations, they still could not move within the 
hospital unit. The number of patients and HCWs were still constant and the ward 
occupancy was assumed to be always 100%. Each patient and HCW had very limited 
attributes and no behaviour rules were defined for the patients. The model was built 
based on a hypothetical ICU and therefore no observed data were applied. Some 
intervention polices were evaluated with the focus on HCW visiting and allocation 
rules which are difficult to be represented in mathematical models. The model was 
only run for a week which made it difficult to study long-term transmission dynamics. 
 
Summary 
Table 2.1 summaries previous literature on modelling HAIs. By reviewing all the 
literature, especially recent studies discussed in this section, some trends of HAI 
modelling are identified: 
• The mathematical compartmental model is still the dominant method for 
modelling HAIs. There are different types of mathematical compartmental 
models. The classic ones, such as those proposed by Sebille et al. (1997) and 
Austin et al. (1999), normally classify patients and HCWs only as colonised or 
uncolonised. Recent studies have introduced more compartments which 
represent patients under isolation, patients in the community (Cooper et al. 
2004), patients who are “super-spreaders”, HCWs who serve patients in a 
single hospital unit and in the whole hospital (Bootsma et al. 2006) and 
patients colonised in different body site(s) (Boldin et al. 2007). Mathematical 
compartmental models were also evaluated in the form of Markov process 
which helps to fit the model to observed data to estimate key model 
parameters such as transmission rate (Pelupessy et al. 2002; Cooper and 
Lipsitch 2004). There are also advances in individual-based models, for 
example, individual patients can have their own spatial locations (Hotchkiss et 
al. 2005); 
• For mathematical compartmental models, there seems to be no preference for 
explicitly representing HCWs in the model or otherwise. The choice depends 
Modelling Hospital-acquired Infections 
 
 28
more on the assumptions made about the model and the availability of data. 
For the two identified individual-based models, it appears that modellers 
prefer to explicitly represent both HCWs and patients; 
• Most modellers have developed stochastic models to accommodate the chance 
effects and randomness associated with the small patient population in the 
hospital setting; 
• In terms of model scope, the trend appears to be that either the model focuses 
on a single hospital unit, normally an ICU, in more detail; or, if the model 
focuses on the whole hospital, the corresponding community is also modelled 
to represent the wider feedback mechanics (i.e., discharged colonised patients 
from the hospital gradually build up in the community reservoir and can be re-
admitted to the hospital); 
• Regarding model objectives, the focus of the model seems to be switched from 
competition between sensitive and resistant strains of the pathogen in the early 
days, to the fitting of the model with observed data to estimate the 
transmission rate, and then to the evaluation of the effectiveness of various 
intervention policies. There is also a clear trend that more studies are focusing 
on MRSA; and 
• More studies seem to use observed data for both model configuration and 
validation. 
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Table 2.1 Summary of previous modelling studies on hospital-acquired infections 
Author(s) 
(Year) 
Modelling 
method 
HCWs 
included?
Deterministic/
stochastic 
Model 
scope 
Infectious diseases 
under study 
Observed data Intervention policies 
evaluated 
Massad et al. 
1993 
MCM (3) No Deterministic Hospital Sensitive and 
resistant strains of 
a pathogen 
Observed data from 
other studies are used to 
configure and validate 
the model 
No 
Sebille et al. 
1997 
MCM (6) Yes Deterministic Hospital 
ICU 
Antibiotic-resistant 
pathogens like 
MRSA 
No observed data Yes (hand-washing, 
antibiotic policy and 
endemic setting) 
Sebille and 
Valleron 
1997 
IBM Yes Stochastic Hospital 
ICU 
Antibiotic-resistant 
pathogens 
No observed data Yes (hand-washing) 
Austin and 
Anderson 
1999 
MCM (4) Yes Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Patient/Hos
pital/Hospit
al & 
Community
Antibiotic-resistant 
pathogens like 
MRSA and VRE 
No observed data Yes (hand-washing, HCW-
patient ratio, and single and 
multiple drug treatment) 
Austin et al. 
1999 
MCM (4) Yes Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
ICU 
VRE Observed data are used 
to configure and 
validate the model 
Yes (hand-washing, 
cohorting and antibiotic 
treatment) 
Cooper et al. 
1999 
MCM (4) Yes Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
unit 
Hand-bore 
pathogens like 
MRSA 
No observed data Yes (transmissibility, 
endemic setting, length of 
stay, hand-washing and 
detection) 
Lipsitch et 
al. 2000 
MCM 
(3,6) 
No Deterministic Hospital Antibiotic-resistant 
pathogens 
No observed data Yes (antibiotic policy) 
Grundmann 
et al. 2002 
MCM (4) Yes Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
adult ICU 
MRSA Model is fitted to 
observed data 
Yes (hand-washing, HCW-
patient ratio and cohorting) 
Pelupessy et 
al. 2002 
MCM (2) 
(Markov 
No Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
ICU 
VRE and 
Pseudomonas 
Model is fitted to 
observed data 
No 
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process) aeruginosa 
Cooper and 
Lipsitch 
2004 
MCM (2) 
(Markov 
process) 
No Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
unit 
MRSA, VRE and 
Gram-negative 
rods 
Model is fitted to 
observed data from 
other literature 
No 
Cooper et al. 
2004 
MCM (7) No Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
and its 
community 
MRSA Observed data are used 
to partially configure the 
model 
Yes (isolation) 
Forrester et 
al. 2005 
MCM (4)  No Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
ICU 
MRSA Model is fitted to 
observed data 
No 
Hotchkiss et 
al. 2005 
IBM Yes Stochastic Hospital 
ICU 
Hospital pathogens No observed data Yes (transmissibility, hand-
washing, cohorting and 
HCW allocation rules) 
Raboud et al. 
2005 
MCM (4) Yes Stochastic Hospital 
unit 
MRSA Observed data are used 
to configure the model 
Yes (screening, staff 
workload and hand-
washing) 
Bootsma et 
al. 2006 
MCM Yes Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital, 
and its 
community 
MRSA Observed data are used 
to configure the model 
Yes (isolation, pre-emptive 
isolation, screening, 
screening for HCWs, ward 
closure and decolonisation) 
Robotham et 
al. 2006 
MCM (8) No Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
and its 
community 
MRSA No observed data Yes (random and 
admission screening) 
Boldin et al. 
2007 
MCM (8)  No Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
ICU 
Hospital pathogens No observed data Yes (barrier precautions 
and antibiotic treatment) 
McBryde et 
al. 2007 
MCM (4) Yes Deterministic/
Stochastic 
Hospital 
ICU 
MRSA Observed data are used 
to configure the model 
Yes (hand-washing, 
decolonisation, HCW-
patient ratio and cohorting) 
Remark: MCM (x) – Mathematical compartmental model (number of compartments); IBM – Individual-based model. 
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2.3.3 Conclusions 
Compared to aggregate level mathematical compartmental models, there is clearly a 
lack of individual-based models to study HAIs. For the few available individual-based 
models, the literature review shows that they have not fully explored the benefits that 
individual models may provide (e.g., locations and movements of patients, complex 
interactions among patients) and still retain most of the restrictive assumptions 
associated with compartmental models, such as exponentially distributed lengths of 
stay, and constant and full ward occupancy. These assumptions can be relaxed by 
individual-based models and they are important to transmission dynamics of HAIs. 
 
A range of intervention policies have been evaluated by existing modelling studies. 
For example, the policies of isolation and hand-washing have been extensively 
studied by many models. However, to combat HAIs such as MRSA, health authorities 
around the world (e.g., NHS in the UK) are adopting more aggressive intervention 
policies such as compulsory admission screening. Many clinical trials have been 
conducted in recent years to evaluate the effectiveness of admission and repeat 
screening, and rapid tests of MRSA (Harbarth et al. 2006; Cunningham et al. 2007; 
Hardy et al. 2007). Various decolonisation treatments have also been studied 
(Harbarth et al. 1999; Macfarlane 2007). Compared to traditional intervention policies, 
these rather novel intervention policies have not been fully represented and 
systematically evaluated by existing modelling studies. 
 
In general, there is also a lack of validation of existing HAI models before they are 
applied to test different policies or make quantitative predictions. There is also 
potential to improve the experimental design methods adopted by previous modelling 
studies so that the effectiveness and robustness of intervention policies can be 
systematically evaluated. The thesis will try to fill in the gaps identified by the 
literature review and attempts to make a significant contribution to the subject. 
 
 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has made necessary preparations for the rest of the thesis by providing a 
comprehensive literature review of existing HAIs models. The review suggested that 
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there is a lack of studies using individual-based models to study HAIs, especially if 
the model can relax some of the restrictive assumptions associated with aggregate-
level models such as exponentially distributed lengths of stay and full ward 
occupancy. It is also worthwhile to embed new HAI prevention policies and 
technologies, such as rapid screening test and decolonisation treatment, in the model 
and to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of these interventions using formal 
experimental design methods. The overall objectives and research questions of the 
thesis will be derived from the findings and discussions in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The overall research objectives and questions of the thesis are derived based on 
previous chapters. The main purpose of the chapter is to explore the methodological 
issues of addressing these identified research questions. The key questions include the 
justification of ABS as a useful technique to the modelling and management of HAIs, 
the framework for applying ABS to the modelling of HAIs and the building of a 
MRSA model based on an empirical study, and the evaluation of intervention policies 
using the MRSA model.  
 
 
3.2 Research Objectives and Questions 
Chapter 1 and 2 have identified the gaps in previous studies and the key motivations 
of this thesis. HAIs are a major threat to patients in the hospital and have placed a 
heavy burden on public health authorities around the world. Various intervention 
polices are available to prevent and control HAIs and these policies have been 
investigated by clinical research and some of them have been evaluated by modelling 
studies. However, there are still many problem areas facing the management of HAIs, 
especially the evaluation of new technologies and intervention polices developed to 
control the spread of infections.  
 
It has been demonstrated in literature review that no well-developed ABS models 
have been built to study HAIs. The introduction of ABS and its application to the 
modelling of infectious diseases indicates that ABS, as an individual-based and 
bottom-up modelling approach, may have a number of advantages to the modelling of 
HAIs. 
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The empirical MRSA case study in the Birmingham Heartland Hospital provides 
valuable source of observed data which can be used for both model configuration and 
validation. Due to the empirical elements of the model, the model experimentation 
results may be more dependable to advise real world management policies to combat 
MRSA, especially if reasonable level of confidence can be placed on the model 
through the model validation process. In particular, the effectiveness and robustness 
of various intervention policies determined by the model may be of great value to the 
management of HAIs. 
 
Despite of the MRSA empirical study, the thesis aims to provide a general framework 
for applying ABS to study of HAIs. The methodology and the proposed framework 
will not only guide the building of the empirical MRSA model, but also can be 
potentially applied to any types of HAIs (e.g., C. difficile).  
 
The specific research objectives and questions that this thesis aims to answer are 
identified next (in Section 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 respectively). 
 
3.2.1 Research Objectives 
1. Agent-based simulation as a decision supporting tool to the modelling and 
management of hospital-acquired infections 
To investigate the feasibility and value of using agent-based simulation to provide a 
flexible and robust modelling approach to the support of modelling and management 
of hospital-acquired infections. 
 
2. Application of agent-based simulation to the modelling and management of 
hospital-acquired infections 
To provide a general framework of applying agent-based simulation to the modelling 
and management of hospital-acquired infections. 
 
To test and validate the use of agent-based simulation model on a MRSA study. 
 
3. MRSA infection control in the hospital 
Methodology 
 
 35
To quantify the effectiveness and test the robustness of various MRSA intervention 
policies and summarise the indications to the management of MRSA in the hospital 
setting. 
 
3.2.2 Research Questions 
1. Agent-based simulation as a decision supporting tool to the modelling and 
management of hospital-acquired infections 
Whether, why, and when agent-based simulation is a useful technique to the 
modelling and management of hospital-acquired infections?  
 
2. Application of agent-based simulation to the modelling and management of 
hospital-acquired infections 
How agent-based simulation can be applied as a general framework to the modelling 
and management of hospital-acquired infections? 
 
How agent-based simulation can be applied to model a MRSA study and be properly 
validated? 
 
3. MRSA infection control in the hospital 
How to quantify the effectiveness of various MRSA intervention polices and how 
robust are these intervention polices considering various influencing factors? What 
are the indications to the management of MRSA in hospital setting? 
 
 
3.3 Potential Methods for Modelling Healthcare-acquired Infections 
In this section, a taxonomy of potential methods to model HAIs will be proposed. The 
modelling techniques considered not only include those that have already been 
applied, but also those that have not (e.g., ABS, DES and SD). The taxonomy will 
provide a basis to compare the advantages and disadvantages of ABS relative to other 
methods regarding HAI modelling (see Section 3.4). 
 
Brennan et al. (2006) evaluated and classified a range of modelling and simulation 
approaches in the context of health economics and disease modelling. In the 
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taxonomy, they created a matrix and broadly classified all models as cohort/aggregate 
level models and individual level models from the horizontal direction, and models 
where no interaction is allowed and models where interaction is allowed from the 
vertical direction. Cohort/aggregate models do not represent individual patients 
explicitly and only consider patients in homogenously mixing groups/cohorts. 
Individual-based models, on the other hand, explicitly represent each heterogeneous 
individual patient. Regarding time, models were also classified as either untimed or 
timed which can be further labelled as either discrete or continuous time. The 
framework is used to assist the discussion of potential methods for modelling HAIs. 
 
In order to describe the transmission dynamics of HAIs, the modelling methods need 
to meet two fundamental requirements. Firstly, time, either continuous or discrete, 
needs to be reflected by the modelling method. Secondly, the method needs to have 
the ability to represent interactions, either among patients or HCWs themselves or 
between patients and HCWs. As a result, the potential methods to model HAIs can be 
narrowed down to the timed models where interaction is allowed (see Figure 3.1). The 
literature review in Section 2.3 shows that most existing models are mathematical 
compartmental models, which belong to cohort/aggregate models, while few are 
individual-based models. This dichotomy will guide the following discussions. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Potential methods for modelling hospital-acquired infections 
 
3.3.1 Cohort/aggregate Models 
 
Mathematical Compartmental Models and Markov Models 
Most existing HAI models are cohort/aggregate models in the form of mathematical 
compartmental models or the corresponding Markov models. In compartmental 
models, patients and HCWs are divided into different groups or compartments, 
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normally regarding their colonisation status (e.g., colonised, susceptible) and other 
risk factors (e.g., isolated). People in each compartment have no identity and are 
assumed to be homogenous, and the model only considers the total number of 
individuals in each compartment. Mathematical equations based on epidemiological 
and biological rules are used to govern the flow rate between compartments. For 
example, according to the mass action assumption, the rate of new secondary cases 
(i.e., the number of individuals flow from susceptible to colonised compartment) is 
proportional to the product of the number of susceptible and colonised patients. These 
mathematical equations determine the dynamics of the model and the number of 
individuals in each compartment through time, and collectively they can be described 
as a system of ordinary differential equations.  
 
The compartmental models can be evaluated deterministically by finding analytical 
solutions from the ordinary differential equations or the steady state of the 
corresponding Markov model. When models are too complex to be mathematically 
tractable, they can be treated deterministically by numerical methods. Increasingly, 
the compartmental models are evaluated stochastically, either by analytical techniques 
for simple stochastic processes or, in most cases, by numerical simulation applying 
the Monte Carlo technique, i.e., the application of random numbers. Table 3.1 
summarises the potential HAIs modelling methods belong to cohort/aggregate models. 
 
System Dynamics 
SD is a simulation method which has been widely used in the business and 
management domain (Forrester 1958; Sterman 2000). Mathematically, SD may be 
represented as a set of differential equations. SD models seldom have analytical 
solutions and are always evaluated numerically through simulation. Classical 
epidemiological models, such as susceptible-infected-removed (SIR) model, can be 
easily represented and solved as SD models (Murray 2002). SD also has been used to 
study the complex transmission dynamics and the cost-effectiveness of interventions 
of community-based infections such as Chlamydia which is a type of sexually 
transmission infection (Evenden et al. 2005; Brailsford 2007). However, it seems that 
SD has never been applied to model the transmission of HAIs. A possible reason is 
that SD models are normally evaluated deterministically which may not be 
appropriate to model a small patient population in the hospital setting. 
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In a SD infection transmission model, homogeneous individuals are grouped together 
and represented as levels/stocks (which correspond to compartments in mathematical 
models); and infection transmission or recovery is represented as the transition or 
flow to and from different levels/stocks. 
 
3.3.2 Individual-based Model 
There are some common properties for individual-based models which may be 
applied to study HAIs. These shared properties include: 
• The capability of representing both time and interactions; 
• Patients and HCWs are explicitly represented as heterogeneous individuals; 
• Individual patient or HCW has multiple attributes and states and the change of 
state from one to another is stochastic or probabilistic in nature; and 
• Models are normally evaluated stochastically by numerical simulation using 
the Monte Carlo technique, and multiple replications are performed to estimate 
the mean model outputs. 
 
A further breakdown of the types of individual-based models can be troublesome 
since different definitions and interpretations may exist for agent-based 
modelling/simulation (see Section 1.3.1), DES and individual-based models. For 
example, in one paper, agent-based models were considered the same as discrete 
element models (Hotchkiss et al. 2005) which, in essence, represent general 
individual-based models. In another paper, the authors classified their model as 
individual-based modelling without further clarification of the type of individual-
based models (Sebille and Valleron 1997). Also, most modellers seem to use ABS and 
agent-based modelling, and individual-based simulation and individual-based 
modelling interchangeably.  
 
Discrete-event Simulation 
DES concerns the modelling of a system as it evolves over time by a representation in 
which the state variables change instantaneously at separate points of time (Law 
2007). DES, as its name suggests, maintains a future event list and have the capability 
of event scheduling. Two principal approaches have been suggested for advancing the 
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simulation through time: next-event time advance (event-driven) and fixed-increment 
time advance (time-slicing). For next-event time advance, the simulation is always 
advanced to the time of the most imminent event in the future event lists, then the 
state of the system and the future event lists are updated. For fixed-increment time 
advance approach, simulation clock is advanced in increments of exactly ∆t time units 
and a check is made to determine if any events should have occurred during the 
previous interval of length ∆t.  
 
Conventionally, DES is normally applied to systems that can be regarded as a queuing 
system where entities go through the system consists of multiple activities, being 
served at each activity by scarce resources, and need to wait in a queue between each 
activity if necessary. Typical queuing systems include production line, airport, banks, 
restaurants, call centres, accident and emergency departments of hospitals and etc. In 
HAI modelling, patients may correspond to entities in DES and the disease 
development may be represented as discrete activities with unconstrained resources 
(e.g., there is no queue between each activity). The heterogeneity nature of individual 
patient can be represented by various attributes associated with each entity. The 
different values of these attributes may affect the way a patient entity passes through 
the disease development stages. 
 
DES has been applied to study community-based infections. For example, McKenzie 
et al. (1998) applied DES to study the transmission of malaria. The development of 
the parasite in both hosts (i.e., humans) and vectors (i.e., female mosquitoes) and the 
interactions between hosts and vectors were represented in the model. Allore et al. 
(1998) used DES to study the effectiveness of mastitis control in dairy herds (i.e., 
cows). Part of the model was to represent the infection transmission among the cow 
population using DES. Cohen et al. (2000) proposed a DES model to represent the 
transmission of feline herpes virus within the cat population. Each individual cat was 
associated with a range of attributes that may affect the transmission. The social and 
spatial structure of the cat population was also described by the model. Rauner et al. 
(2005) applied DES to evaluate and compare two alternative strategies for the 
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV in developing countries. DES was 
chosen over decision tree models and SD models as each mother-baby pair can be 
tracked and individual variability can be represented. However, it appears that DES 
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has not been applied to study transmission dynamics in the hospital setting (see 
Section 2.3). 
 
Classification of Individual-based Models 
An attempt is made to breakdown the types of individual-based modelling methods 
from the perspective of ABS (see Figure 3.2). In this classification, ABS has both a 
broader sense and a narrow sense. In the broader sense, ABS is the same as 
individual-based models as long as the model meets the aforementioned shared 
properties. On the other hand, ABS in the narrow sense refers to what is generally 
known as ABS where a bottom-up, rather than top-down, modelling approach is 
adopted and agents have rather complex behaviour rules (see Section 1.3). The term 
ABS will only refer to its narrow sense hereafter. 
 
Any individual-based models that can not be classified as ABS (in the narrow sense) 
or DES will be labelled as general individual-based models. The general individual-
based models are not event-driven, otherwise they may be classified as DES. The 
individuals in these models do not have complex behaviour rules and models are not 
built around individuals using a bottom-up modelling approach, otherwise they can be 
classified as ABS.  
 
In the broader sense, individual-based models share common features among 
themselves. Firstly, they all have the aforementioned common properties. Then, ABS 
and DES share some characteristics such as they can both incorporate event-
scheduling capability, and both modelling methods have established methodology and 
standard computer packages. ABS and general individual-based models may share 
features such as a time-slicing mechanism. Finally, DES and general individual-based 
models may share the properties of being a top-down modelling approach.  
 
Each type of the individual-based modelling method has its own distinctive features. 
In ABS, the model is built around agents who, apart from multiple attributes and 
states, may have complex behaviour rules and can be proactive, adaptive and 
intelligent. Moreover, unlike other individual-based modelling methods, ABS adopts 
a bottom-up modelling approach from the perspective of the locally defined agents. In 
DES, individuals are represented as entities which are only one of the many elements 
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of the model and normally pass through a predefined queuing system consists of 
queues and workstations. Entities in DES can have multiple attributes but normally 
only have limited rules. For general individual-based models, there is no established 
methodology or standard computer packages; instead, models are normally developed 
in general-purpose languages in which passive individuals change their states 
according to pre-defined rules. The relationships among different types of individual-
based models are shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Relationships of different individual-based modelling methods 
 
Individual-based models are normally only treated stochastically by numerical 
simulation through the Monte Carlo technique. It is possible to evaluate individual-
based models deterministically in theory (i.e., simulation with no random numbers), 
but such practice is seldom performed as it has limited practical values. DES and ABS 
both have standard techniques and computer packages to aid model developments and 
experimentations. Table 3.1 summarises the potential methods, both cohort/aggregate 
level and individual level models, for modelling HAIs. 
Table 3.1 Summary of methods for modelling hospital-acquired infections 
Cohort/aggregate level model Individual level model  
Mathematical compartmental General DES ABS 
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 model (Markov model) / SD individual-based 
model 
Anal
ytical 
Solving system of ordinary 
differential equations or finding 
stead state for Markov model. 
Not applicable. Deter
minis
tic 
Num
erical 
Simulating differential equations 
or Markov model with no 
random number (system 
dynamics). 
Possible in theory, but with limited 
practical values. 
Anal
ytical 
Analytical solution for stochastic 
Markov process. 
Not applicable. Stoch
astic 
Num
erical 
Simulating Markov process 
using the Monte Carlo 
technique. 
Simulation using 
the Monte Carlo 
technique. 
Standard simulation 
techniques and 
packages. 
 
According to this classification, previous individual-based models (Sebille and 
Valleron 1997; Hotchkiss et al. 2005) should be labelled as general individual-based 
models. These models have passive individual patients and HCWs who change their 
states according to pre-defined rules through time. They are not ABS models in the 
narrow sense since (1) they have not adopted a bottom-up modelling approach from 
the patient’s and HCW’s perspective, (2) individuals have no complex behaviour rules, 
and (3) they have not followed an established methodology which exists for ABS. At 
the same time, they are also not DES since both models have no event-scheduling 
capability. 
 
 
3.4 Comparison between Agent-based Simulation and other 
Modelling Methods 
The comparison between ABS and other modelling methods will be performed under 
the taxonomy proposed in the previous section. 
 
3.4.1 Comparison between Individual-based Models and Cohort/Aggregate 
Models 
Under the proposed taxonomy, cohort/aggregate level models include discrete and 
continuous Markov models, mathematical compartmental models and SD, either 
evaluated deterministically or stochastically. The following comparison between 
individual-based and cohort/aggregate models also applies to the comparison between 
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ABS and cohort/aggregate models, as ABS is one type of individual-based models. 
The comparison between ABS and other types of individual-based models will be 
discussed in detail in Section 3.4.2.  
 
Relative Advantages of Individual-based Models  
Flexibility to represent patient’s attributes, risk factors and states 
In individual-based models, each patient can be easily associated with a number of 
attributes and risk factors (e.g., age, sex, length of stay, type of disease, the number of 
wounds) that may affect the transmission of the HAI under study. Each individual 
patient and HCW can also have a number of states (e.g., colonised and susceptible). 
The change of state and the way a patient’s attributes and risk factors affect 
transmission are modelled on an individual basis. Cohort/aggregate models normally 
can only handle a limited number of risk factors and states by dividing patients into 
different groups. As the number of risk factors and states increase, the required 
number of compartments may increase exponentially and soon become intractable. 
This problem of cohort/aggregate models is referred to by many authors as the “curse 
of dimensionality” (see for example Brennan et al. 2006). 
 
The ability to represent spatial location and individual movement 
One advantage of individual-based model is its ability to easily represent spatial 
location and the movements of patients and HCWs which has been demonstrated in 
the work of Hotchkiss et al. (2005). The location may be represented as a patient state 
and the movement is effectively the change of the state. In cohort/aggregate models, it 
may be troublesome to represent these features due to the “curse of dimensionality”. 
 
Less restrictive assumptions to suit underlying mathematics 
Individual-based models, compared to cohort/aggregate level models, have less 
restrictive assumptions to meet the requirements of underlying mathematics. For 
example, in individual-based models, patients can be admitted and discharged 
following their own paths and consequently the total number of patients in the system 
and the ward occupancy may vary over time. On the other hand, most 
cohort/aggregate models assume a fixed patient population and a constant 100% ward 
occupancy.  
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Individual-based models can apply any types of parametric or empirical distributions 
to represent the length of stay while cohort/aggregate models need to assume 
exponentially-distributed length of stay. Such an assumption may be unrealistic since 
a large number of very short stays are expected which may not match the reality. 
Hospital length of stay has not been found to fit any simple parametric distribution, 
often because of a long tail of long stay patients. 
 
Ability to represent sufficient detail and complexity 
Cooper (2007) recognised that there will be an increase use of HAIs models as 
precision tools for probing the fine structure of detailed data sets. Individual-based 
models have much greater ability to represent detailed structure and incorporate 
complexity. For example, complex intervention policies, such as HCW allocation 
rules (Hotchkiss et al. 2005), admission coupled with repeat screening tests and 
decolonisation treatments, can be easily embedded in individual-based models. In 
contrast, one of the major difficulties with cohort/aggregate models is the rapid 
growth of mathematical complexity of the systems used to describe the various 
aspects of phenomena in sufficient detail (Bagni et al. 2002).  
 
Reliable to make quantitative predictions 
Compared to cohort/aggregate level models, since individual-based models are 
generally more representative of the real-world situation and have less restrictive 
assumptions, they are expected to be more reliable to make quantitative predictions. 
Cooper et al. (2007) suggested that most of the cohort/aggregate models use simple 
models that have permitted qualitative but not reliable quantitative predictions about 
the likely effect of different interventions. 
 
Transparency and easily understood 
Individual-based models can be more transparent and easier to understand than 
cohort/aggregate models, especially for people who do not have much mathematical 
background. Individual-based models normally do not have complex mathematical 
equations and expressions. Instead, the model structure and assumptions are described 
by narrative texts and diagrams, and the model dynamics are described through 
algorithms and rules which are similar to human language. Specific individual-based 
model types, such as ABS and DES, have their own tools (e.g., visual animation, flow 
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diagrams and state-charts) to aid the communication of the model with the audience. 
For cohort/aggregate models, the mathematical expressions and manipulations of 
these expressions to analyse the model, while may be easily understood and deemed 
rigorous and elegant, may be prohibitive to many people interested in HAI modelling 
study but with less mathematical background. 
 
The ability to collect individual-level statistics 
Since patients are individually represented and (potentially) tracked in individual-
based models, it is possible to collect individual-level statistics and extract episode 
history of a specific patient, especially those who acquire colonisation during the 
hospital stay. Such individual-level statistics (e.g., the time of colonisation, the time of 
recovery and the associated risk factors) and episode information, which are not 
possible to obtain from cohort/aggregate models, can provide valuable information to 
study the detailed transmission dynamics of HAIs. 
 
Relative Disadvantages of individual-based Models 
Compared to cohort/aggregate models, there are also some relative disadvantages of 
individual-based models.  
 
No rigorous mathematical expressions and loss of analytical power 
Individual-based models normally do not have formal and rigorous mathematical 
expressions for model description and analysis. Therefore, it may not be possible to 
obtain analytical solutions from individual-based models. On the other hand, 
cohort/aggregate models may be written as a system of ordinary differential equations, 
in the form of Markov processes or by other mathematical expressions, and rigorous 
and precise solutions may be found for some simple cohort/aggregate models. 
 
Less parsimonious and data demanding 
While it is easy to incorporate heterogeneity and complexity into individual-based 
models, they can, for the same reason, be less parsimonious than cohort/aggregate 
models which normally only concentrate on a few important factors and relationships. 
Due to the same reason, individual-based models may need more data for model 
configuration and validation than cohort/aggregate models.  
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More time for model coding and verification 
One indispensable step for developing individual-based models is to code and verify 
the model in a computer, which involves correctly transferring the conceptual model 
to a computer and making sure it works properly as expected. For complex models, 
these steps may take considerable time and effort. For cohort/aggregate models, 
model coding and verification are not necessary if the models are only evaluated 
deterministically via analytical methods. Many user-friendly off-the-shelf computer 
packages exist (e.g., Simu8® and Anylogic®) for certain type of individual-based 
models such as DES and ABS. Therefore, the time required to code and verify the 
model can be significantly reduced if the modeller is familiar with these packages. 
 
Relative slow running speed 
When models are evaluated numerically by computer simulation, individual-based 
models normally have a slower running speed compared to cohort/aggregate models 
since each individual needs to be explicitly represented, tracked and updated, and 
multiple replications are needed to estimate the mean model responses. The 
computing effort increases with the increasing number of individuals and the 
complexity of the model structure. The speed is normally not a problem since there 
are only a limited number of patients and HCWs in the hospital setting. However, if 
the community is to be included in individual-based models, the issue of running 
speed may become a problem. The rapid development of computer hardware and the 
technology of distributed computing may partially solve the problem. For example, 
Parker (2007) developed a framework for large-scale, distributed agent-based 
epidemic model which is capable of easily simulating millions of agents. Another way 
to tackle the problem is to combine the two modelling paradigms by representing the 
community using the cohort/aggregate model while retaining the individual-based 
model to represent the patients and HCWs. 
 
 
3.4.2 Comparison between Agent-based Simulation and Discrete-event 
Simulation 
Both ABS and DES have been applied to study community-based infection 
transmissions but not transmission dynamics in the hospital setting (see Section 1.3.4 
and Section 3.3.2). However, according to the proposed taxonomy, they are both 
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potential methods of modelling HAIs (see Section 3.3.2). ABS and DES are similar 
simulation techniques in many ways. For example, they both model individuals who 
change states over time. Individuals in both types of models may have attributes and 
states, and the individual characteristics will affect the state change of that particular 
entity (in DES) or agent (in ABS). Event-driven time advance mechanisms may be 
applied to both techniques. Despite the similarities, ABS and DES are two simulation 
methods which have many different features and these differences may affect their 
suitability and ability to model certain systems. There has been no systematic study to 
compare the two simulation techniques in the context of HAI modelling. In this 
section, the differences between the two simulation methods and the advantages and 
disadvantages of ABS relative to DES are discussed in this context. 
 
Differences between Agent-based Simulation and Discrete-event Simulation 
ABS and DES have different origins and for a long time they have been studied in 
different disciplines. ABS is traditionally associated with artificial intelligence and 
complex adaptive systems (North and Macal 2007) while DES is traditionally 
associated with operational research. It is only until recently that ABS is gradually 
assimilated by the operational research discipline. From the perspective of DES, many 
ABS models maintain a future events list and have the capability of event scheduling. 
From the perspective of ABS, many DES models, especially those involve humans 
and interactions, look similar to ABS models where agents are not fully developed 
and have limited behaviour rules. In order to compare the two simulation methods in 
the context of HAI modelling, the differences between the two techniques are 
discussed first. 
 
Modelling approach and the role of entity/agent 
ABS adopts a bottom-up modelling approach from the agent’s point of view and the 
agent is the single most important element of the model. DES adopts a top-down 
modelling approach from the overall system’s point of view and the entity is only one 
of the many essential elements of the model.  
 
Entity/Agent representation and dynamics 
Apart from attributes, agents in ABS can have complex states and adaptive behaviour 
rules. Agents may change the states reactively or proactively. Agents’ actual 
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development and movement routes may be unpredictable and broadly defined by 
boundaries or rules. In DES, simple attributes, numerical, text or logical, are attached 
to entities. Entities normally change their states only passively and pass through the 
pre-defined system structure. 
 
Traceability and control of entity/agent 
In ABS, the agent is the core of the model and normally it is easy to trace a particular 
agent at any time during the simulation. Consequently, the control of an agent is direct 
and can be carried out at any time. While in DES, it may not be easy to trace an 
individual entity once it enters the system. Therefore, the control of an entity is 
indirect and is normally performed only when an event happens to the entity (e.g., 
enter or leave a queue/activity).  
 
Events generation 
Since the agent is the core of ABS and it is easily traceable and directly controllable, 
events in ABS can be generated by agents themselves and naturally associated with 
any specific agent. In DES, events are normally generated by and associated with 
other model elements (e.g., queues and activities) which constitute the model structure. 
As a result, it is difficult to associate events with a specific entity. 
 
Handling of a number of concurrent state changes 
In ABS, the model is built around agents and the focus of the model is to describe 
agents’ behaviour rules that change their states. Agents can be effectively and 
efficiently involved in a number of concurrent or simultaneous state changes. For 
example, the agent can change their states regarding spatial locations, and at the same 
time change states regarding the development of the infectious disease. If necessary, 
the patient agent can also be involved in other state changes that are relevant to the 
transmissions dynamics, such as the development of the underling illness and the 
aging process. The handling of a number of concurrent state changes can be easily 
implemented in ABS. 
 
In contrast, DES normally assumes that each entity is only involved in a unique 
stream of activities of state changes which is embedded in the pre-defined model 
structure. It is difficult for entities to experience a number of simultaneous state 
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changes in most DES software. Davies et al. (1993) developed a structure which 
overcomes this problem. The approach allows an entity to engage in different 
concurrent activities or wait in any number of queues, and activities can be de-
scheduled, interrupted or delayed. The advantages of the approach in the health 
context were described by Davies and Davies (1994) and the method is referred to as 
POST (patient-oriented simulation technique). The approach has been applied in 
many healthcare areas (Davies et al. 2000; Cooper et al. 2002) including the 
transmission of community-based infections (Rauner et al. 2005). POST was coded in 
Pascal and subsequently in Delphi (Cooper et al. 2008) and is not easy to use. Similar 
facilities are not available in commercial software. 
 
Spatial and movement representation 
ABS models are normally spatially explicit and this is one of the reasons that 
modellers adopt ABS. It is common for agents to move freely (within boundary and 
according to rules) and be aware of its own as well as other agents locations. In DES, 
in order to represent spatial location and movements, a pre-defined model structure 
and states which represent physical locations are needed. However, the inclusion of 
the movement activity may prohibit the entity from engaging in other activities in 
DES (see the previous section on handling concurrent state changes). 
 
Exchange messages 
Sending and receiving messages are standard techniques adopted by ABS and agents 
can act accordingly based on the information received from other agents or from the 
system environment. In DES, it is normally difficult to exchange messages between 
specific entities due to the difficulty to trace and directly control individual entities. 
 
 
 
Application domain 
ABS best suits those systems which consist of autonomous agents who interact with 
each other and with the environment. Infection transmission among patients and 
HCWs in the hospital setting is a good example of such a system. DES, on the other 
hand, is best for modelling queuing systems. The differences between ABS and DES 
are summarised in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2 Differences between agent-based simulation and discrete-event simulation 
 Agent-based simulation Discrete-event simulation 
Modelling approach 
and the role of 
entity/agent 
Bottom-up modelling approach from the agent’s point of 
view.  Agent is the most important element of the model. 
Top-down modelling approach from the system’s point of 
view. Entity is only one of the many essential elements of 
the model. 
Entity/agent 
representation and 
dynamics 
Agent can have complex states and behaviour rules and 
changes its states reactively or proactively. Agents’ actual 
development and movement routes may be unpredictable 
and defined by boundaries or rules. 
Simple attributes (numerical or text) are attached to 
entities. Entity changes its states only passively and passes 
through a pre-defined system structure. 
Traceability and 
control of 
entity/agent 
It is easy to trace a particular agent at any time during the 
simulation; Control of agent is direct and can be carried out 
at any time. 
It is difficult to trace individual entity once it enters the 
system; control of an entity is indirect and is normally 
performed only when an event happens to the entity. 
Events generation Events can be generated by agents themselves and therefore 
can be naturally associated with the agent who creates the 
event. 
Events are normally generated by and associated with 
queues or activities, and difficult to be associated with a 
specific entity. 
Handling concurrent 
state changes 
Agents can effectively and efficiently handle a number of 
concurrent state changes which are embedded within the 
agent. 
Entities can normally only handle one stream of activity 
which is embedded in the predefined modelling structure. 
Spatial and 
movement 
representation 
It is common for agents to move freely (within boundary 
and according to rules) and be aware of its own and other 
agents’ locations. 
Entities can move within pre-defined states which 
represent physical locations. This may cause problems for 
other activities. 
Exchange messages Agents can exchange messages with each other and with 
the environment. 
Entities can not exchange messages easily. 
Application domain Systems consist of autonomous agents who interact with 
each other and with the environment. 
Queuing systems. 
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Relative Advantages of Agent-based Simulation 
Based on the differences identified between ABS and DES, the relative advantages of 
ABS compared to DES can be summarised in the context of HAI modelling. 
 
Natural choice to represent patients and infection transmissions 
In general, compared to DES, ABS is a more natural choice to represent patients and 
infection transmission dynamics. In HAI models, patients are undoubtedly the most 
important element of the model. This is in line with the fact that agents in ABS are the 
core of the model. Furthermore, infection transmission occurs through the interactions 
among patients and between patients and HCWs; while ABS is deemed as most 
appropriate to model systems consisting of autonomous agents interacting with each 
other and with the environment. 
 
Powerful tools to represent patient behaviour rules 
Besides simple attributes and states, patients may have complex behaviour rules 
governing their infection development, movements and other aspects of state changes 
and activities. Compared to DES, ABS has more powerful tools to represent these 
behaviour rules, which can be further facilitated by the message exchange capability. 
For example, a patient’s behaviour may be triggered by the information received from 
other patients or HCWs. 
 
Powerful tools to represent patient spatial location and movement 
One particular advantages of ABS, compared to DES, is its ability to represent 
patients’ spatial locations and movements. The relative spatial location between 
susceptible and colonised patients may be critical to the successful transmission of a 
pathogen in the hospital setting. It is expected that the closer the two patients stay, the 
more likely contacts and consequently successfully transmissions may occur. ABS 
simulation has well established methods to represent spatial locations and various 
rules to govern the movements of agents. 
 
Powerful tools to represent multiple concurrent  state changes 
Patients may have multiple concurrent state changes at the same time regarding 
infection development, detection status, decolonisation status, location and etc. 
Compared to DES, ABS is more straightforward to handle such situations. 
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Relative Disadvantages of Agent-based Simulation 
The relative disadvantages of ABS compared DES include: 
• Compared to DES which has a wide range of well-developed and user-friendly 
software packages, there are only a few software packages that support ABS 
and most of these have a relatively short history and are less user-friendly to 
develop, debug and implement ABS models. This may be a disadvantage for 
potential modellers when choosing between ABS and DES. 
• Compared to DES, ABS is less effective in representing queuing systems 
which can be an important aspect of the HAI models when the patient pathway 
needs to be modelled. 
 
3.4.3 Comparison between Agent-based Simulation and General Individual-
based Models 
The relative advantages of ABS compared to DES also apply to the comparison with 
general individual-based models. Furthermore, another relative advantage of ABS 
(and DES), compared to general individual-based models, is that both ABS and DES 
have well established methodology and both methods, especially DES, have well-
developed computer packages while general individual-based models are normally 
built in general purpose computer languages such as Java and C++. The relative 
advantage of general individual-based models is that no prior knowledge about ABS 
(or DES) is necessary which may mean a shorter learning curve, especially if the 
modeller is proficient in general computer languages. 
 
 
3.5 Model Structure 
ABS models normally have a hierarchical model structure, with higher level 
representing system environment where agents stay, and lower level representing 
individual agents, their attributes, states, behaviours, and their interactions with each 
other and with the environment (Gilbert and Terna 2000). In the context of modelling 
HAIs, the corresponding system environment is either a hospital or a particular 
hospital unit (e.g., surgical ward, ICU) depending on the scale of the study. The 
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corresponding individual agents may include patients, HCWs and other 
humans/objects (e.g., visitors) depending on model assumptions. 
 
In the hospital or hospital unit level of the model, global variables and other 
modelling constructs may be used to define the following aspects of the system 
environment: 
• Capacity and layout of the hospital and/or hospital unit. For example, Figure 
3.3 illustrates a typical hospital ward which has 22 beds in total, with 5 beds in 
single-bed rooms, 2 beds in a room/bay of 2 beds, and 15 beds in rooms/bays 
of 3 beds; 
• Intervention policies. For example, in order to describe the screening test, the 
turnaround time, sensitivity and specificity of the screening test may need to 
be defined in the system environment level. Intervention policies and how they 
can be incorporated into the model are described  in detail in Section 3.8.1; 
• Global influencing factors. For example, the endemic setting and the 
transmission coefficient need to be defined globally. Influencing factors and 
how they can be incorporated into the model are described in detail in Section 
3.8.2; and  
• Other hospital and/or hospital-unit level parameters which are may be relevant 
to the modelling of HAIs, e.g., the admission rate of patients. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Layout of a typical hospital unit with 22 beds (Source: Cepeda et al. 2005) 
 
The representation of agents in the lower level of the model will be discussed in detail 
in Section 3.6. The attributes and states of the agents are normally straightforward to 
define. However, behaviour rules, especially complex rules, may not be represented 
by simple variables, but need more sophisticated modelling constructs such as state-
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charts, message exchange mechanisms and tailor-made computer language scripts. 
For example, in Anylogic®, which is one of the few commercially available ABS 
packages, the state-chart can define multiple concurrent state changes of a patient in 
terms of colonisation, location and etc. Behaviour rules and interactions can be 
embedded in the state-chart by pre-defined functions, message exchange mechanisms 
and java scripts.  
 
 
3.6 Representation of Agents 
The most important element of an ABS model is the agent and this section will 
describe the types of agents and the main issues for defining the patient agents. 
 
3.6.1 Types of Agents 
In the context of HAI modelling, agents are mainly patients, which are indispensable 
in modelling infection transmission, and HCWs, which may or may not be 
represented in the model. Unlike normal human beings represented by ABS models, 
patients are the recipients of the healthcare service and their actions and behaviours 
are largely confined by their patient identity and the regulations of the hospitals. 
Therefore, the behaviour rules of the patient agents will be predominantly reactive 
rather than proactive. HCW agents, if explicitly represented in the model, may have 
proactive behaviour rules since they are actively in charge of the provision of 
healthcare services to the patients. 
 
3.6.2 Representation of Patient Agent 
Patient is undoubtedly the most important agent in a HAI model since patients are 
both sources and recipients of infectious diseases in the hospital setting. In order to 
represent patient agents in ABS, their attributes (e.g., age, length of stay), states (e.g., 
colonised/uncolonised, location) and behaviour rules (e.g., admission/discharge, 
infection transmission) that govern the state changes need to be defined.  
 
Lengths of Stay 
Length of stay is probably the most important attribute of a patient when modelling 
infection transmission in the hospital. Length of stay will directly affect how long a 
Methodology 
 
 56
susceptible patient is exposed to transmission risk and how long a colonised patient 
exposes the risk to other susceptible patients. Length of stay may potentially interact 
with many intervention policies that aim to control HAIs (e.g., screening tests, 
decolonisation treatment).  
 
ABS is able to apply any types of parametric and empirical distributions to represent 
the patients’ lengths of stay (see Section 3.4.1). If necessary, patients may be divided 
into sub-groups each of which can have their own distribution. Both empirical and 
theoretical studies show that longer length of stay is positively correlated with the risk 
of colonisation (Morrison and Stolarek 2000; Cosgrove et al. 2005).  
 
In general, empirical distribution based on observed data may be applied when 
validating the model against the actual situation. While a parametric distribution is 
preferred for model experimentation since they can be easily manipulated in terms of 
mean and shape. 
 
In ABS, length of stay can be sampled from the selected distribution using random 
numbers when the patient agent is created. The patient will be discharged from the 
hospital when sampled length of stay is reached. What happened during the patient’s 
stay in the hospital may or may not affect the sampled length of stay, depending on 
model assumptions.  
 
Other Patient Attributes 
Apart from the length of stay, other patient attributes that may potentially affect or be 
associated with transmission dynamics may include the vulnerability of the 
susceptible patient (e.g., age, sex) and the infectivity of the colonised patient (e.g., the 
number of colonised body sites). 
 
Concurrent State Changes and Potential States 
One of the identified advantages of ABS is its ability to handle multiple concurrent 
state changes of the agent (see Section 3.4.2). In HAI modelling, a patient agent may 
be simultaneously involved in one of the following streams of state changes: 
• Colonisation status: depending on the nature of the pathogen under study, the 
colonisation status may include the states of susceptible, colonised but not 
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infectious, colonised and infectious, overt infection, immune to the pathogen 
and other possible colonisation states; 
• Location status: depending on how detailed the layout of the hospital or 
hospital unit is represented in the model, different states may indicate which 
ward/bay/bed the patient stays. 
• Detection status: potential states may include identified case (both negative 
and positive), unidentified case and case under investigation (i.e., sample is 
taken but result has not been reported); 
• Decolonisation status: states may include under decolonisation treatment and 
not under decolonisation treatment; and 
• Isolation status: potential states may consist of isolation in singe-bed isolation 
room, cohort isolation in side room or open bay, other types of isolation and 
not in isolation. 
 
Behaviour Rules 
Once the attributes and states of a patient agent are determined, the ABS model needs 
to define the rules that determine the initial attributes and states of a patient and, 
subsequently, how the patient changes state from one another. These rules may not 
only depend on the attributes and current states of the patient itself, but also the 
attributes and states of other patients (i.e., interaction between patients) and/or the 
current hospital setting (i.e., interaction with the hospital environment). For example, 
whether a patient may acquire colonisation or can be successfully isolated may 
depend on the attributes and states of both him/herself and other patient agents; while 
both successful detection of colonisation and isolation may depend on the hospital 
setting and policies. 
 
When multiple concurrent state changes are modelled for a patient agent, it is possible 
that the state changes may be dependent on each other. For example, state change 
regarding detection status will clearly affect the state change of decolonisation and 
isolation status because normally only detected patients can be treated and isolated. 
These dependencies also need to be embedded in the behaviour rules. 
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In the context of modelling HAIs, the behaviour rules of patient agents are mainly 
reactive rather than proactive (see Section 3.6.1). The potential behaviour rules of 
patient agents may include: 
• Colonisation development rules: the most important rule is how the 
susceptible patient acquires colonisation which will be discussed in detail in 
Section 3.7; 
• Bed allocation and patient movement rules; 
• Detection and screening rules; and  
• Decolonisation treatment rules.  
 
Ward Occupancy 
In an ABS model, each individual patient agent may follow his/her own path of 
admission, discharge and movements governed by behaviour rules. Therefore, ward 
occupancy may vary and fall below 100% due to the model dynamics and bed 
availability. This is a more realistic representation of the actual situation and, further 
more, the model can be used to explore the potential impact of changed ward 
occupancy levels. 
 
Apart from patient agents, other types of agents may be necessary for a model if they 
serve as vectors for the transmission of HAIs. These agents may include HCWs, 
visitors, and non-human objects (e.g., common toilets). Appendix A discusses how 
these types of agents can  be represented in the ABS model. 
 
 
3.7 Modelling Infection Transmission 
Representing the transmission process of the infectious disease is the key of any 
epidemiological model. In theory, the transmission of a pathogen among patients in 
the hospital needs source of transmission (e.g., colonised patients), target of 
transmission (i.e., susceptible patients) and, in case of cross-transmission, vectors (e.g., 
HCWs and visitors). The potential transmission routes of HAIs include (1) 
transmission through direct patient-to-patient contacts; (2) cross-transmission between 
patients via transiently or permanently colonised HCWs or other human vectors (e.g., 
visitors); and (3) transmission from contaminated background environment (e.g., 
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object surface). Different transmission routes may co-exist for the spread of a certain 
type of pathogen. Even with the advance of science, the existence and the relative 
importance of each transmission route for pathogens such as MRSA and C. difficile 
are not fully understood and quantified (Dziekan et al. 2000; Vos and Verbrugh 2005).  
 
Depending on whether HCWs or any other vectors are explicitly represented, there are 
two classes of methods to model infection transmission: host-vector models (Bailey 
1975) when vectors are explicitly represented, and mass action assumption (Anderson 
and May 1992) when only patients are considered. This section will discuss these 
methods with the focus on how they can be applied in ABS models. The pairwise 
action assumption, which is modified from the mass action assumption, is proposed to 
suit the ABS where individual characteristics need to be modelled. 
 
3.7.1 Host-Vector Model 
In the host-vector model, both hosts (i.e., patients) and vectors (e.g., HCWs) are 
explicitly represented. Conceptually, infection transmission occurs by first 
transmitting the pathogen from a colonised patient to a susceptible vector, and then 
from the colonised vector to another susceptible patient (Figure 3.4). Host-vector 
models are widely applied to HAI models (Austin and Anderson 1999; Cooper et al. 
1999; Grundmann et al. 2004; Hotchkiss et al. 2005; Raboud et al. 2005; McBryde et 
al. 2007). Most previous applications divide patients and HCWs into several 
homogeneous compartments and model the transmission between patients and HCWs 
in an aggregate manner, while few represent them as individuals and explicitly model 
the physical one-to-one contacts (Hotchkiss et al. 2005).  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Infection transmission representation by host-vector model 
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A Host-vector model is conceptually a natural way to model infection transmission 
and fits the paradigm of ABS when patients and HCWs are individually represented. 
In ABS, the contacts between patients and HCWs can be explicitly modelled. The 
success of transmission through each contact is probabilistic in nature, which may 
depend on factors such as the nature of the contact (e.g., high risk or low risk contact) 
and the infectivity/vulnerability of patients/HCWs. The disadvantage of the approach 
is the large amount of data required to describe the contact structure and patterns 
between patients and HCWs, and the decolonisation rate of HCWs (e.g., from hand-
washing) who are normally only transiently colonised. It is also difficult to estimate 
the baseline probability of successful transmission per contact. Another disadvantage 
is that when HCWs are explicitly represented, other potential important transmission 
routes (e.g., direct transmission between patients) may be ignored. 
 
3.7.2 Mass Action Assumption  
The mass action assumption has been widely applied in HAI modelling to represent 
infection transmission when HCWs are not explicitly represented (Cooper et al. 2004; 
Stone 2004; Robotham et al. 2006). Under the mass action assumption, patients and 
potential vectors (although not explicitly represented) are assumed to be 
homogenously mixed which means everyone interacts with equal probability with 
everyone else and possible heterogeneities arising from age, space or behavioural 
aspects are not included (Keeling and Rohani 2008). No explicit transmission route is 
assumed under the mass action assumption. Instead, transmission is assumed to be 
incurred by all possible transmission routes, including cross transmission via vectors. 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the mass action assumption. Mathematically, secondary cases 
(i.e., patients who acquire the infectious diseases during the hospital stay) occur at a 
rate proportional to the product of the number of colonised patients and susceptible 
patients.  
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Figure 3.5 Infection transmission representation by mass action assumption 
 
Mass action has two forms of expression depending on how we expect the contract 
structure to change with population size: the true mass action (or frequency dependent) 
or the pseudo mass action (or density dependent). If SP and IP represent the number 
of susceptible and colonised patients in the system, and C represents the constant 
transmission coefficient, then secondary transmissions will occur at a rate defined by 
)1/( −+⋅⋅ SPIPSPIPC  under true mass action and SPIPC ⋅⋅  under pseudo mass 
action. True mass action principle assumes that the number of contacts is independent 
of the population size. In other words, each patient will have a fixed number of 
contacts (indirect with HCWs or direct with other patients) per time unit regardless 
how many patients are in the system. Therefore, as the number of patients in the 
system increases, the contacts of a patient will be distributed among a increasing 
number of patients and the chance that the patient may have direct or indirect contact 
with any specific patient will decrease. True mass action is thought to be more 
appropriate to model vector-borne pathogens and those with heterogeneous contact 
structure (Keeling and Rohani 2008) and is used by most previous HAI models. In 
this thesis, only true mass action is considered. 
 
During a time step t∆ , Equation 3.1 gives the number of new secondary 
transmissions during the time step.  
t
SPIP
SPIPCtT ∆⋅−+
⋅⋅=∆
1
)(   (3.1) 
where  )( tT ∆  is the number of new secondary transmission cases during time 
t∆ which is measured in days, 
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           C is the transmission coefficient which is defined as the number of secondary 
cases caused by one colonised patient per day, assuming a large population of 
susceptible patients, 
          IP is the number of colonised patients, 
          SP is the number of susceptible patients. 
 
The basic reproduction ratio, or 0R , which is defined as “the average number of 
secondary cases caused by an infectious individual in a completely susceptible 
population” is widely used in epidemic theory (Anderson and May 1992). The 
parameter is normally directly used in community-based infection transmission 
models to quantify the transmission dynamics. For modelling HAI, which has a rapid 
turnover of patients (normally a few days), rather than directly applying 0R , the 
derived transmission coefficient or rate which represents “the average number of 
secondary cases caused by an infectious individual in a completely susceptible 
population per day” is normally used (Cooper et al. 2004; Bootsma et al. 2006). The 
transmission coefficient, or C, used in this thesis is in line with previous HAI models 
and has the same underlying assumptions of the basic reproduction number. 
 
Given a fixed number of total patients (i.e., IP+SP) which means a constant 
denominator for Equation 3.1, increasing the number of colonised patients (i.e., IP) 
means a decreasing number of susceptible patients (i.e., SP). This indicates a non-
linear relationship between the new secondary cases and the number of colonised 
patients. Given a constant C of 0.1 per day and total patient population of 30 (i.e., 
IP+SP=30), the non-linear relationship between )( tT ∆ and IP under the true mass 
action assumption is illustrated in Figure 3.6. The figure shows that the number of 
new secondary cases reaches its peak when there are equal numbers of colonised and 
susceptible patients. The figure also demonstrates that, in a constant patient 
population, the depletion of susceptible patients (or the increase of colonised patients) 
will reduce the rate of new secondary cases. 
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Figure 3.6 Non-linear relationship between the number of colonised patients and new 
secondary cases by mass action assumption 
 
In order to fit into ABS model where patient agents need to be dealt with individually, 
Equation 3.1 needs to be modified so that the equation can represent the rate of 
colonisation of one susceptible patient during time t∆  (see Equation 3.2). From an 
individual susceptible patient’s point of view, given a fixed number of total patients, 
the risk of acquiring colonisation will increase linearly as the number of the colonised 
patients increases (Figure 3.7). 
t
SPIP
IPCt ∆⋅−+⋅=∆ 1)(λ   (3.2) 
where )( t∆λ is the rate of colonisation of a susceptible patient due to the presence of 
colonised patients in the system during time t∆ , 
           C, IP, SP share the same definitions as in Equation 3.1.   
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Figure 3.7 Relationship between the number of colonised patients and the rate of 
colonisation of a susceptible patient by mass action assumption 
 
According to Equation 3.2, the rate of colonisation of the susceptible patient is 
bounded by the value of C (the rate equals to C when there is only one susceptible 
patient in the system while all other patients are colonised). Once the rate of 
colonisations is calculated, the transmission probability of the susceptible patient can 
be determined by Equation 3.3. Equation 3.3 is derived from the Poisson distribution, 
assuming the rate of events happening in the given period of time (i.e., t∆ )  is )( t∆λ . 
According to the probability density function of the Poisson distribution, the term 
)( te ∆−λ  represents the probability that no event (i.e., the transmission of infectious 
diseases) happens during the time period; while )(1 te ∆−− λ  represents the probability 
that at least one event happens during the time period. Random numbers can then be 
applied to determine whether the event will actually occur.  
)(1)( tetP ∆−−=∆ λ   (3.3) 
where )( tP ∆ is the probability that the susceptible patient get colonised due to the 
presence of colonised patients in the system during time t∆ . 
 
The mass action assumption can be directly applied to ABS models using Equations 
3.2 and 3.3. The advantages of the mass action assumption include: no specific 
assumption about the potential transmission routes, less reliance on data, and 
mathematically sound and tractable. When observed data are limited, the approach 
may be the only option to model the infection transmission process. However the 
Methodology 
 
 65
standard mass action assumption also has many disadvantages. The main 
disadvantage is that it does not allow for individual characteristics (e.g., different 
vulnerability and infectivity) which may have a big impact on the infection 
transmission process. In order to overcome the problem, the mass action assumption 
will be modified to suit individual-based models such as ABS in the following section. 
 
3.7.3 Pairwise Action Assumption 
The pairwise action assumption, modified from the mass action assumption, aims to 
represent the infection transmission between pairs of patients considering the 
individual characteristics of each patient. Under the pairwise assumption, the 
probability of the transmission of the HAI of interest from a colonised patient to a 
susceptible patient is modelled between pairs of patient agents. Each patient is 
heterogeneous and has his/her own attributes which may affect the transmission 
probability. All possible pairs of susceptible-colonised patients are assessed separately 
and independently at each time step. The susceptible patient in the pair may have a 
specific vulnerability (e.g., age, ICU admission) while the colonised patient in the pair 
may have a particular infectivity (due, for example, to decolonisation treatment). 
Figure 3.8 illustrates the pairwise action assumption. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 Infection transmission representation by pairwise action assumption 
 
A mathematical expression of the rate of colonisations of the susceptible patient under 
the pairwise action assumption is given in Equation 3.4.  
t
n
iiIvvV
Ct ∆⋅−
⋅⋅=∆
1
,...),(,...),(
)( 2121λ   (3.4) 
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where )( t∆λ  is the rate of colonisations of the susceptible patient in the pair may 
experience due to the colonised patient in the pair, during time t∆ , 
           C is the transmission coefficient which is defined as the number of secondary 
cases caused by one colonised patient per day (with I=1), assuming a large population 
of susceptible patients with no additional vulnerabilities,  
          V is a function of different factors of ,..., 21 vv  that may affect the vulnerability 
of the susceptible patient in the pair, 
          I is a function of different factors ,..., 21 ii  that may affect the infectivity of the 
colonised patient in the pair, and 
          n is the total number of patients in the system. 
 
Once the rate of colonisations of the susceptible patient is determined, Equation 3.3 
can be applied to obtain the probability that the susceptible patient get colonised due 
to the colonised patient in the pair during time t∆ . The pairwise action assumption 
retains the advantages of the mass action assumption while overcomes its 
disadvantage of assuming a homogeneous patient population.  
 
Patient Location 
In ABS, each patient agent may have states representing the specific ward/bay/bed 
location and corresponding behaviour rules governing the movements between 
locations (see Section 3.6.2). The representation of patient location in HAI models 
will make the model more realistic since it is expected that the spatial adjacency of 
two patients will affect the chance of contacts/interaction, and therefore transmission 
between them.  
 
Under the pairwise action assumption, the relative spatial adjacency between the two 
patients in the pair can be incorporated into the transmission probability equation. 
How the patient locations affect transmission depends on the level of detail the patient 
locations are represented. If every bed location in the hospital or hospital unit is 
explicitly modelled, then the likelihood and intensity of interactions between the two 
patients may be represented as a function of the distance between the two patients. 
However, such an approach needs large amount of data and the model may not be 
generic to suit different hospital layouts and settings. Furthermore, the intensity of 
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interactions may not be a linear function of the distance between the two patients, 
since the layout of the hospital or hospital unit will also affect the degree of 
interaction among patients (e.g., two patients in two different wards or ward bays may 
have low level of interaction even distance between them is short). 
 
An alternative approach to embed spatial location in the pairwise action assumption is 
to represent the ward and/or ward bay location in a hospital-level model, or to 
represent ward bay location in a hospital unit level model. This approach may need far 
fewer data. When two patients are evaluated by pairwise action assumption, the model 
can check whether the two patients stay in the same local environment (e.g., same 
ward bay) and incorporate this information into the transmission probability equation. 
It is expected that two patients in the same local environment have a higher level of 
interactions than two patients from different local environments. The rationale for 
treating global and local contacts differently when studying stochastic infection 
transmission is discussed in detail by Koopman et al. (2002). 
 
An implementation of the pairwise action assumption which considers both patient 
infectivity/vulnerably and patient locations is demonstrated in the MRSA case study 
model in Chapter 4.  
 
3.7.4 Choice of Methods 
The choice of different methods for modelling infection transmission should be 
mainly determined by the nature of the infectious disease under study, the model 
assumptions made and the availability of the data. In theory, the three methods can all 
be applied in the ABS model. In fact, simple ABS models have been successfully 
built to implement both host-vector models and the standard mass action assumption 
based on two previous MRSA modelling studies (Cooper et al. 1999; Robotham et al. 
2006) before ABS was applied to the MRSA case study (see Section 4.2.2 and 
Appendix B). 
 
As a general guidance, the host-vector model may be adopted if the cross transmission 
route (facilitated by vectors) and its relative importance compared to other 
transmission routes are well understood; and data regarding contact structure and 
patterns, transmission probability per contact, decolonisation rate of HCWs are 
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readily available. Otherwise, the mass action or the pairwise action assumption may 
be applied to deal with models where vectors are not explicitly represented. Compared 
to the pairwise action assumption, the mass action assumption might be easier to 
implement since no additional information about the individual characteristics of the 
patients are needed. Pairwise action assumption is more realistic and flexible, and 
suits the needs of ABS since individual characteristics can be represented to estimate 
the transmission probability. Furthermore, the effect of spatial adjacency between 
pairs of patients can be modelled by pairwise action assumption.  
 
3.7.5 Time Advance Mechanism  
There are two main time advance mechanisms in the computer simulation, one is 
time-slicing and the other is event-driven (see Section 3.3.2). In theory, ABS can 
apply both types of time advance mechanisms.  
 
When modelling infection transmission, there may be problems in applying the event-
driven method. The event scheduling engine maintains a list of the next events of each 
patient in the simulation. If, for example, the next event for a patient is that the patient 
gets colonised then the newly colonised patient will pose an additional risk to all the 
remaining susceptible patients when the colonisation event happens. This will 
potentially affect the next event of every single susceptible patient in the system. The 
next events list will need to be reassessed.  
 
In a HAI model, many events (e.g., admission/discharge of colonised patients, 
movements of colonised patients, isolation, decolonisation treatment) will affect the 
future events of every susceptible patient in the system regarding when they will 
acquire colonisation. Constantly updating the events of all susceptible patients is 
difficult. A further problem is that, even if it is possible to update the events of every 
susceptible patient frequently, it is difficult to quantify how the original scheduled 
colonisation event should be adjusted. Due to the potential problems of using event-
driven time advance mechanism to model infection transmission, the time-slicing 
method may be a reasonable choice Under the time-slicing mechanism, possible 
secondary transmissions are evaluated during each time slice.  
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Regardless of what methods are applied to model infection transmission, the rate of 
colonisation of each susceptible patient during the time slice is calculated (e.g., using 
Equation 3.2 or 3.4) based on the system situation at the end of the time slice. Then, 
the rate of colonisation can be transformed to the transmission probability during the 
time slice using Equation 3.3. Finally, random numbers will be applied to determine 
whether the transmission actually occurs to each susceptible patient. 
 
 
3.8 Experimental Factors and Model Responses 
Experimental factors and model responses are two important elements of the model. 
Experimental factors are input parameters and structural assumptions composing the 
model; while model responses are output performance measures (Law 2007). From 
the perspective of modelling HAIs, experimental factors can be divided into two 
categories: those regarding intervention policies to prevent and control the 
transmission of HAIs and those regarding influencing factors that may potentially 
have a big impact on the transmission of HAIs. For intervention policies, people 
normally have certain degree of control and the focus is to evaluate the effectiveness 
and robustness of them. As to influencing factors, people normally have less control 
and the focus is the sensitivity analysis to measure their impacts on infection 
transmission.  
 
3.8.1 Intervention Policies 
A group of intervention policies which are widely implemented in practice and 
studied in theory are known as the “Search-and-Destroy” (S&D) strategy (see Section 
1.2.3). Cooper et al. (2004) suggested that a policy of screening newly admitted 
patients for MRSA coupled with rapid and effective isolation and treatment may make 
a major contribution to controlling the spread of MRSA.  
 
Screening Method 
The first step of S&D strategy is the pre-emptive “searching” or screening of 
colonised patients. Infected patients normally have overt symptoms which make them 
easier to identify compared to colonised patients who do not have clinical identifiable 
symptoms but still are able to transmit the pathogen. Pre-emptive screening of 
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colonised patients is therefore the key to the success of S&D strategy. When 
alternative screening methods exist, the choice of which screening test to apply is an 
important decision that may affect the effectiveness of the overall S&D strategy. 
 
All screening tests have some common features which describe the quality (e.g., 
sensitivity and specificity), cost and the speed (e.g., turnaround time) of the test. 
Sensitivity is the ability of a test to identify correctly individuals who have a given 
disease or condition; while specificity is the ability of a test to correctly exclude 
individuals who do not have a given disease or condition.  
 
Turnaround time is an important feature of a screening test. In the narrow sense, 
turnaround time is the time required in the laboratory to obtain the test result from the 
sample. In the broad sense, it is the overall time between the sample is taken from the 
patient and the time the test result is reported. The turnaround time of a test in the 
narrow sense is the inherent nature of the test; while in the broad sense it is subject to 
many external uncertainties such as the way the hospital handles sample 
transportation and the delay caused by the communication of the results.  
 
Shorter turnaround time should enhance the effectiveness of S&D strategy because 
the sooner the colonised patients are identified, the quicker follow up “destroy” 
policies can be applied to stop the transmission. For example, some previous studies 
demonstrated the effectiveness of the rapid PCR test (which reduces the test 
turnaround time from up to four days to a few hours) in reducing MRSA 
transmissions in the hospital setting (Harbarth et al. 2006; Cunningham et al. 2007; 
Hardy et al. 2007).  
 
Screening Strategy 
Once the screening method is chosen, a strategy is required to organise the screening 
tests. Many options are available as to the timing and frequency of the screening tests: 
• Admission screening only (Harbarth et al. 2006; Cunningham et al. 2007); 
• Random interval repeat screening (Robotham et al. 2006); 
• Fixed interval repeat screening (McBryde et al. 2007);  
• Admission coupled with random interval repeat screening;  
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• Admission coupled with fixed interval repeat screening (Cepeda et al. 2005; 
Pan et al. 2005; Hardy et al. 2007); and 
• For research purpose, patients may also be screened on discharge (Hardy et al. 
2007) or even after discharge (Fung et al. 2002). 
 
Options available regarding the types of patients involved in the screening include: 
• All patients (Hardy et al. 2007); 
• Patients deemed as high-risk due to factors such as previous infection history, 
prior to surgical operations and transferred from areas where certain HAI is 
endemic (Pan et al. 2005). 
 
Potential options of screening strategy include all possible combinations of the 
“timing and frequency of the test” and “the types of patients involved”. Theoretically, 
the more frequent of the tests and the more patients involved, the better the chance to 
detect asymptomatic colonised patients. 
 
Isolation 
Once colonised patients are identified by screening tests, one “destroying” policy is to 
physically isolate these patients to minimise their contacts with susceptible patients. 
Pre-emptive isolation of all or high-risk patients on admission has also been 
implemented in practice (Harbarth et al. 2006). In reality, different types of isolation 
facilities exist and their effects on confining the colonised patients may vary. Single 
bed room with en-suite facility and air circulation system is the ideal option. However 
most single bed rooms in the UK hospital do not have these facilities. Side room or 
side bay with few beds are often used to isolate patients in practice. Cohort nursing 
(sometimes known as cohort isolation), which refers to grouping colonised patients 
together in a ward bay and assigning designated nurse(s), is also a form of isolation. 
 
Identified colonised patients can only be isolated if an isolation facility is available at 
the time of request and if the patient is clinically appropriate to be isolated. The 
number of isolation facilities, ward occupancy and patient characteristics may all 
affect the chance of successful isolations.  
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The effectiveness of the isolation policy is quite controversial. Based on a 12-month 
study of a large UK teaching hospital where pre-emptive screening is not practised, 
Wigglesworth and Wilcox (2006) observed that of all the isolation needs due to 
infection control purpose, 22% may not be met within the first 24 hours. The 
percentage may be considerably higher if pre-emptive screening is practiced (since the 
isolation requests may increase). They concluded that insufficient capacity to isolate 
patients is common and may compromise infection control efforts.  
 
Decolonisation 
Apart from isolation, another key “destroy” policy is the decolonisation treatment. 
Decolonisation refers to the medical treatment to reduce or eradicate the pathogen 
from the colonised/infected patients. The treatment may last a few days and at the end 
of the treatment, a proportion of patients may recover and no longer pose a risk to 
other patients. During the treatment, the risk posed by the colonised patients (i.e., the 
infectivity of the patient) may be reduced.  
 
Other Intervention Polices 
Apart from the S&D strategy, other intervention policies have also been implemented 
in practice or proposed in theory to prevent and control HAIs. These interventions 
may include: 
• Hand hygiene and general hygiene of the hospital unit (Forrester et al. 2005); 
• Barrier precaution measures (Grundmann et al. 2002). For identified colonised 
patients, barrier precaution measures may be applied such as wearing 
disposable gloves and gowns, and stringent enforcement of hygiene rules; 
• Ward closure (i.e., stop admitting new patients) which is sometimes 
implemented in practice (Barrett et al. 1998). If ward closure is modelled, the 
conditions to close and reopen the ward need to be specified; and 
• Screening HCWs and treatment of colonised HCWs (Fitzpatrick et al. 2000). 
If S&D strategy also applies to HCWs, the identified colonised HCW may be 
temporarily excluded from the job until he/she recovers. 
 
 
3.8.2 Influencing Factors 
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Endemic Setting 
Endemic setting refers to the proportion of patients who have already been colonised 
with the HAI of interest on admission. These patients are known as primary cases and 
will pose a risk to susceptible patients as soon as they are admitted to the hospital. In 
the long term, there is a feedback relationship between eradicating the pathogen 
within the hospital and the lower community prevalence which should then be 
reflected by a smaller proportion of primary cases back in the hospital. However, in 
the short term, the hospital has little control over the endemic setting. 
 
Length of Stay 
The patient’s length of stay has a big impact on the transmission dynamics of HAIs 
(see detailed discussion in Section 3.6.2). The hospital may reduce the average length 
of stay in the long term, probably by changing hospital guidelines or introducing 
advanced health technologies. However, length of stay is normally not controllable in 
the short term. 
 
Transmissibility 
Transmissibility is mainly the inherent nature of the specific (strain of) infectious 
disease under study. It describes the average ability of the pathogen to transmit among 
patients. In HAI modelling, when vectors (e.g., HCWs) are not represented, 
transmissibility is normally defined as the average number of secondary cases 
incurred in a time unit (e.g., one day) by one primary case assuming a large number of 
susceptible patients. When vectors are explicitly modelled, transmissibility may be 
defined as the probability of transmitting the pathogen between a patient and a vector 
per contact. Intervention policies and other influencing factors may affect the 
transmission dynamics, but they should not affect the underlying transmissibility. 
 
Effectiveness of Intervention Policies 
Although the hospital may have control over intervention policies, it normally has less 
control over how effective the intervention policies are. The influencing factors which 
concern the effectiveness of intervention policies include (1) the effectiveness of 
isolation; (2) the effectiveness of decolonisation on reducing the infectivity of 
colonised patients during their treatment; (3) the effectiveness of improved hygiene 
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(both hand hygiene and environment hygiene); and (4) the effectiveness of barrier 
precaution measures. 
 
3.8.3 Model Responses 
Model responses are the model outputs which are used to monitor the transmission 
situation of the hospital, or served as performance measurements of the intervention 
policies.  
 
Number of Secondary Cases 
Secondary cases, also known as nosocomial cases, are patients who do not have the 
HAI of interest on admission but later acquire colonisation during the hospital stay. 
Although the hospital has less control over the number of primary cases, it can 
intervene to minimize the number of secondary cases.  
 
The number of secondary cases is naturally correlated with the number of primary 
cases which are the source of transmission in the first place. Therefore, when 
performing comparison studies, the number of secondary cases is only a good model 
response if both scenarios have similar level of primary cases; otherwise, the model 
response may be misleading. For example, if the first scenario which adopts 
intervention A has 20 primary cases and 40 secondary cases; the second scenario 
which adopts intervention B has 100 primary cases and 50 secondary cases; and all 
other conditions are similar between the two scenarios. Although the first scenario has 
fewer secondary cases, it is misleading to conclude that intervention A (where 20 
primary cases lead to 40 secondary cases) is more effective than intervention B 
(where 100 primary cases only lead to 50 secondary cases). 
 
Transmission Ratio 
The transmission ratio is the number of secondary cases divided by the number of 
primary cases in the same period. The transmission ratio considers both primary and 
secondary cases and thus may be a fair and reasonable model response to compare 
different scenarios with different levels of primary cases. Using the same example in 
the previous section, the transmission ratios are 2 (2 = 40 / 20) and 0.5 (0.5 = 50 / 100) 
respectively for the two scenarios. It is clear that intervention B appears to be more 
effective than intervention A.  
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It may be misleading to simply report the transmission ratio without specifying the 
levels of primary and secondary cases. For example, two scenarios with same number 
of total admissions may have the same transmission ratio of 0.5 over the same period 
of time, while the numbers of primary and secondary cases are 50/100 and 20/40 
respectively. If only the transmission ratios are reported, the fact that the first scenario 
has a worse overall infection situation will be hidden. It is also helpful to report the 
corresponding total admissions to give a rounded picture of the transmission situation. 
 
Prevalence 
Prevalence refers to the proportion of colonised patients (both primary and secondary 
cases) in the hospital at a given time. Prevalence is appropriate to assess the overall 
infection situation. It is, however, less satisfactory to measure the effectiveness of 
intervention policies since it does not consider the relative ratio between primary and 
secondary cases. 
 
Other Model Responses 
Other model responses which have been used to measure the transmission dynamics 
of HAIs include: 
• Colonisation/infection patient-days which reports the accumulated number of 
days colonised patients stay in the hospital (Cooper et al. 1999); 
• Isolation patient-days which represent the accumulated number of days 
isolated patients stay in the hospital (Bootsma et al. 2006); and 
• Attack rate which is defined as the rate at which a susceptible patient get 
colonised (McBryde et al. 2007). 
 
 
3.9 Experimental Design 
Experimental design is about systematically setting the level of various experimental 
factors to see the impact on model responses, and it should be an integral part of the 
whole simulation project (Kleijnen et al. 2005). For the study of HAIs, experimental 
design provides the tool to systematically evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of 
various intervention policies and test the sensitivity of various influencing factors.  
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The main experimental design methods that have been applied in the thesis are 
fractional factorial design and response surface design. Justification of using these 
methods and their detailed descriptions are given in Section 6.2.  
 
 
3.10 Summary 
Based on previous chapters, the overall research objectives and questions of the thesis 
were derived at the beginning of the chapter. The following sections of the chapter 
aim to address the main methodological issues of these research questions. 
 
A taxonomy of potential methods for modelling HAIs was proposed and the relative 
advantages of ABS compared to cohort/aggregate models (e.g., Markov models, SD) 
and other types of individual-based models (e.g., DES) were identified using the 
proposed taxonomy. These analyses have helped to justify the usefulness and 
potential benefits of applying ABS to the modelling and management of HAIs. 
 
Two key aspects of modelling HAIs using ABS are the representation of patient 
agents and the modelling of the infection transmission process. The representation of 
patient agents by attributes, states and behaviour rules were described. Key features of 
patient agents (compared to previous models), such as non-exponentially distributed 
length of stay, multiple concurrent state changes and changing ward occupancy were 
discussed in detail. Different methods for modelling infection transmission were 
introduced with a focus on the mass action assumption, where vectors (e.g., HCWs) 
are not explicitly modelled. In order to suit the needs of individual-based models such 
as ABS, the pairwise action assumption was proposed, modifying the mass action 
assumption. The key features of the pairwise action assumption were discussed 
including how individual vulnerability/infectivity and how spatial locations can be 
incorporated. The problem of using event-driven time advance mechanism to model 
infection transmission was discussed and the time-slicing method was proposed to be 
the alternative approach.  
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To address the last research question of the evaluation of various MRSA intervention 
polices, the potential experimental factors and model responses, and the types of 
chosen experimental design methods were described. In general, this chapter has 
justified and addressed the main methodological issues of modelling HAIs using ABS. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Agent-based Simulation Model of MRSA 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In order to test the methodology and the modelling framework described in Chapter 3 
on a specific HAI, an agent-based simulation model of MRSA is proposed in this 
chapter. Based on an empirical study in a UK hospital, the MRSA model will also be 
used to evaluate the effectiveness of various interventions. In this chapter, the 
background of the research study is introduced and the key features of the model are 
described. Then, two key aspects of the model, patient behaviour rules and the 
modelling of infection transmission, are discussed. Finally, the hierarchical model 
structure which consists of the overall system environment (i.e., the hospital ward) 
and the local patient agents are presented. 
 
 
4.2 Project Background 
 
4.2.1 Background 
The building of a simulation model was originally part of a research study (Hardy et 
al. 2007), funded by the Department of Health in the UK, to test whether screening 
MRSA using a rapid PCR test, which may provide results within a day, is more 
effective and cost-effective than the established culture test which may take up to four 
days to obtain results. The main research study was designed as a prospective 
randomised two-period cross-over study at Birmingham Heartlands Hospital, a typical 
large general teaching hospital in the UK which has more than 1,000 beds. The 
project involved seven surgical wards (denoted as ward A, B, C, D, E, F and G 
hereafter) and lasted for sixteen months. In the first eight months, four hospital wards 
(i.e., wards A, B, C and D) adopted the PCR test while the other three wards (i.e., 
wards E, F and G) continued to use the conventional culture test.  After eight months, 
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there was a cross-over with the first four wards adopting the culture test and the other 
three the PCR test. Overall, fourteen scenarios were generated from the study with 
each ward being associated with two scenarios, one for the culture test period and the 
other for the PCR test period. In order to concentrate the sole effect of the rapid 
screening test, all controllable factors and intervention measures were kept the same 
between the culture and PCR test period for each study ward except the choice of 
screening test itself. 
 
Apart from general infection prevention and control measures such as hand-washing, 
staff education and standard barrier precaution measures, active S&D strategies, 
including pre-emptive admission and repeat screening test, isolation and 
decolonisation treatment, were also implemented across all study wards. Detailed 
information regarding MRSA colonisation status, screening test, isolation, 
decolonisation treatment, ward movement, operation history, antibiotic treatment, 
demographics and other potential risk factors were collected for each patient. 
Observed data were kept in both an Access database and Excel spreadsheets. During 
the sixteen-month study period, 12,732 patients were admitted to the seven study 
wards with a total of 13,952 ward admission/re-admission episodes (a patient may be 
admitted to the ward several times). Altogether, 30,490 screening test samples were 
taken with 12,682 being admission screening tests and 17808 being repeat screening 
tests. Overall, 453 patients were identified as colonised with MRSA by admission 
screening tests (i.e., primary cases) and 268 patients were identified to have acquired 
MRSA colonisation while they stayed in the hospital by repeat screening tests (i.e., 
secondary cases).  
 
Statistical analysis of the research study has demonstrated the effectiveness of the 
rapid screening test in reducing MRSA transmission in the hospital setting. Compared 
to study periods when culture screening tests were adopted, the transmission ratio, 
which is the ratio of the number of secondary cases to the number of primary cases, 
was significantly reduced in six out of seven study wards when rapid PCR screening 
tests were applied (Hardy et al. 2009). 
 
Compared to statistical analysis, ABS model can describe the transmission dynamics 
of MRSA over time and evaluate the theoretical mean effectiveness of the rapid 
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screening test when randomness is considered. Furthermore, the model can 
systematically explore scenarios that have not been implemented in the research study, 
such as the evaluation of other intervention policies (e.g., screening strategy, isolation 
and decolonisation treatment), and the sensitivity analysis of influencing factors (e.g., 
patients’ lengths of say, transmissibility of MRSA and the proportion of patients 
colonised with MRSA on admission).  
 
4.2.2 Test Agent-based Simulation Model on Previous Studies 
Before the full-scale ABS model was built, two preliminary tests were performed to 
use an ABS model to replicate the assumptions and results of two previous MRSA 
studies adopting mathematical compartmental models. The first study (Cooper et al. 
1999), which focused on a single hospital unit, explicitly considered both patients and 
HCWs and classified them as either susceptible or colonised. The model assumed that 
the only transmission route of MRSA is patient-to-patient cross transmission via 
transiently colonised HCWs. Other main assumptions of the model include constant 
patient population, 100% bed occupancy, fixed detection rate, immediate removal of 
detected colonised patients and 100% hand-washing efficacy. An ABS model was 
built in Anylogic® to replicate the assumptions of the model. Applying the model, the 
same model experimentations were performed with the same input parameter values 
of the original model. In all scenarios tested, which include changing the 
transmissibility, changing the probability of colonisation on admission and changing 
the detection rate, the results of the ABS model closely matched that of the original 
mathematical model.  
 
The second study (Robotham et al. 2006), which represented the whole hospital and 
its community, only considered patients and divided them into eight different 
compartments that included susceptible patients, undetected colonised patients, 
detected colonised patients who are isolated, detected colonised patients who are not 
isolated and other four compartments representing people in the community with 
different MRSA colonisation status (susceptible or colonised) and readmission rate 
(high or low). The model did not assume any explicit MRSA transmission route and 
infection transmission was assumed to follow the mass action assumption. Other 
assumptions of the model include fixed patients and community population, 
transmission only occurs in the hospital, isolation can perfectly prevent transmission 
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and colonised patients can be decolonised with a natural recovery rate. An ABS 
model was built in Anylogic® to replicate the assumptions of the model. Due to the 
large community population size (around 170,000 people), only patients in the 
hospital (1000 patients) were represented individually as agents while the different 
groups of people in the community were represented as integer variables. The ABS 
model and the original model were compared with the same input parameter values. 
In all the scenarios tested, the results of the ABS model closely matched that of the 
mathematical model.  
 
The main purpose of the two pilot models was to demonstrate that ABS can be at least 
as good as existing mathematical compartmental models to describe and study MRSA 
transmission dynamics even without further exploring the distinctive features and the 
identified relative advantages of ABS. Another aim was to test and get familiar with 
the software, Anylogic®, before it was used to develop the full-scaled MRSA model. 
Appendix B gives a detailed description of the two test ABS models and the 
comparisons with the mathematical models. 
 
 
4.3 Model Features 
The proposed model has the following key features which both comply with the 
general requirements of ABS and take into account of the specific characteristics and 
data availability of the MRSA research study. 
 
4.3.1 Model Objectives 
From the perspective of the MRSA study, the model objectives are to apply ABS to 
describe the transmission dynamics of MRSA in the hospital setting, to evaluate the 
effectiveness of various intervention policies to prevent and control MRSA (including 
single effectiveness and potential interactions among different factors), to test the 
sensitivity of various influencing factors that potentially affect MRSA transmission, 
and eventually to indicate the best practices to manage MRSA in the hospital setting. 
From the perspective of exploring ABS methodology and application, the objectives 
of the modelling study are to demonstrate that, compared to other modelling methods, 
ABS has many advantages and it is an effective, robust and flexible technique to 
Agent-based Simulation Model of MRSA 
 
 82
model the transmission dynamics of HAIs such as MRSA, and to show the feasibility 
of the modelling framework proposed in Chapter 3. 
 
4.3.2 Model Setting 
The scope of the model is a single hospital ward divided into bays, with some 
isolation rooms. It is assumed that most MRSA colonisation will be transmitted within 
a ward, rather than amongst the wider hospital or community population. 
 
The only type of agent represented by the model is the patient. HCWs do get 
colonised and are an important vector in the transmission of MRSA and some 
previous models represented them explicitly. In this model, they are represented 
implicitly by the pairwise action assumption which is modified from the mass action 
assumption (see Section 3.7.3). 
 
4.3.3 Ward Representation 
Each ward bay may have up to six beds; while each isolation room has only one 
isolation bed. Ward bays and isolation rooms are explicitly modelled but the location 
of patients within the bays and the location of the bays within the wards are not. The 
admission, discharge and movement of each patient are governed dynamically by the 
relevant behaviour rules of the patient (see Section 4.4). Consequently, throughout the 
simulation, the number of patients in the ward is not constant but determined by the 
model dynamics and bed availability. 
 
4.3.4 Patient Representation 
Each patient agent is created when admitted to the ward and disposed of from the 
model when discharged from the ward. Apart from the behaviour rules, each patient 
agent has distinctive attributes and states. It is the combination of attributes, states and 
behaviour rules that define the patient in the model.  
 
The attributes that are represented in the model include the length of stay of the 
patient and indications of the patient’s vulnerability to infection including whether the 
patient has been admitted to ICU during the hospital stay and whether the patient has 
been fitted with invasive devices during the ward stay (e.g., an intravenous catheter). 
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These attributes are widely recognised as having a significant impact on the 
transmission dynamics of MRSA (Bootsma et al. 2006; Noah 2006). 
 
ABS can efficiently handle multiple concurrent state changes of a patient agent (see 
Section 3.6.2). In this model, the states of a patient agent can be theoretically grouped 
into one of the following categories: 
• Colonisation status which includes two states: susceptible and colonised; 
• Detection which contains three states: undetected, screened but waiting for the 
result and detected; 
• Decolonisation treatment which has two states: under decolonisation treatment 
and not under decolonisation treatment; and 
• Location which comprises the states that represent the possible locations a 
patient can be situated in the ward including the different bays and isolation 
beds. 
 
At any time during the ward stay, a patient must be in one and only one state in each 
category. For example, a patient agent may currently be colonised with MRSA 
(colonisation status), has been screened but is waiting for the result (detection), has 
not received decolonisation treatment (decolonisation treatment) and is situated in a 
bed in a specific ward bay (location). The patient will change state according to the 
behaviour rules described in Section 4.4.  
 
4.3.5 Transmission of MRSA 
The transmission of MRSA between patients in the ward is modelled by pairwise 
action assumption, which takes into account individual patient characteristics (see 
Section 4.5 for detailed discussion). 
 
4.3.6 Intervention Policies and Influencing Factors 
The prevention and control policies embedded in the model include pre-emptive 
admission and repeat screening tests, rapid screening tests, isolation of detected 
colonised patients and decolonisation treatment for detected colonised patients. These 
intervention policies were also implemented in the research study and therefore 
observed data are available to reflect the actual characteristics of the interventions 
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(e.g., the actual turnaround time of PCR and culture tests, and the duration and 
success rate of the decolonisation treatment).  
 
The model also incorporates many influencing factors which potentially may have a 
big impact on MRSA transmission. These factors include MRSA endemic setting (the 
proportion of patients colonised with MRSA on admission), patients’ lengths of stay, 
the transmissibility of MRSA, the effectiveness of decolonisation treatment and the 
proportion of transmission coming from within the same bay compared to the whole 
ward.  
 
4.3.7 Model Responses 
The main model responses, or model outputs, are the number of patients who are 
MRSA negative on admission (i.e., primary cases), who become colonised during 
their ward stay (i.e., secondary case) and the corresponding transmission ratio which 
is the ratio of secondary cases to primary cases. The first measurement reflects the 
absolute number of secondary cases during the study period while the second 
response indicates the relative extent of MRSA transmission allowing for both the 
numerator and denominator. As the hospital can not generally control the proportion 
of primary cases admitted, the transmission ratio is a more objective output to 
measure the effectiveness of hospital interventions, especially in the short term. 
 
For model validation purpose, apart from the two main model responses, the time to 
detection, i.e., the delay between the time a patient is admitted to the time MRSA 
colonisation is detected, is also used as a model response to be compared with the 
corresponding observations. 
 
4.3.8 Time Advance Mechanism 
The two time advance mechanisms and their use in modelling infection transmission 
were discussed in Section 3.7.5. Both mechanisms are applied in this model. The 
time-slicing approach is used to model the transmission of MRSA; while the event-
driven approach is applied to schedule the rest of the activities and events (e.g., 
screening tests for patients, patients discharged from the ward and patient movements 
within the ward) generated by the model. It is not unusual to apply both time-slicing 
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and event-driven time advance mechanisms in the same simulation model. In fact, the 
time-slicing can be deemed as special events which happen in fixed time intervals. 
 
4.3.9 Simulation Package and Random Number Generator 
The model was built in Anylogic®, one of the few commercially available simulation 
packages that support the development of ABS. Like any ABS package other than 
general computer languages such as Java and C++, it is relatively quick to design and 
build the model structure in Anylogic®. Standard techniques of ABS, such as 
message exchange mechanism and agents’ space awareness and movement 
functionality, are supported by the package. Complex states and behaviour rules of the 
agent can be developed by a special model construct, called the state-chart. In a state-
chart, the states of an agent can be defined together with the rules of how the agent 
changes from one state to another. Simple rules can be set by built-in functions while 
sophisticated rules can be designed by Java scripts. Apart from ABS, Anylogic® also 
supports DES and system dynamics, making it easier to handle both time-slicing and 
event-scheduling time advance mechanisms at the same time.  
 
The model did not use the standard random number generator of Anylogic® which is, 
in fact, the standard Java random number generator that is under criticism by many 
experts (L’Ecuyer 2001). Instead, the Mersenne-Twister random number generator 
(Matsumoto and Nishimura 1998), which is recommended and applied by many 
studies (Law 2007), is used for the model. Figure 4.1 illustrates the main features of 
the proposed ABS model. 
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Figure 4.1 Main features of the agent-based simulation model 
 
 
4.4 Patient Behaviour Rules 
The fundamental feature of ABS is that the overall dynamics emerge or are driven by 
the behaviours of the locally defined agents. The rules described in this section will 
govern the behaviours of each patient agent and its interactions with other patient 
agents and with the ward environment. 
 
4.4.1 Patient Admission and Discharge 
Patient interarrival times are sampled from a globally defined interarrival distribution 
and, on arrival, the patient agent joins an artificial queue from which it is admitted to 
the ward when there is at least one empty bed (excluding isolation beds). If more than 
one bed is available, the patient will be randomly allocated to one of them. On 
admission, the patient has a certain probability of being already colonised with MRSA 
(i.e., primary case) or not (i.e., susceptible patient). However, the patient’s MRSA 
status is unknown to the ward until the patient is screened and the test result is ready. 
The vulnerability of the patient is also determined at admission by sampling whether 
the patient has been or will be admitted to ICU and whether the patient will need an 
invasive device during the ward stay.  
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Two separate and independent distributions are used to sample patients’ lengths of 
stay, depending on the patient’s MRSA status on admission. The patient will be 
discharged from the ward when the sampled length of stay is met regardless of his/her 
other states in the model. 
 
4.4.2 Detection by Admission Screening (Primary Case) 
If admission screening is operational, each patient will have the MRSA screening test 
within two days of the admission. Assuming 100% test sensitivity and specificity then 
the MRSA status will be detected following a screening delay (the time taken for the 
pathology test and the communication of the results). If a patient has a positive result 
then intervention policies may be applied (see Section 4.3.6). During the screening 
delay, no interventions are introduced and the patient may transmit the MRSA 
pathogen to other susceptible patients. If the sampled length of stay is short, it is 
possible that the patient has already been discharged by the time the screening result 
is reported.  
 
4.4.3 Acquiring Colonisation 
For a susceptible patient, the screening test, either admission or repeat screening, will 
simply confirm the negative status with no following intervention policies 
implemented. The most important issue for a susceptible patient is that he/she may 
become colonised during the ward stay (i.e., secondary transmission). The modelling 
of the transmission of MRSA is discussed in detail in Section 4.5. 
 
4.4.4 Detection by Repeat Screening (Secondary Case) 
When a susceptible patient becomes colonised with MRSA, the positive MRSA status 
will not be detected immediately and the patient will start to pose a risk to other 
susceptible patients. The colonisation of previously susceptible patients will only be 
detected if there is a policy of repeat screening and the results from that screening 
arrive before the patient is discharged. If the colonisation is detected, the patient may 
be isolated and/or receive decolonisation treatment.  
 
4.4.5 Decolonisation Treatment 
Decolonisation treatment will last for a few days and at the end of the treatment, the 
patient will be tested, maybe several times, to see if MRSA has been successfully 
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cleared. A patient who is deemed to be successfully decolonised is assumed to have 
returned to a susceptible state. A patient occupying an isolation bed following 
successful decolonisation will be transferred to a ward bay if there is a spare bed 
available; otherwise the patient continues to stay in the isolation bed. If the 
decolonisation fails, the patient will go through the treatment again. A colonised 
patient receiving decolonisation treatment is assumed to have a lower infectivity than 
an undetected colonised patient. Figure 4.2 illustrates the colonisation status, detection 
and decolonisation states of a patient and the main state transitions. 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Patient colonisation status, detection and decolonisation states and main 
state transitions 
 
4.4.6 Patient Location and Movements (including Isolation) 
After admission, a patient may be moved from one bay to another. Furthermore, 
detected colonised patients will move to an isolation bed if there is one available. Not 
all isolation beds are used for the sole purpose of isolating MRSA colonised patients. 
The isolation beds may be used for patients with other types of infectious diseases 
(e.g., C. difficile) or patients with special clinical needs. Therefore, the model has a 
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parameter representing the probability that an isolation attempt fails due to a reason 
other than all isolation beds are occupied by MRSA colonised patients. As a result, 
isolation may fail even when the model suggests that there are empty isolation beds in 
the isolation rooms. Under such circumstances, to reflect the real ward situation, a 
random patient in the bay rather than the colonised patient will move to an isolation 
bed. 
 
A patient who stays in an isolation bed will normally remain in isolation until the 
patient is discharged; the only exception is that if the decolonisation treatment is 
found to have been successful then the patient may move out. Figure 4.3 illustrates a 
patient’s ward locations and movements in a hospital ward with three ward bays and 
one isolation room. 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Patient ward locations and movements in the hospital ward 
 
4.4.7 Type of Patient Agent 
In the MRSA model, the behaviour rules of patient agents are normally reactive rather 
than proactive in nature. In other words, patient agents are largely controlled by the 
hospital and their behaviours are highly confined by the hospital environment. As a 
result, patient agents in the model are not as intelligent and adaptive as the agents in 
some ABS models. Among different definitions and categorisations of ABS and 
agents, the patient agents in the model fit in with North and Macal’s concept of agents 
(North and Macal 2007). In their definition, agent potentially may have five different 
properties (see detailed description in Section 1.3.3) and agents may have some but 
not all of these properties. The important thing to be deemed as ABS is that the model 
is structured in such a way that missing features can be easily added within the 
established modelling framework. In the proposed model, patient agents are self-
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contained independent individuals that are situated in the hospital environment and 
interact with other agents and the environment. They are not adaptive or proactive, but 
they are still agents who have complex reactive behaviour rules.  
 
 
4.5 Model MRSA Transmission 
The transmission of MRSA is modelled between pairs of agents, modifying the 
widely used mass action assumption (see Section 3.7.3). The general equations for 
determining the rate of colonisations of a susceptible patient and the transmission 
probability are given in Equation 3.4 and 3.3 in Chapter 3. 
 
4.5.1 Transmission Probability Equations 
In the ABS model, each patient is heterogeneous and has his/her own attributes which 
may affect the probability of transmission. All possible pairs of susceptible-colonised 
patients are assessed at each time step. The susceptible patient in the pair may have a 
specific vulnerability while the colonised patient in the pair may have a particular 
infectivity. The relative spatial adjacency of the two patients in the pair may also 
affect transmission. 
 
Detected colonised patient 
The infectivity of a colonised patient will be reduced if the MRSA colonisation is 
detected and he/she receives decolonisation treatment. The reduced infectivity is 
denoted by the parameter k, which is a multiplying factor and takes the value between 
zero (i.e., detection and treatment can totally eliminate the infectivity of the colonised 
patient) and one (i.e., detection and treatment have no effect in reducing infectivity 
during the treatment). When k takes a value in between, it means that the infectivity of 
the colonised patient is reduced by (1-k)*100 percent due to the detection and the 
decolonisation treatment. 
 
Local versus whole ward interactions 
The transmission probability equations also allow for the spatial adjacency of the two 
patients in the pair and treat the global and local interactions differently by 
introducing the parameter m. Each patient in the ward has two levels of interactions at 
the same time; one is the local interactions with adjacent patients within the same 
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ward bay (e.g., direct physical contacts between neighbouring patients), and the other 
is the global interactions with every patient in the ward, including the patients in the 
same ward bay and the isolation room (e.g., indirect contacts facilitated by the nurses 
or doctors who serve all patients in the ward). The parameter m, which takes the value 
from zero to one, represents the fraction of a patient’s local interactions, while (1-m) 
represents the proportion of a patient’s global interactions. Therefore, when two 
patients do not stay in the same bay, they can only have global interactions; while if 
the two patients stay in the same local environment, they will have both local and 
global interactions. 
 
When both patients in the pair stay in the same bay, the multiplying factor of 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+− 1
1
1 wardbay n
m
n
m  is included in the equation where the first term represents the 
transmission risk caused by local interactions and the second term represents the 
transmission risk caused by global interactions between the two patients. The 
parameters of bayn  and wardn  represent the total number of patients in the bay where 
the two patients in the pair stay and the total number of patients in the whole ward 
respectively. Alternatively, if two patients in the pair do not stay in the same bay, the 
multiplying factor of 
1
1
−
−
wardn
m  is included in the equation which only reflects the 
global interactions.  
 
Patient Vulnerability 
The parameter V is a multiplying factor that represents the vulnerability of the 
susceptible patient in the pair where the ‘normal’ patient has the vulnerability of one. 
Therefore, the value of V may be above one if the patient has been admitted to ICU 
and/or needs invasive devices. Table 4.1 shows the equations for calculating the rate 
of colonisations the susceptible patient may experience due to the colonised patient in 
the pair during a single time step.  
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Table 4.1 Equations for calculating the rate of colonisations of susceptible patients 
Scenarios  Colonised 
patient 
Susceptible 
patient 
Rate of colonisations 
1 Undetected Same bay 
t
n
m
n
mVCt
wardbay
∆⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−⋅⋅=∆ 1
1
1
)(λ  
2 Undetected Other 
bays/Isolation tn
mVCt
ward
∆⋅−
−⋅⋅=∆
1
1)(λ  
3 Detected & 
Under 
Treatment 
Same bay 
t
n
m
n
mkVCt
wardbay
∆⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−⋅⋅⋅=∆ 1
1
1
)(λ
4 Detected & 
Under 
Treatment 
Other 
bays/Isolation tn
mkVCt
ward
∆⋅−
−⋅⋅⋅=∆
1
1)(λ  
 
In the equations, the parameter C is defined as the number of secondary cases incurred 
by one colonised patient per day, assuming a large population of susceptible patients. 
In previous studies, the range of values of C was found to lie between 0.017 and 0.465 
(Cooper et al. 2004; Raboud et al. 2005; Robotham et al. 2006; McBryde et al. 2007). 
The value of C may depend on the particular hospital environment and the patients 
involved in the study and will need to be re-assessed for each study. The value of V 
depends on the patient’s risk factors and can be estimated from the relative risk or 
odds ratio (Stewart 2002). The parameter of k and m all take values between zero and 
one, and in the hospital setting where the average length of stay of patients is only a 
few days, the choice of time-slice, or t∆ , is normally one day or even shorter. For the 
denominators, for a typical hospital ward where ward occupancy is normally above 
80%, bayn  may take values up to six for a ward bay and wardn  may take values up to 
thirty or even more.  
 
Once the rate of colonisations of the susceptible patient is obtained, the probability 
that the susceptible patient may actually get colonised can be calculated using 
Equation 3.3 (i.e., )(1)( tetP ∆−−=∆ λ ).  
 
4.5.2 Modelling Infection Transmission by Time-slicing 
The time-slicing time advance mechanism is used to model MRSA transmission 
between pairs of patient agents. The interval between two successive evaluations is set 
at t∆  days. At the end of each time-slice, all possible colonised-susceptible pairs are 
formed and evaluated separately and independently. Mathematically, if Nc and Ns 
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represent the number of colonised and susceptible patients in the ward at the end of a 
certain time-slice, then each colonised patient will form Ns pairs, each susceptible 
patient will form Nc pairs, and thus the total number of pairs formed and evaluated 
during the time-slice is NcNs. This implies that a single susceptible patient will be 
evaluated multiple times during one time-slice if there is more than one colonised 
patient in the ward. Under such circumstances, since each pair evaluation is 
independent and separate, the susceptible patient will become colonised as long as one 
of the evaluations determines a transmission actually takes place.  
 
 
4.6 Model Structure  
The MRSA model has a hierarchical structure which consists of the overall system 
environment, i.e., the hospital ward, and the individual local agents, i.e., the patients 
(see Figure 4.4). At the ward level where individual patients are situated and interact 
with each other, global variables are used to define the ward layout, the intervention 
policies, the common characteristics of MRSA such as the transmissibility and 
common features shared by all patients such as the arrival rate and proportion of 
patients colonised on admission.  
 
Individual patient attributes are represented by local variables. Patient states and the 
behaviour rules governing the state transitions are defined by two state-charts in 
Anylogic®. One state-chart represents the colonisation status, detection and 
decolonisation treatment states of the patient and the corresponding behaviour rules 
that govern the changes among these states. The other state-chart represents the 
location states of the patient and the corresponding bed allocation and patient 
movement rules, including the isolation policy. The two state-charts also interact with 
each other since a patient’s colonisation status and detection states may affect its 
location states (e.g., a detected colonised patient may be isolated) and vice versa (e.g., 
a colonised patient poses less transmission risk if he/she is isolated). The behaviour 
rules are represented by either pre-defined functions of the state-chart, or, for more 
complicated and flexible rules such as the MRSA transmission, by tailor-made Java 
scripts which are supported by Anylogic®.   
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Some behaviour rules are modelled with the help of the message exchange 
mechanism. For example, a patient who leaves an isolation bed may send a message 
to a random patient in the ward bay who is waiting to be isolated. Messages can also 
be exchanged between different state-charts of the same agent. For example, when a 
colonised patient is detected by the screening test, an ‘isolation request’ message will 
be sent to the location and movement state-chart of the same patient; upon receiving 
this message, the recipient state-chart will trigger the corresponding behaviour rule 
that attempts to isolate the patient. 
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Figure 4.4 Structure of the agent-based simulation model 
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4.7 Summary  
Applying the framework proposed in the previous chapter, this chapter presents the 
first known attempt to build an ABS model to study the transmission of HAIs in 
general and MRSA in particular. The scope of the model is a hospital ward in which 
each individual patient is explicitly represented as an agent which will interact with 
other patient agents and the ward environment. The vulnerability and infectivity of the 
patient are incorporated into the model. Each patient has multiple concurrent streams 
of states which represent colonisation, detection, decolonisation treatment and 
location. The transmission of MRSA is modelled between pairs of individuals in 
successive time-slices. Various MRSA intervention policies are embedded in the 
model including admission and repeat screening tests, shorter test turnaround time, 
isolation and decolonisation treatment.  
 
The model will be configured with and validated against observed data from the 
empirical research study (see Chapter 5). Once reasonable confidence is placed on the 
model, the intervention policies and influencing factors will be systematically 
evaluated by model experimentation (see Chapter 6). 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Model Configuration and Validation 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the proposed MRSA model will be validated against empirical 
observation so that certain level of confidence can be placed on the model. If the 
model can reasonably represent or ‘predict’ what has happened in reality, the model 
can be safely applied for various ‘what-if’ scenarios. In this study, confidence of the 
model can be obtained if the predicted MRSA transmission dynamics may 
consistently match the observed transmission dynamics across all study wards in the 
hospital. 
 
 
5.2 Model Configuration 
The MRSA research study, on which the model was based, was carried out on seven 
surgical wards with a cross-over after eight months on each, creating fourteen 
scenarios in all. For each scenario, the model will be configured with a unique set of 
input parameter values based on the observed data from that particular ward and study 
period.  
 
There are two main data sources for estimating the input parameter values. Whenever 
possible, empirical observed data from are used; but where this is not possible, 
previous literature, local expertise or assumptions need to be applied. One special 
input parameter is the transmission coefficient, the value of which will neither be 
directly estimated from observation nor be based on previous literature, expertise or 
assumptions. Instead, the value of the transmission coefficient will be determined by 
fitting the model to observed data during the calibration-validation process (see 
Section 5.3). The input parameter values can also be classified in terms of their 
universality:  
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• The values which are shared by all fourteen scenarios (e.g., transmission 
coefficient). 
• The values which are unique for the same study ward, regardless of the study 
period (e.g., ward layout information)  
• The values which are unique for different wards and different study periods 
(e.g., length of stay). 
 
5.2.1 Input Parameter Values 
In this section, the values and sources of input parameters for the model validation are 
estimated and discussed. Data cleaning is performed on the database of the MRSA 
study before they are used for the modelling study. Detailed information about data 
cleaning is given in Appendix C. 
 
Ward Layout 
Seven study wards that are involved in the research study have different ward layouts 
regarding the total number of beds in the ward, a breakdown of the number of beds in 
each ward bay, and the number of isolation beds in each ward. All the information 
about ward layout was obtained directly from the hospital (see Table 5.1).  
 
Table 5.1 Study ward layout information  
Ward 
A B C D E F G 
Total beds in the ward (beds) 34 27 34 25 20 34 25 
Isolation beds in the ward (beds) 2 2 4 3 2 4 3 
Beds in bay 1 (beds) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Beds in bay 2 (beds) 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Beds in bay 3 (beds) 6 6 6 5 6 6 5 
Beds in bay 4 (beds) 7 7 6 5 n/a 6 5 
Beds in bay 5 (beds) 7 n/a 6 n/a n/a 6 n/a 
 
Screening Test 
Input parameters regarding the screening test include the actual turnaround time of the 
culture or rapid test for each scenario and the interval of repeat screening. The average 
test turnaround time for each of the fourteen scenarios is estimated directly from the 
observed data (see Table 5.2). According to the clinical protocol of the research study, 
every patient, except those who are identified as colonised with MRSA, will be 
screened every four days during their stay in the ward (Hardy et al. 2007). Therefore, 
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the interval for repeat screening test is set at four days across all scenarios. In the 
study, patients who are detected as colonised with MRSA within forty-eight hours of 
admission are defined as primary cases. The observed data also show that admission 
screening test is not always performed on the day a patient is admitted to the ward. 
Therefore, it is assumed that the time between the patient’s admission and the 
admission screening follows a uniform distribution between zero and two days. 
 
Table 5.2 Observed average test turnaround times for MRSA screening tests 
Ward A B C D E F G 
Study period Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po
Test turnaround 
time (days) 
0.8 3.3 0.6 3.3 0.8 2.9 0.7 3.0 3.4 1.0 3.6 0.7 3.3 0.7
Pr: pre-crossover period; Po: post-crossover period. 
 
Decolonisation Treatment 
Input parameters regarding decolonisation treatment include the delay to the start of 
the treatment after the positive test result is reported, and the duration and success rate 
of the treatment. The average delay to the start of the treatment of each scenario is 
estimated from the observed data (see Table 5.3) and the actual delay in the model is 
sampled from the exponential distribution where the mean is set at the observed 
average delay.  
 
Table 5.3 Observed average delays to the start of the decolonisation treatment after 
MRSA detection 
Ward A B C D E F G 
Study period Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po
Decolonisation 
treatment 
delay (days) 
0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.6 1 0.5
Pr: pre-crossover period; Po: post-crossover period. 
 
The duration of treatment complies with the clinical protocol which is five days 
(Hardy et al. 2007). Once the treatment is over, the patient will wait for two days 
before being re-screened to confirm the outcome of the treatment. The treatment is 
deemed as successful if three successive weekly test results are negative. The average 
success rate of the treatment is 74.7% which is estimated from the pooled observed 
data and will be applied across all scenarios. 
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In the model, if the treatment is successful, the patient’s colonisation status will 
change to susceptible immediately after the treatment. As the success of the treatment 
needs to be confirmed by three successive negative results, the patient will only move 
back to a ward bay (if the patient is in isolation during the treatment) once the third 
negative test result is reported. If the treatment fails, it is assumed that the patient will 
receive the treatment again once the first positive test result is reported. 
 
Vulnerability of Susceptible Patients 
Input parameters regarding vulnerability of susceptible patients include the probability 
of a patient being admitted to ICU, the probability of a patient being given invasive 
devices and the relative impacts of these risk factors on patient’s vulnerability. Based 
on observed data, the probabilities of a patient being admitted to ICU and being given 
invasive devices for each scenario are estimated and shown in Table 5.4 and 5.5 
respectively.  
 
Table 5.4 Observed probability of a patient being admitted to ICU 
Ward A B C D E F G 
Study period Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po
ICU admission 
probability (%) 
37.2
% 
42.9
% 
1.7
%
0.8
5%
7.8
% 
7.1
% 
1.5
%
1.1
% 
3.1
% 
2.9
% 
5.4
% 
5.1
% 
1.6
% 
1 
%
Pr: pre-crossover period; Po: post-crossover period. 
 
Table 5.5 Observed probability of a patient being given invasive devices 
Ward A B C D E F G 
Study period Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po 
Invasive devices 
application 
probability (%) 
86.1
% 
89.2
% 
62.4
% 
68.7
% 
78.3
% 
85.7
% 
79.2
% 
88.3
% 
75.8
% 
91.3
% 
77.7
% 
79.1
% 
73.9
% 
85.8
% 
Pr: pre-crossover period; Po: post-crossover period. 
 
The relative impacts of the two risk factors are also estimated from the observed data. 
Patients are classified into four categories depending on the two risk factors (see 2nd 
and 3rd columns of Table 5.6). Based on the observed data, the relative risk of 
acquiring MRSA for the patients in each category is determined using standard 
techniques (Stewart 2002). Appendix D gives the detailed discussion of the definition 
of relative risk and how each relative risk is calculated. The relative risks of each 
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patient category are shown in the 5th column of Table 5.6. For example, compared to 
patients who have neither been admitted to ICU nor been given invasive devices, 
patients who have been admitted to ICU but not been given invasive devices are 4.6 
times more likely to acquire MRSA.  
 
The relative risks of the four categories of patient range from 1 to 6.23 which means 
the average risk of patients is above one. The relative risks need to be standardised so 
that the average risk of patients equals one, which is requested by the model (see 
Section 4.5.1). In order to estimate the standardised risk for each category, the 
proportion of patient in each category is used as the weighting factor (see the 4th 
column of Table 5.6). The last column of Table 5.6 shows the standardised risks of 
each patient category which are 0.356, 1.637, 0.826 and 2.217 respectively.  
 
Table 5.6 The impacts of ICU admission and invasive device application on patient’s 
vulnerability to MRSA 
Patient 
category 
ICU 
admission 
Invasive 
devices 
application
Percentage 
of patients 
(%) 
Relative 
risk 
Weighted 
mean risk 
Standardised 
risk 
   a b Σ ( a * b ) b /  Σ ( a * b )
1 No No 19.4% 1 0.1942 0.356 
2 Yes No 1% 4.6 0.0441 1.637 
3 No Yes 61.3% 2.33 1.4272 0.826 
4 Yes Yes 18.4% 6.23 1.1446 2.217 
Total   100%  2.81  
 
Length of Stay 
In order to reflect the actual lengths of stay of patients during each scenario as close 
as possible, lengths of stay in the validation models are represented by empirical 
distributions rather than parametric distributions, i.e., the lengths of stay of each 
scenario is represented by step-wise distributions which closely follow the pattern of 
the observed data.  
 
Another distinctive feature of representing the length of stay in the model is to 
distinguish the lengths of stay of patients who are primary cases (i.e. patients who are 
already colonised on admission) from those who are not. Table 5.7 shows the 
observed average length of stay for all patients, primary case patients, non-primary 
case patients, and the absolute and relative differences between the lengths of stay of 
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primary and non-primary case patients of each scenario. The observation shows that 
the average length of stay of primary case patients is significant higher than non-
primary case patients in most scenarios (thirteen out of fourteen). An example of two 
empirical distributions (one for the lengths of stay of non-primary case patients and 
the other for primary case patients) which have been used to configure one of the 
fourteen validation models are shown in the form of histogram in Figure 5.1 and 5.2. 
Appendix E gives the detailed empirical distributions for all fourteen validation 
models. 
 
Table 5.7 Observed mean lengths of stay for all patients, primary case patients and 
non-primary case patients 
Ward (study 
period) 
All 
patients 
(days) 
Non-primary 
case patients 
(days) 
Primary case 
patients 
(days) 
Absolute 
difference 
(days) 
Relative 
difference 
(%) 
 a b c c - b ( c – b ) / b
Ward A pre 7.54 7.46 9.04 1.58 21.2% 
Ward A post 7.54 7.52 8.74 1.22 16.2% 
Ward B pre 3.99 3.85 10.64 6.79 176.4% 
Ward B post 2.47 2.45 3.58 1.13 46.1% 
Ward C pre 7.62 7.43 11.63 4.2 56.5% 
Ward C post 6.68 6.61 10.50 3.89 58.9% 
Ward D pre 11.50 11.19 22.36 11.17 99.8% 
Ward D post 10.10 9.93 18.86 8.93 89.9% 
Ward E pre 7.80 7.56 16.45 8.89 117.6% 
Ward E post 6.27 6.17 8.12 1.95 31.6% 
Ward F pre 7.44 7.39 9.05 1.66 22.5% 
Ward F post 6.72 6.76 5.50 -1.26 -18.6% 
Ward G pre 13.11 12.96 16.94 3.98 30.7% 
Ward G post 10.41 10.02 24.93 14.91 148.8% 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
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Figure 5.1 Empirical distribution of the lengths of stay of non-primary case patients 
for pre-crossover period of ward A 
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Figure 5.2 Empirical distribution of the lengths of stay of primary case patients for 
pre-crossover period for ward A 
 
Arrival Rate and Endemic Setting 
Patient arrival rates for all scenarios are directly estimated from observed data by 
dividing the total number of days in the study period by the corresponding total 
number of admissions in that period (see Table 5.8). The proportion of patients 
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colonised with MRSA on admission, or the endemic setting, of each scenario is also 
estimated from observed data by dividing the number of primary cases by the total 
number of admissions in each scenario (Table 5.8). 
 
Table 5.8 Observed patient arrival rate and proportion of patients colonised with 
MRSA on admission 
Ward (study 
period) 
Total 
admissions  
Study period 
(days) 
Patient arrival rate 
(patients per day)
Primary 
cases 
Endemic 
setting (%)
 a b c = a / b d e =  d / a 
Ward A pre 1088 243 4.48 58 5.3% 
Ward A post 997 242 4.12 18 1.8% 
Ward B pre 894 243 3.68 22 2.5% 
Ward B post 1933 242 7.99 27 1.4% 
Ward C pre 1070 243 4.40 60 5.6% 
Ward C post 1050 242 4.34 32 3.0% 
Ward D pre 479 243 1.97 17 3.5% 
Ward D post 543 242 2.24 16 2.9% 
Ward E pre 638 243 2.63 29 4.5% 
Ward E post 788 242 3.26 43 5.5% 
Ward F pre 1065 243 4.38 41 3.8% 
Ward F post 1171 242 4.84 49 4.2% 
Ward G pre 445 243 1.83 24 5.4% 
Ward G post 521 242 2.15 17 3.3% 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
 
Availability of Isolation Beds 
The isolation beds in the ward are not solely reserved for MRSA patients. Patients 
who are identified to have other infectious diseases (e.g., C. difficile) or require 
special clinical care may also occupy the isolation facilities. The parameter of 
isolation bed availability reflects the probability that detected MRSA patients can not 
be isolated due to such reasons. The parameter values are estimated from the observed 
data (see Table 5.9). For example, for ward A during the pre-crossover period, the 
probability that a detected MRSA patient can be successfully isolated is 23.8%. 
 
Table 5.9 Observed availability of isolation beds 
Ward A B C D E F G 
Study period Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po Pr Po
Isolation bed 
availability (%) 
23.8
% 
35.7
% 
31.5
% 
25.0
% 
9.8
%
41.0
% 
10.0
% 
36.4
% 
14.9
% 
18.3
% 
22.6
% 
18.1
% 
22.6
% 
5.4
%
Pr: pre-crossover period; Po: post-crossover period. 
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Assumed Values for Other Parameters 
Apart from the transmission coefficient, key model assumptions including m 
(proportion of transmission risk coming from within the same bay compared to the 
whole ward), k (effectiveness of decolonisation treatment) and s (inter-bay movement 
rate) are derived from local expertise and assumptions, and share the same value 
across all scenarios for model validation. It is assumed that roughly two thirds of the 
transmission risk is caused within the same bay due to local interactions while the rest 
of the risk is determined by the ward-level interactions. Therefore, the parameter of m 
is set at 0.667. The parameter of k is set at 0.4 for patients undergoing decolonisation 
treatment. It assumes that colonised patients who receive decolonisation treatment 
may reduce their infectivity by 60%. Since the values of both parameters are based on 
assumptions, sensitivity analysis will be performed on both m and k during model 
experimentation. The parameter of s is set at 0.1 which assumes, on average, a patient 
is moved from one bay to another every ten days during the ward stay. The actual 
interval between each inter-bay movement is sampled from an exponential 
distribution with a mean interval of 10 days. Table 5.10 summaries the input 
parameter values of the fourteen validation models. 
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Table 5.10 Summary of input parameter values for model validation 
Parameter values 
A B C D E F G 
Category Parameter name  
pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post pre post 
Total beds in a ward (beds)  34 27 34 25 20 34 25 
Isolation beds in a ward (beds)  2 2 4 3 2 4 3 
Beds in bay1 (beds)  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Beds in bay2 (beds)  6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Beds in bay3 (beds)  6 6 6 5 6 6 5 
Beds in bay4 (beds)  7 7 6 5 n/a 6 5 
Ward layout 
Beds in bay5(beds)  7 n/a 6 n/a n/a 6 n/a 
Test turnaround time(days)  0.8 3.3 0.6 3.3 0.8 2.9 0.7 3 3.4 1 3.6 0.7 3.3 0.7 Screening test
Repeat screening interval 
(days) 
 4 
Delay of treatment (days)  0.6 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.7 0.6 1 0.5 
Treatment duration (days)  5 Decolonisation treatment Treatment success rate (%)  74.7% 
Probability admitted to ICU 
(%) 
 37.2
% 
42.9
% 
1.7
% 
0.85
% 
7.8
% 
7.1
% 
1.5
% 
1.1
% 
3.1
% 
2.9
% 
5.4
% 
5.1
% 
1.6
% 
1% 
Probability of giving invasive 
device (%) 
 86.1
% 
89.2
% 
62.4
% 
68.7
% 
78.3
% 
85.7
% 
79.2
% 
88.3
% 
75.8
% 
91.3
% 
77.7
% 
79.1
% 
73.9
% 
85.8
% 
0.356    (No ICU admission and No invasive devices applications) 
1.637   (ICU admission but No invasive device applications) 
0.826   (No ICU admission but invasive device application) 
Vulnerability 
Impact on vulnerability due to 
ICU admission and invasive 
devices application 
 
 
V
 2.217 (ICU admission and invasive devices application) 
All patients LOS (days)  7.05 7.05 3.55 2.06 7.15 6.2 11.0
1 
9.61 7.32 5.78 6.96 6.24 12.6
2 
10.4
1 
Non-primary case patients 
LOS (days) 
 6.97 7.04 3.41 2.04 6.95 6.13 10.7 9.45 7.07 5.69 6.91 6.28 12.4
7 
10.0
2 
Length of 
stay 
Primary case patients LOS 
(days) 
 8.56 8.24 10.1
4 
3.22 11.1
6 
10 21.8
6 
18.4
1 
15.9
5 
7.62 8.56 5.01 16.4
7 
24.9
3 
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Patient arrival rate (patients 
per day) 
 4.48 4.12 3.68 7.99 4.4 4.34 1.97 2.24 2.63 3.26 4.38 4.84 1.83 2.15 
Endemic setting (%)  5.3
% 
1.8
% 
2.5
% 
1.4
% 
5.6
% 
3% 3.5
% 
2.9
% 
4.5
% 
5.5
% 
3.8
% 
4.2
% 
5.4
% 
3.3
% 
Other 
information 
Availability of isolation beds 
(%) 
 23.8
% 
35.7
% 
31.5
% 
25.0
% 
9.8
% 
41.0
% 
10.0
% 
36.4
% 
14.9
% 
18.3
% 
22.6
% 
18.1
% 
22.6
% 
5.4
% 
Transmission coefficient  C To be fitted with observed data 
Proportion of risk within bay m 0.667 
Treatment effect on infectivity k 0.4 
Other model 
assumptions 
Inter-bay movement rate s 0.1 
   Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period; LOS: length of stay. 
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5.2.2 Data for Model Validation 
Empirical observation that will be compared to model responses includes the actual 
number of secondary cases, the transmission ratio and the “average time to detection” 
of each scenario (see Table 5.11). The number of secondary cases is obtained from the 
observed data and the transmission ratio which is the ratio of the secondary case to the 
primary case is calculated (see Table 5.8). For each detected MRSA patient, the time 
to detection measures the delay between the time the patient is admitted to the ward 
and the time the patient is detected as colonised with MRSA. For each scenario, the 
average time to detection is estimated from the observed data. 
 
Table 5.11 Observed data to be compared with model responses 
Ward (study 
period) 
Secondary 
cases 
Transmission 
ratio 
Average time to 
detection (days)
Ward A pre 18 0.31 10.7 
Ward A post 36 2.00 12.8 
Ward B pre 6 0.27 14.2 
Ward B post 4 0.15 8.3 
Ward C pre 34 0.57 15.4 
Ward C post 20 0.63 13.8 
Ward D pre 8 0.47 19.3 
Ward D post 11 0.69 9.7 
Ward E pre 36 1.24 13.4 
Ward E post 15 0.35 8.1 
Ward F pre 38 0.93 13.8 
Ward F post 23 0.47 13.4 
Ward G pre 12 0.50 13.4 
Ward G post 7 0.41 6.4 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
 
 
5.3. Model Validation 
Regarding the validation of epidemiological models, Cooper (2007) argued that the 
best we are able to say is that we can not reject the model following confrontations 
with observed data, and we will expect to gain more confidence in a model that 
repeatedly passes such a test. One advantage of this study is that there is a large 
amount of observed data and more importantly, there are fourteen separate scenarios 
based on which the model can be repeatedly tested and validated. In each scenario, 
input parameter values that are derived mainly from the empirical data are used to 
configure the model and the dynamic model responses will, in turn, be compared with 
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the corresponding observations. Such repeated model validation tests are beneficial to 
gain confidence in the model, and have seldom been carried out in previous HAI 
modelling studies due to the lack of observed data. 
 
5.3.1 Validation Method 
 
Chance Effect and Multiple Replication Simulation Runs 
Chance effect or randomness is one of the key features of HAIs (see Section 1.2.2). 
Given the same initial conditions, the transmission dynamics may be very different 
simply due to the intrinsic stochasticity of the spread of infectious diseases within a 
small patient population. Figure 5.3 demonstrates two different transmission dynamics 
realised by two simulation runs with exactly the same initial conditions and input 
parameter values. Due to chance effects, conclusions drawn from simulation models, 
either for model validation or experimentation, must be based on multiple replications 
so that the mean and the variations of model responses can be estimated. Therefore, it 
was decided that 500 replications of simulation runs should be performed for each 
distinctive set of input parameter values during model validation and experimentation. 
Furthermore, in order to get rid of the initial bias, a warm-up period of 50 days is 
added for each simulation run and consequently only simulation data after 50 days are 
collected for analysis. The time needed to run a single replication of the model for a 
year was about 1 second on a personal computer with a 2.2GHz Intel processor. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Realisation of two transmission dynamics by two simulation runs with the 
same initial condition and input parameter values (blue line: number of total patients 
in the ward; brown line: number of susceptible patients in the ward; green line: 
number of colonised patients in the ward) 
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To demonstrate that the hospital ward has settled into a steady state after 50 days, 
Figure 5.4 shows the time-series of the mean number of patients in the hospital ward 
from 30 replications. The model is configured with model inputs of ward A during the 
pre-crossover period (see Table 5.10) assuming a transmission coefficient of 0.1. 
Figure 5.4 indicates that the mean number patients in the hospital ward increases from 
zero (the hospital ward is empty at the beginning of the simulation) to about 31 during 
the first 50 days; afterwards the mean number of patients levels off and varies in a 
small range between 29 and 33 patients.  
 
 
Figure 5.4 Time-series of the mean number of patients in the hospital ward from 30 
replications 
 
To demonstrate that 500 replications are enough to obtain accurate model responses, 
the confidence interval method is applied (Robinson 2004). Figure 5.5 shows the 
cumulative mean and the confidence interval of the transmission ratio from 1000 
replications of the model configured with inputs of ward A during the pre-crossover 
period assuming a transmission coefficient of 0.1. A significant level of 5% is used to 
construct the confidence interval which ensures a 95% probability that the value of the 
‘true’ mean transmission ratio lies within the calculated confidence interval. For each 
replication, the simulation is run for 415 days with 50 days warm-up period and 365 
days for data collection. Figure 5.5 demonstrates that the confidence interval is 
sufficiently narrow and the cumulative mean line (the thick line in the middle) 
becomes almost a flat line after 500 replications are performed. The precision of the 
Model Configuration and Validation 
 
 111
model response, which is defined as half the width of the confidence Interval 
expressed as a percentage of the cumulative mean (Robinson 2004), is about 1.9% 
after 500 replications. 
 
 
Figure 5.5 Cumulative mean and confidence interval of the transmission ratio from 
1000 replications 
 
The Calibration-Validation Process 
The procedure to validate the model follows the calibration-validation process, in 
which all fourteen scenarios are randomly split up into two groups, one for the 
parameter calibration process and the other for the model validation process.  
 
The only parameter to be calibrated is the transmission coefficient which is defined as 
the number of secondary cases incurred by one primary case per day assuming a large 
population of susceptible patients in the system. The transmission coefficient is the 
key parameter to define the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases. However, it 
is also difficult to estimate the parameter directly from observation (Cooper and 
Lipsitch 2004). As a result, the transmission coefficient has been the subject of many 
previous modelling studies in which mathematical compartmental models were fitted 
to observed data to calibrate the coefficient (Grundmann et al. 2002; Pelupessy et al. 
2002; Cooper and Lipsitch 2004; Forrester et al. 2005).  
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During the following model validation stage, the transmission coefficient calibrated in 
the calibration stage will be applied to the rest of the scenarios, and comparisons 
between observations and model responses will be performed to determine how close 
the model can represent the real system.  
 
Parameter Calibration  
During parameter calibration, the best estimate of the transmission coefficient for 
each scenario in the calibration group is estimated. All these best estimates of the 
transmission coefficient will then be used calculate the overall transmission 
coefficient for the following validation stage. 
 
For each calibration scenario, the transmission coefficient is tested on a range of 
values to find the best-fit coefficient that leads to the closest match between the 
observed transmission ratio and the mean transmission ratio predicted by the model 
through 500 replications. During parameter calibration, all other input parameters, 
except the transmission coefficient, will take the values given in Table 5.10. 
 
In order to find the best estimate of the transmission coefficient for each scenario, the 
coefficient is initially set at 0.1 which is an arbitrary value based on the estimations 
from previous studies (Hotchkiss et al. 2005; McBryde et al. 2007). Starting with the 
initial values, the model is run for 500 replications and the mean predicted 
transmission ratio is compared with the observed transmission ratio (see Table 5.11). 
If the former is larger than the latter, which indicates that the coefficient in the current 
model is too high, the coefficient is decreased by one small unit and the comparison 
will be repeated. Otherwise, if the mean transmission ratio is smaller than what is 
observed, which indicates the coefficient in the current model is too low, the 
comparison will be repeated with the coefficient being increased by one small unit. 
The small unit chosen in the study is 0.001. This iterative process continues until two 
consecutive comparisons give two distinctive results with one showing mean model 
response is slightly higher than the observation and the other showing the opposite. 
The search will stop at this point and the coefficient which gives the smaller absolute 
difference between the mean model response and the observation is chosen to be the 
best estimate of the transmission coefficient for this scenario. 
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Once the estimates of the transmission coefficient from all scenarios in the calibration 
group are obtained, a weighted mean coefficient is calculated to be the overall 
transmission coefficient. In this study, the number of secondary cases in each scenario 
is selected as the weighting factor since it is a reasonable indicator of the magnitude 
of MRSA transmission in each scenario and the data are available from observation. 
 
Model Validation 
During the model validation stage, the weighted mean transmission coefficient 
determined in the calibration stage will be used to test the fit of the model to the 
observed data for all scenarios in the validation group. For each scenario, the model 
will be run for 500 replications and the mean and distribution of various model 
responses (not only the transmission ratio, but also the absolute number of secondary 
cases and the average time to detection) will be compared with the corresponding 
observations.  
 
Due to chance effects, each observed scenario is just one possible realisation which 
may take place for that ward during that study period with the same input parameter 
values. Therefore, the single observation itself does not necessarily represent the 
theoretical average transmission dynamics and it may even be an extreme case. As 
Robinson (2004) argued that real world data, even if “accurate”, are only a sample 
which in itself creates inaccuracy. Therefore, when a single outcome from the 
observation (e.g., the observed transmission ratio of one scenario) is compared with 
the corresponding model responses (e.g., the mean and distributions of transmission 
ratios predicted by 500 replications of the same scenario), they are unlikely to be an 
exact match. 
 
In order to compare rationally a single observation with the corresponding model 
responses, it is reasonable to look at whether the single observation is within certain 
range of the model responses (e.g., within two standard deviations, or within first and 
third quartiles). The practice has been used for the validation of HAI models (Austin 
et al. 1999; Grundmann et al. 2002). In this study, for each validation scenario, the 
single observation will be compared with the first and third quartiles, and tenth and 
ninetieth percentiles of the model responses from 500 replications. Standard deviation 
is not used for the comparisons since the model responses do not follow the normal 
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distribution (see Section 5.3.2). Paired-t statistical tests are also applied to test the 
difference between the observed and mean model responses. 
 
5.3.2 Validation Results 
Among the fourteen scenarios from the research study, one scenario, which 
corresponds to the post-crossover study period of ward A, is excluded from the 
validation analysis since the ward was closed for refurbishment for a couple of 
months in that period and the number of isolation beds was changed after the 
refurbishment.  
 
In order to reduce the bias from certain wards and ensure that both calibration and 
validation sample groups can be a fair representation of all study wards, every 
scenario in the calibration group must come from a different ward. The result of the 
sample split-up was that the pre-crossover period of ward A, E and G, and the post-
crossover period of ward B, D and F are used for the parameter calibration stage; 
while the remaining seven scenarios are used for the model validation stage. 
 
Parameter Calibration 
For each scenario in the calibration group, the procedure described in Section 5.3.1 is 
applied to find one best estimate of the theoretical transmission coefficient. Table 5.12 
shows each estimate of the transmission coefficient from the calibration scenarios and 
the weighted mean transmission coefficient which is used for the validation stage. The 
numbers of secondary cases used to weight each estimate of the transmission 
coefficient are also given in the table. The six estimates of the transmission coefficient 
range from 0.063 to 0.180 and the weighted mean coefficient is 0.1404. 
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Table 5.12 Parameter calibration for transmission coefficient 
Ward Study 
period 
Type of 
screening test
Estimate 
of C  
Observed 
secondary cases
 Weighted 
mean C 
   a b b * a 
∑
∑ ×
b
ab )(  
A Pre PCR 0.063 18 1.134  
B Post Culture 0.105 4 0.420  
D Post Culture 0.151 11 1.661  
E Pre Culture 0.180 36 6.480  
F Post PCR 0.162 23 3.726  
G Pre Culture 0.098 12 1.176  
    104 14.597 0.1404 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period; C: transmission coefficient. 
 
Model Validation – Comparison between Observation and Model Responses 
The weighted mean transmission coefficient is used for all seven scenarios in the 
model validation group. 500 replications are performed for each scenario and the 
model predictions are compared with the observed transmission ratio, number of 
secondary cases and the average time to detection.  
 
Normality tests are performed to ascertain whether the 500 individual model 
responses of the transmission ratio in each scenario follow a normal distribution. The 
tests were carried out in MINITAB® and the methods applied include the Anderson-
Darling test, the Ryan-Joiner Test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The null 
hypothesis (Ho) of the test is that the model responses follow a normal distribution, 
while the alternative hypothesis (Ha) is that the model responses do not follow a 
normal distribution. The test results are shown in Table 5.13. For every validation 
scenario and every normality test method (except for the post-crossover period for 
Ward E using the Anderson-Darling and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests), the null 
hypothesis is rejected under the significant level of 5% (i.e., the individual 
transmission ratios predicted by the model do not follow a normal distribution). 
Therefore, a non-parametric method based on quartiles is used. 
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Table 5.13 Normality tests for model responses of transmission ratio from 500 
replications 
Anderson-Darling 
Test 
Ryan-Joiner Test Kolmogorov-
Smirnov Test 
Ward (Study 
period) 
p-value Reject 
Ho 
p-value Reject 
Ho 
p-value Reject 
Ho 
Conclusion 
Ward B (Pre) 0 Yes <0.01 Yes <0.01 Yes Not Normal
Ward C (Pre) 0 Yes <0.01 Yes <0.01 Yes Not Normal
Ward C (Post) 0 Yes <0.01 Yes <0.01 Yes Not Normal
Ward D (Pre) 0 Yes <0.01 Yes <0.01 Yes Not Normal
Ward E (Post) 0.08 No 0.037 Yes >0.15 No Hard to say 
Ward F (Pre) 0 Yes <0.01 Yes 0.047 Yes Not Normal
Ward G (Post) 0 Yes <0.01 Yes <0.01 Yes Not Normal
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
 
Figure 5.6 shows the distribution of the 500 individual transmission ratios predicted 
by the model (i.e., the histogram) for one validation scenario (ward C during the pre-
crossover period). The first and third quartiles (0.423 and 0.608), the tenth and 
ninetieth percentiles (0.356 and 0.709) of the predicted transmission ratios and the 
observed transmission ratio (0.567) are also shown in the diagram. For this validation 
scenario, the observed transmission ratio lies between the first and third quartiles of 
the predicted transmission ratios, indicating a fairly good match between the 
observation and the model prediction.  
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Figure 5.6 Comparison between observed transmission ratio and transmission ratios 
predicted by multiple replications of the simulation model (pre-crossover period of 
ward C) 
 
Spider diagrams are used to show the comparisons of all seven validation scenarios in 
a single diagram. Figure 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show the comparisons between observations 
and model predications regarding the transmission ratio, the absolute number of 
secondary cases and the average time to detection respectively. The data behind the 
spider diagrams and the comments on the closeness between the observation and 
model predictions are shown in Table 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16. 
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Figure 5.7 Comparison between observed transmission ratio and model predications 
 
Table 5.14 Comparison between observed transmission ratio and model predications 
Ward (Study 
period) 
Obser
vation 
Mean 
model 
responses
1st 
quartile
3rd  
quartile
10th  
percentile
90th 
percentile 
Remark 
Ward B (Pre) 0.273 0.259 0.167 0.345 0.095 0.429 Within quartiles 
Ward C (Pre) 0.567 0.524 0.423 0.608 0.356 0.709 Within quartiles 
Ward C (Post) 0.625 0.706 0.526 0.857 0.406 1.036 Within quartiles 
Ward D (Pre) 0.471 0.565 0.347 0.714 0.222 1.000 Within quartiles 
Ward E (Post) 0.349 0.425 0.332 0.511 0.250 0.607 Within quartiles 
Ward F (Pre) 0.927 0.759 0.587 0.917 0.459 1.08 Within percentiles
Ward G (Post) 0.412 0.561 0.35 0.71 0.235 0.942 Within quartiles 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
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Figure 5.8 Comparison between observed number of secondary cases and model 
predications 
 
Table 5.15 Comparison between observed number secondary cases and model 
predications 
Ward (Study 
period) 
Obser
vation 
Mean 
model 
responses
1st 
quartile
3rd  
quartile
10th  
percentile
90th 
percentile 
Remark 
Ward B (Pre) 6 5.8 3 8 2 10 Within quartiles 
Ward C (Pre) 34 30.7 24 37 20 42 Within quartiles 
Ward C (Post) 20 21.7 16 27 12 33 Within quartiles 
Ward D (Pre) 8 9.3 5.8 12 3 17 Within quartiles 
Ward E (Post) 15 17.5 13 22 10 26.1 Within quartiles 
Ward F (Pre) 38 29.4 23 35.3 17 42 Within percentiles
Ward G (Post) 7 9.3 5 12 3 16 Within quartiles 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
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Figure 5.9 Comparison between observed average time to detection and model 
predications 
 
Table 5.16 Comparison between observed average time to detection and model 
predications 
Ward (Study 
period) 
Obser
vation 
Mean 
model 
responses
1st 
quartile
3rd  
quartile
10th  
percentile
90th 
percentile 
Remark 
Ward B (Pre) 14.2 15.2 8 20 4 28 Within quartiles 
Ward C (Pre) 15.4 15.5 12.8 17.7 10.6 20.8 Within quartiles 
Ward C (Post) 13.8 14.4 10.9 16.7 8.9 20.7 Within quartiles 
Ward D (Pre) 19.3 17.7 12.7 21.6 9.3 27 Within quartiles 
Ward E (Post) 8.1 11.5 9.1 13.6 7 16.4 Within percentiles 
Ward F (Pre) 13.8 17.8 13.6 21.5 10.8 25.5 Within quartiles 
Ward G (Post) 6.4 16.8 11.6 20.9 8 26 Within range 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
 
The comparison between the empirical observations and the model predictions are 
encouraging. Regarding the transmission ratio and the number of secondary cases, the 
observed data are within the first and third quartiles of the model prediction in six out 
of seven scenarios and within the tenth and ninetieth percentile in one scenario. This 
is an indication that the model may correctly and consistently predict and match the 
actual transmission dynamics under a wide variety of situations (e.g., the average 
length of stay of the seven validation scenarios ranges from 3.55 to 11.01 days, the 
total ward size and the number of isolation beds ranges from 20 to 34 beds and from 2 
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to 4 beds respectively, and the proportion of colonised patients on admission ranges 
from 2.5% to 5.6%).  
 
As to the validation on the average time to detection, the observed data are within the 
first and third quartiles of model predictions in five out of seven scenarios, within the 
tenth and ninetieth percentiles in one scenario, and within range in one scenario. 
Though not as strong a match as the comparisons for the transmission ratio and the 
number of secondary cases, it still demonstrates the capability of the model to 
consistently predict the actual transmission dynamics in a more detailed and micro 
level. It is the first time a HAI model captures the patient-level statistics of time to 
detection and compares it with observed values.  
 
Overall, reasonable confidence can be placed on the validity of the model as the 
model might be correctly and consistently matching the actual MRSA transmission 
dynamics not only on a single scenario, but across all seven validation scenarios. 
 
Model Validation – Statistical Tests 
Apart from comparisons through diagrams and tables, statistical tests were performed 
to test whether there is a significant difference between the observation and the mean 
model responses. The statistical method applied is the paired-t test which is suitable to 
test the difference of the means from two dependent samples that are of the same 
sample size and consist of matched pairs. Each of the seven scenarios in the validation 
group will produce a matched pair and hence each paired-t test involves seven 
matched pairs. Within each pair, one variable is the observed transmission ratio (or 
observed number of secondary cases, or observed average time to detection) and the 
other dependent variable is the corresponding mean transmission ratio (or mean 
number of secondary cases, or mean average time to detection) predicted by the 
model.  
 
Confidence intervals (under the confidence level of 99% and 95%) of the difference 
between the observation and the mean model prediction were constructed by the 
statistical package MINITAB® using the paired-t test. If the confidence interval 
includes zero, it means, under the chosen confidence level, there is no significant 
difference between the observation and the mean model prediction; otherwise, it 
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indicates the difference between the observation and the model prediction is statistical 
significant.  
 
Table 5.17 reports the results of the paired-t tests using the data shown in the second 
and third columns of Table 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 (the second column gives the observed 
transmission ratio, number of secondary cases and average detection time, while the 
third column gives the corresponding mean model predictions). The confidence 
intervals constructed all include zero which demonstrates that, under the confidence 
level of 99% and 95%, there is no statistical significant difference between the 
observation and mean model predictions.  
 
The p-values of the paired-t tests are also given in Table 5.17. The higher the p-value 
is, the more likely not to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between 
the observation and the mean model predictions. P-values for the transmission ratio 
and the number of secondary cases are very high (0.561 and 0.702) which is a strong 
indication that there is no statistical difference between observed transmission ratio 
(and number of secondary cases) and the mean model predications.  
 
Table 5.17 Results of paired-t tests for the difference between observation and model 
predictions 
Paired-t test 99% confidence 
interval 
95% confidence 
interval 
p-
value 
Conclusion 
Transmission ratio (-0.176 , 0.126) (-0.124 , 0.074) 0.561 No difference
Number of secondary cases (-5.06 , 6.29) (-3.13 , 4.36) 0.702 No difference
Average time to detection (-8.10 , 2.99 ) (-6.22 , 1.10) 0.138 No difference
 
5.3.3 Final Estimation of the Transmission Coefficient 
As reasonable confidence has been gained on the validity of the model by the 
calibration-validation process, a final task in this chapter is to estimate the weighted 
mean transmission coefficient again using all thirteen scenarios (one scenario is 
excluded from analysis as explained in Section 5.3.2) rather than just the six scenarios 
in the calibration group. Compared to the previously calibrated transmission 
coefficient based on six scenarios, this final transmission coefficient should, in theory, 
be closer to the true theoretical transmission coefficient of the MRSA study since it is 
based on all available scenarios. The final transmission coefficient will be used to 
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configure the hypothetical test ward based on which formal and systematic model 
experimentations will be carried out in Chapter 6. 
 
The final weighted mean transmission coefficient calculated is 0.1414 (see Table 
5.18), which, due to the large amount of empirical data involved and the reasonable 
confidence that has been placed on the model, can also be a reasonable estimation of 
the MRSA transmission coefficient of a typical surgical ward in the UK hospitals. 
This value complies with the findings or the values used by previous modelling 
studies (Grundmann et al. 2002; Cooper et al. 2004; Bootsma et al. 2006; McBryde et 
al. 2007) and it may be used in future MRSA modelling studies where the value of the 
transmission coefficient is required to configure the model. 
 
Table 5.18 Estimation of final weighted mean transmission coefficient based on all 
scenarios 
Ward Study 
period 
Type of 
screening test 
Unique 
C 
Observed 
secondary cases
 Weighted 
mean C 
   a b b * a 
∑
∑ ×
b
ab )(  
A Pre PCR 0.063 18 1.134  
B Pre PCR 0.144 6 0.864  
B Post Culture 0.105 4 0.42  
C Pre PCR 0.15 34 5.1  
C Post Culture 0.132 20 2.64  
D Pre PCR 0.123 8 0.984  
D Post Culture 0.151 11 1.661  
E Pre Culture 0.18 36 6.48  
E Post PCR 0.12 15 1.8  
F Pre Culture 0.159 38 6.042  
F Post PCR 0.162 23 3.726  
G Pre Culture 0.098 12 1.176  
G Post PCR 0.111 7 0.777  
    232 32.804 0.1414 
Pre: pre-crossover period; Post: post-crossover period. 
 
5.3.4 Conclusions 
It is the first time that a MRSA transmission model is systematically validated against 
observed data using formal model validation methods. Robinson (2004) argued that it 
is not possible to prove that a model is absolutely valid and instead it is only possible 
to think in terms of the confidence that can be placed in a model. As the model 
appears to be correctly and consistently matching the actual transmission dynamics 
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across most of the validation scenarios (which represent a variety of situations 
regarding length of stay, ward size, endemic setting and other features), reasonable 
confidence can be placed on the model.  
 
There are some important model parameters, such as m (i.e., the proportion of 
transmission within the same bay compared to the whole ward), k (the effectiveness of 
decolonisation treatment on reducing infectivity), whose values are based on 
assumptions rather than empirical observation. The choice of the values of these input 
parameters may affect the estimation of the transmission coefficient and hence the 
validation results. In order to understand the extent of impacts of these parameters on 
model responses, sensitivity analysis will be performed on these model inputs in the 
following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Model Experimentation and Analysis 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The purpose of model experimentation is to evaluate the effectiveness and robustness 
of various intervention polices to prevent and control MRSA, and to test the 
sensitivity of various influencing factors that have a potential impact on MRSA 
transmission. In particular, the chapter aims to test the effectiveness of three 
intervention policies: introducing rapid screening tests, adopting pre-emptive 
screening test (admission and/or repeated screening), and providing isolation facilities. 
Based on the experimentation results, the practical indications to the management of 
MRSA in the hospital setting can be concluded. These indications may help the 
hospital to effectively control MRSA. 
 
 
6.2 Experimental Factors and Model Responses 
 
6.2.1 Experimental Factors 
In experimental design terminology, the input parameters and structural assumptions 
of a model which are to be tested by the model experimentation are called 
experimental factors, and the output performance measurements are called model 
responses. The decision as to which parameters and structural assumptions are 
considered fixed aspects of a model and which are experimental factors depends on 
the goals of the study (Law 2007). In accordance with the objective of the modelling 
study, the experimental factors selected are those input parameters or structural 
assumptions that represent either key intervention policies or key influencing factors 
of MRSA. Overall, eight experimental factors are chosen and listed in the order of 
their controllability in Table 6.1. In general, the hospital has more control over 
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intervention polices than influencing factors. Detailed descriptions of these 
experimental factors are given in Section 3.8.1 and 3.8.2. 
 
The base/alternative values of each experimental factor are also given in Table 6.1 
and they will be used for the fractional factorial design. The base value attempts to 
reflect the less favourable condition for preventing and controlling MRSA, while the 
alternative value attempts to represents a realistic value under improved conditions. 
 
Table 6.1 Experimental factors and their base/alternative values 
Category Experimental factor Factor 
index 
Base value 
(-) 
Alternative value 
(+) 
Test turnaround time (days) 1 4 1 
Screening strategy 2 Admission 
only 
Admission plus 4 
day repeat 
screening 
Controllable 
Number of Isolation beds (beds) 3 0 6 
k: effectiveness of 
decolonisation treatment 
4 0.5 0.1 
C: transmission coefficient 5 0.15 0.1 
m: proportion of transmission 
within bay 
6 0.1 0.9 
Less 
controllable 
Average length of stay (days) 7 6¹ 4² 
Uncontrollable Endemic setting (%) 8 10% 2% 
1: In the test ward model, the length of stay for non-primary case patients will be 
sampled from the gamma distribution with shape parameter 1.2 and scale parameter 5. 
2: In the test ward model, the length of stay for non-primary case patients will be 
sampled from the gamma distribution with shape parameter 1.2 and scale parameter 
3.333. 
 
Test Turnaround Time (TTT) 
The factor of test turnaround time represents an important intervention policy of 
adopting a rapid screening test. The factor is highly controllable since the hospital can 
decide which screening test (with different test turnaround time) is adopted. The base 
and alterative values of the factor are 4 days and 1 day respectively.  
 
Screening Strategy (SS) 
Screening strategy represents another important intervention policy and it is also a 
much controllable factor. The base screening strategy is “Admission only” which 
means only admission screening is performed. The alternative strategy is “Admission 
plus 4 day repeat screening” which means both admission screening and four day 
repeat screening are implemented.  
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Number of Isolation Beds (IB) 
The number of isolation beds is also under the control of the hospital and it reflects 
the intervention policy of isolating identified MRSA patients. The base scenario is 
that there are no isolation beds and the alternative scenario is that six isolation beds 
are provided.  
 
Two issues need to be taken into consideration when analysing the effectiveness of 
this experimental factor. Firstly, the isolation beds in the ward are not solely devoted 
to MRSA colonised patients (e.g., patients with other infectious diseases may be 
isolated). Actually, the parameter of the availability of the isolation bed (i.e., the 
probability that an isolation bed may not be used to isolate MRSA patient due to the 
reason that it is occupied for other reasons) is included in the model to represent this 
situation. Secondly, since the patient arrival rate is fixed at its default value across all 
experimentations, a change of the number of isolation beds may actually change the 
ward occupancy since the product of the average length of stay and patient arrival rate 
should always equal to the product of the number of beds in the ward and the average 
ward occupancy (see Equation 6.1). When the average length of stay and patient 
arrival rate are fixed, the more isolation beds are introduced, the lower the average 
ward occupancy is.   
 
(Average Length of Stay) × (Patient Arrival Rate) = (Number of Beds in Ward) × 
(Average Ward Occupancy)     (6.1) 
 
Other Experimental Factors 
Other less controllable experimental factors include the effectiveness of 
decolonisation treatment (EDT), the transmission coefficient (TC), the proportion of 
transmission coming from within the same bay (PWB), the length of stay (LOS), and 
the endemic setting (ES). Their base and alternative values are given in Table 6.1.  
 
6.2.2 Model Responses 
The model responses for the experimentation are the absolute number of secondary 
cases and the transmission ratio which is the ratio of the number of secondary cases to 
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the number of primary cases. These two model responses are used to measure the 
effectiveness and robustness of various MRSA intervention policies.  
 
 
6.3 Experimental Design Methods 
When the arduous process of building, verifying and validating a simulation model is 
completed, it is time to have the model work for you; and one extremely effective way 
of accomplishing this task is to apply experimental design methods to help explore the 
model (Sanchez 2007). In this study, two formal experimental design methods are 
adopted: fractional factorial design and response surface design. 
 
6.3.1 Fractional Factorial Design 
The most commonly applied experimental design method appears to be full k2  
factorial design. According to the method, all k experimental factors will be set at two 
levels (i.e., the base level and the alternative level), and a full combination of the k 
experimental factors with two levels will result k2  design points in total. Normally 
multiple replication runs are performed at each design point, and mean model 
responses are estimated. Standard statistical techniques exist to analyse the responses 
and calculate the main effect of each experimental factor as well as arbitrary higher-
order interaction effects among the factors.  
 
The main effect of each experimental factor measures the average change of the 
model response due to a change of the factor value from its base to the alternative 
level, considering all possible combinations of the other factors. In this study, the 
main effect of each experimental factor indicates the average effectiveness of the 
intervention policy or the average sensitivity of the influencing factor, considering all 
possible combinations of the rest of the experimental factors. The two-way interaction 
effect measures the level of interactions between two factors, i.e., the effect of one 
factor depends in some way on the level of the other factor. The two-way interaction 
effect between factor i and factor j is the difference between the average effect of 
factor i when factor j is at its base level and the average effect of factor i when factor j 
is at its alternative value. In this study, the two-way interaction effect may disclose the 
potential dependency between pairs of experimental factors. 
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Given a limited number of experimental factors, a full k2 design has relatively few 
design points, is easy to implement, and allows you to examine any higher-order 
interactions without confounding among factors.  
 
One assumption of the factorial design is that each experimental factor only has two 
levels tested: base and alternative level. Therefore, it is not possible to explore the 
factor on more than two levels and linearity is implicitly assumed between the 
experimental factor and model responses, and between different experimental factors. 
Another drawback of the method is that when the number of experimental factors 
increases, the number of total design points increases exponentially and will soon 
become intractable. 
 
The reason to use the fractional factorial design (with resolution V), rather than a full 
factorial design, is to reduce the number of design points and subsequently the 
computational time and effort. A full factorial design with eight experimental factors 
(the number of experimental factors in this study) needs 256 design points ( 25628 = ), 
each representing a unique combination of the base/alternative levels of all eight 
factors. Like model validation, for each design point, the simulation model will run 
500 replications to estimate the mean model responses; and each simulation run will 
last 415 days (365 days for data collection preceded by 50 day warm-up period). This 
implies a total of 128,000 ( 128000500256 =× ) runs are required for a full factorial 
design experiment. The fractional factorial design can significantly reduce the number 
of design points; and the resolution V can guarantee that not only main effects but 
also the two-way interaction effects can be estimated without confounding with each 
other (Law 2007).  
 
Table 6.2 gives the definition of resolution III, IV, and V in pk−2  fractional factorial 
design according to Law (2007). Standard techniques exist to construct a pk−2  design 
matrix and estimate the main and non-confounding two-way interaction effects (if the 
resolution allows) of the experimental factors (Law 2007). 
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Table 6.2 Definition of resolution III, IV and V of fractional factorial design (source: 
Law 2007) 
Resolution Definition 
III No main effect is confounded with any other main effect, but main 
effects are confounded with two-way interactions and some two-way 
interactions may be confounded with each other. 
IV No main effect is confounded with any other main effect or with any 
two-way interaction, but two-way interactions are confounded with 
each other. 
V No main effect or two-way interaction is confounded with any other 
main effect or two-way interactions. 
 
With eight experimental factors, fractional factorial design with resolution V needs 64 
design points. According to the rules for determining the combinations of 
experimental factors in each design point, the design matrix is constructed (see the 
first ten columns of Table 6.4). During model experimentation, the model responses 
of each design point are estimated based on 500 replications. Since multiple 
replications are performed for each design point, the model responses may be used not 
only to estimate the mean main and two-way interaction effects, but also the 
distribution and confidence interval for each main and two-way interaction effect.  
 
6.3.2 Response Surface Design 
Compared to factorial design, response surface design can test the experimental factor 
on many different levels, so that non-linear and more detailed relationships can be 
revealed. A response surface design tests two experimental factors at a time while 
keeping all other experimental factors and input parameters at default values.  
 
If the first experimental factor has n levels and the second factor has m levels to be 
tested, then the total number of design points for the response surface is the product of 
n and m (i.e., mn× ). For each design point, the model response will be estimated 
based on 500 replications and a three-dimensional diagram will be constructed to 
show the response surface with the two horizontal axes representing the levels of the 
two experimental factors and the vertical axis representing the corresponding mean 
model responses. The detailed and potential non-linear relationships between each of 
the two experimental factors and the model response and the potential non-linear 
interaction between the two experimental factors can be captured by the response 
surface.  
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The drawback of response surface design is that it needs a large number of design 
points, especially if more levels of each factor are tested. Another drawback of the 
design is that it only tests two factors at a time while the values of other potential 
experimental factors need to be fixed. This assumption means response surface design 
can not reveal the potential interactions between the two factors tested and other 
experimental factors.  
 
Following the fractional factorial design, the response surface design will be carried 
out on those pairs of experimental factors that both demonstrate significant two-way 
interaction effects in the factorial design and have potential practical implications on 
MRSA control and prevention. Experimental design itself is a vast research area in the 
operational research and statistics domain. Detailed discussion of experimental design 
methods (including factorial design, response surface design and other experimental 
design methods) can be found in the relevant subject literature (Chapter 9 of Kleijnen 
and Groenendaal 1992; Kleijnen et al. 2005; Chapter 12 of Law 2007). 
 
 
6.4 Test Ward Configuration 
A hypothetical test ward, or a benchmark scenario, that represents the typical 
characteristics of all scenarios of the MRSA case study is created and its default input 
values are determined. As a principle, if an input parameter has the same value across 
all fourteen validation scenarios, then the same value will be used for the test ward as 
well. Otherwise, the input value will be re-estimated based on the pooled observed 
data from all scenarios. 
 
Ward Layout 
The test ward represents a typical study ward from the research project and should 
also be representative as a typical surgical ward in the UK hospital. It is assumed that, 
by default, the test ward consists of 34 beds, among which four are isolation beds. The 
remaining 30 beds are distributed evenly in five ward bays (e.g., each ward bay has 
six beds).  
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Screening Test 
The test ward carries out either admission screening or four day repeat screening. 
Regarding the turnaround time of the screening test, since no specific test method 
(e.g., conventional culture or rapid PCR test) is assumed to be applied to the test ward, 
an average value of two days is used. 
 
Decolonisation Treatment 
The duration and success rate of decolonisation treatment are set at five days and 
74.6% respectively in the test ward as both values are shared by all validation 
scenarios. Like the validation models, the test ward also assumes that successful 
treatment needs to be confirmed by three successive weekly negative screening tests. 
As to the delay of decolonisation treatment after the detection of MRSA, an average 
delay of 0.77 day was estimated from the pooled observed data. 
 
Vulnerability of Susceptible Patients 
It is assumed that susceptible patients in the test ward have the same level of 
vulnerability which complies with the average vulnerability of patients in the research 
project.  
 
Length of Stay 
In the validation models, the patient’s length of stay is sampled from empirical 
distributions. For the test ward, the use of parametric distributions is more appropriate 
since it is easier to manipulate the mean and the shape of the length of stay by 
adjusting the parameter values of the chosen distribution. The use of parametric 
distributions can also help other researchers to replicate the model experiments.  
 
Like the validation models, the length of stay in the test ward is classified into two 
categories: one for primary case patients and the other for non-primary case patients 
(see Section 5.2.1). The majority of patients are non-primary case patients, i.e., 
patients who are not colonised with MRSA on admission. The parametric distribution 
for the length of stay of non-primary case patients will be determined first. Due to the 
limited number of primary case patients, it is difficult to fit a separate parametric 
distribution. Instead, the lengths of stay of primary case patients are determined by 
multiplying the length of stay distribution of non-primary case patients and the ratio 
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of the average length of stay of the primary case patients to the non-primary case 
patients. 
 
Based on 13,417 observed lengths of stay, the parametric distribution for non-primary 
case patients selected by the distribution fitting package, Bestfit®, is a gamma 
distribution with the shape parameter, α, equal to 1.2, and the scale parameter, β, 
equal to 5.243. According to the property of the gamma distribution, the mean length 
of stay equals the product of α and β, which is 6.291 days. The Chi-square test is also 
satisfied (p<0.005). Figure 6.1 illustrates the comparison between the fitted gamma 
distribution and the histogram of the observed lengths of stay of non-primary case 
patients. Regarding the lengths of stay of primary case patients, a multiplying factor 
of 1.639, which is the ratio of average length of stay of primary case patients (i.e., 
10.311 days) to the average length of stay of non-primary case patients (i.e., 6.291 
days), is estimated from the observed data.  
 
When the average length of stay needs to be changed during experimentation, the 
shape parameter, α, will keep the same value and the scale parameter, β, will be 
adjusted so that the product α and β equals the desired mean length of stay. 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Comparison between the fitted gamma distribution and the observed 
lengths of stay of non-primary case patients 
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Other Input Parameters 
The default input parameter values of the arrival rate, the endemic setting and the 
availability of isolation beds are all estimated directly from the observed data. The 
average patient arrival rate during the study period is 4.7 patients per day. The 
endemic setting and the availability of isolation beds are 3.4% and 19.8% respectively. 
For the input parameters m (i.e., the proportion of transmission risk coming from 
within the same bay compared to the whole ward), k (i.e., the effectiveness of 
decolonisation treatment) and s (i.e., the inter-bay movement rate), the test ward 
adopts the same assumptions as the validation models which are 0.667, 0.4 and 0.1 
respectively. The transmission coefficient of the test ward uses the weighted mean 
transmission coefficient estimated based on 13 scenarios which is 0.1414 (see Section 
5.3.3). Table 6.3 summarises the default input parameter values of the test ward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.3 Default input parameter values for the test ward 
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Category Parameter Symbol Value 
Total beds in the ward (beds)    34 
Isolation beds in the ward (beds)   4 
Beds in bay1 (beds)   6 
Beds in bay2 (beds)   6 
Beds in bay3 (beds)   6 
Beds in bay4 (beds)   6 
Ward 
layout 
Beds in bay5 (beds)   6 
Test turnaround time (days)   2 Screening 
test Repeat screening interval (days)   4 
Delay of decolonisation treatment (days)   0.77 
Decolonisation treatment duration (days)   5 
Decolonisat
ion 
treatment Decolonisation treatment success rate    74.7% 
Length of stay distribution for non-primary 
case patients (days) 
  Gamma(1.2
, 5.243) 
Non-primary case patients mean length of 
stay (days) 
 6.291 
Multiplying factor for primary case patients 
length of stay 
 1.639 
Primary case patients mean length of stay 
(days) 
  10.311 
Length of 
stay 
All patients mean length of stay (days)   6.404 
Patient arrival rate   4.7 
Endemic setting   3.4% 
Other 
information 
Availability of isolation beds   19.8% 
Transmission coefficient  C 0.1414 
Proportion of risk within bay m 0.667 
Effectiveness of decolonisation treatment k 0.4 
Other 
model 
assumptions 
Inter-bay movement rate s 0.1 
 
 
6.5 Model Experimentation: Fractional Factorial Design 
 
6.5.1 Experimental Results 
 
Model Responses 
For each of the 64 design points, the eight selected experimental factors will take 
either the base or alternative value according to the design matrix given in Table 6.4. 
For example, at the first design point (the third row of Table 6.4), the first six 
experimental factors will take their base values while the last two experimental factors 
will take the alternative values. All other input parameters of the test ward are set at 
default values given in Table 6.3. Once a design point is configured, the model will 
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run for 500 replications, each lasts for 415 days (365 days for data collection and 50 
days for warm-up period), and the mean number of primary and secondary cases, and 
mean transmission ratio are shown in the last three columns of Table 6.4. These 
model responses will be used to estimate the main and two-way interaction effects of 
the experimental factors. 
 
Table 6.4 Fractional factorial design matrix and model experimentation results based 
on 500 replications 
Design 
point 
Factor 
1 
 
2 
 
3 4 5 6 7 8 Mean 
primary 
Cases 
Mean 
secondary 
Cases 
Mean 
transmission 
Ratio 
 TTT SS IB EDT TC PWB LOS ES    
1 - - - - - - + + 34.5 40.9 1.189 
2 + - - - - - - - 168.3 212.0 1.263 
3 - + - - - - - - 168.2 214.5 1.279 
4 + + - - - - + + 34.2 27.2 0.797 
5 - - + - - - - + 34.5 79.3 2.330 
6 + - + - - - + - 172.3 117.3 0.682 
7 - + + - - - + - 171.8 139.8 0.815 
8 + + + - - - - + 34.2 36.7 1.077 
9 - - - + - - - + 34.1 65.9 1.937 
10 + - - + - - + - 171.8 89.3 0.520 
11 - + - + - - + - 172.1 123.4 0.718 
12 + + - + - - - + 34.0 21.4 0.631 
13 - - + + - - + + 34.0 33.3 0.981 
14 + - + + - - - - 172.4 147.1 0.854 
15 - + + + - - - - 170.9 164.6 0.965 
16 + + + + - - + + 34.1 16.9 0.497 
17 - - - - + - + - 172.4 91.1 0.530 
18 + - - - + - - + 34.4 27.1 0.787 
19 - + - - + - - + 34.1 30.6 0.900 
20 + + - - + - + - 170.4 66.0 0.388 
21 - - + - + - - - 172.3 134.2 0.780 
22 + - + - + - + + 34.3 16.3 0.475 
23 - + + - + - + + 34.5 20.8 0.604 
24 + + + - + - - - 171.3 86.6 0.506 
25 - - - + + - - - 167.6 112.3 0.672 
26 + - - + + - + + 34.1 12.3 0.363 
27 - + - + + - + + 33.5 17.5 0.526 
28 + + - + + - - - 167.8 53.5 0.319 
29 - - + + + - + - 171.1 75.8 0.444 
30 + - + + + - - + 34.1 16.7 0.489 
31 - + + + + - - + 34.0 22.7 0.669 
32 + + + + + - + - 171.1 44.3 0.259 
33 - - - - - + + - 171.9 141.0 0.822 
34 + - - - - + - + 33.9 48.8 1.444 
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35 - + - - - + - + 34.7 52.8 1.523 
36 + + - - - + + - 171.5 102.8 0.600 
37 - - + - - + - - 171.6 181.4 1.059 
38 + - + - - + + + 34.1 17.4 0.510 
39 - + + - - + + + 34.4 26.0 0.762 
40 + + + - - + - - 171.2 111.7 0.652 
41 - - - + - + - - 168.5 184.3 1.097 
42 + - - + - + + + 34.5 20.8 0.607 
43 - + - + - + + + 34.2 28.4 0.833 
44 + + - + - + - - 168.6 82.1 0.487 
45 - - + + - + + - 171.3 94.8 0.554 
46 + - + + - + - + 34.1 26.1 0.767 
47 - + + + - + - + 33.9 34.2 1.008 
48 + + + + - + + - 171.7 56.2 0.327 
49 - - - - + + + + 34.4 20.6 0.597 
50 + - - - + + - - 169.4 99.0 0.585 
51 - + - - + + - - 169.0 113.7 0.674 
52 + + - - + + + + 34.0 14.6 0.428 
53 - - + - + + - + 34.2 25.2 0.739 
54 + - + - + + + - 171.2 47.0 0.275 
55 - + + - + + + - 171.0 62.4 0.365 
56 + + + - + + - + 34.4 13.4 0.391 
57 - - - + + + - + 34.2 26.1 0.765 
58 + - - + + + + - 170.9 48.4 0.284 
59 - + - + + + + - 170.9 70.8 0.415 
60 + + - + + + - + 34.2 11.6 0.339 
61 - - + + + + + + 34.2 15.7 0.459 
62 + - + + + + - - 171.3 57.3 0.334 
63 - + + + + + - - 170.4 81.6 0.480 
64 + + + + + + + + 34.4 8.1 0.236 
 
Average Main and Two-way Interaction Effects 
The average main and two-way interaction effects are calculated using standard 
techniques (Law 2007) based on the mean transmission ratios of each design point. 
The average main effects of the factors are listed in the last row of Table 6.5; while 
the average two-way interaction effects are given in the cells where the two factors 
intercept in the table. Since the two-way interaction effect between factors i and j is 
the same as the effect between j and i, only half of the cells in the table are filled. 
Detailed analyses of the effects are discussed in Section 6.5.2 and 6.5.3. 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 Main and two-way interaction effects of fractional factorial design 
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Factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  
TTT SS IB EDT TC PWB LOS ES 
Factor 1 TTT x        
2 SS 0.004 x       
3 IB -0.002 0.015 x      
4 EDT -0.034 -0.004 0.019 x     
5 TC 0.094 0.080 0.026 0.064 x    
6 PWB 0.048 0.062 -0.068 0.035 0.067 x   
7 LOS 0.081 0.103 0.007 0.074 0.137 0.044 x  
8 ES -0.083 -0.054 -0.012 -0.028 -0.086 -0.027 -0.060 x 
Main 
effect 
 -0.291 -0.148 -0.093 -0.187 -0.422 -0.151 -0.311 0.177
 
Distributions of each Main and Two-way Interaction Effects 
For one replication of every design point (i.e., 64 simulation runs from 64 design 
points), one set of the estimates of the main and two-way interaction effects can be 
obtained. Since each design point has 500 replications, each main and two-way 
interaction effect will have 500 different estimates. Apart from the average effects 
which are given in Table 6.5, in order to examine the variation of each main and two-
way interaction effect, confidence intervals and other descriptive statistics (e.g., range, 
first and third quartiles, percentage of negative effects) are calculated based on these 
individual estimates of each effect (see Table 6.6).  
 
The 95% confidence intervals of each main and two-way interaction effect are shown 
in the third (lower bound) and fourth (upper bound) columns of the table. The 
confidence interval will be highlighted if zero is not included in the interval (i.e., the 
effect is statistically significant and different from zero, either positive or negative). 
The first and third quartiles and the overall range (i.e., minimum and maximum 
individual estimates) of each effect based on 500 individual estimates are also given 
in the table (from fifth to eighth column), and are highlighted if the interval does not 
contain zero (i.e., all individual effects between first and third quartiles are different 
from zero, or all individual effects are different from zero, either positive or negative). 
The last column of the table shows the percentage of individual effects that falls 
below zero, and the value will be highlighted if either 90% of individual effects are all 
positive (i.e., the value is less than 10%) or negative (i.e., the value is more than 90%) 
which both indicates a significant effect. 
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Table 6.6 Confidence interval and descriptive statistics of the main and two-way 
interactive effects 
Confidence 
interval (95%) 
First and third 
quartile 
Range Effects Mean 
effect 
Lower Upper First Third Min Max 
Percentage 
below zero
1 -0.291 -0.296 -0.286 -0.327 -0.258 -0.451 -0.132 100.0% 
2 -0.148 -0.152 -0.143 -0.186 -0.109 -0.337 -0.016 100.0% 
3 -0.093 -0.098 -0.088 -0.128 -0.055 -0.274 0.061 94.6% 
4 -0.187 -0.192 -0.182 -0.228 -0.149 -0.358 0.009 99.8% 
5 -0.422 -0.427 -0.417 -0.458 -0.384 -0.590 -0.255 100.0% 
6 -0.151 -0.156 -0.146 -0.189 -0.114 -0.324 0.005 99.6% 
7 -0.311 -0.316 -0.305 -0.346 -0.271 -0.498 -0.122 100.0% 
8 0.177 0.172 0.182 0.135 0.216 0.014 0.405 0.0% 
1x2 0.004 -0.001 0.008 -0.034 0.039 -0.165 0.235 46.0% 
1x3 -0.001 -0.006 0.003 -0.040 0.036 -0.168 0.175 50.0% 
1x4 -0.034 -0.040 -0.029 -0.072 0.007 -0.196 0.147 71.2% 
1x5 0.094 0.089 0.099 0.057 0.131 -0.069 0.287 4.6% 
1x6 0.048 0.043 0.053 0.011 0.086 -0.151 0.232 20.0% 
1x7 0.081 0.076 0.086 0.042 0.117 -0.085 0.244 6.8% 
1x8 -0.083 -0.088 -0.078 -0.120 -0.046 -0.287 0.104 92.6% 
2x3 0.015 0.010 0.020 -0.024 0.054 -0.189 0.179 41.8% 
2x4 -0.004 -0.009 0.002 -0.043 0.034 -0.163 0.183 53.4% 
2x5 0.080 0.075 0.085 0.040 0.120 -0.056 0.256 8.0% 
2x6 0.062 0.057 0.066 0.023 0.099 -0.116 0.267 13.0% 
2x7 0.102 0.097 0.108 0.064 0.140 -0.043 0.290 4.8% 
2x8 -0.054 -0.059 -0.048 -0.090 -0.010 -0.255 0.103 82.2% 
3x4 0.019 0.013 0.024 -0.018 0.059 -0.162 0.170 36.2% 
3x5 0.026 0.021 0.032 -0.011 0.067 -0.164 0.232 32.0% 
3x6 -0.068 -0.074 -0.063 -0.106 -0.027 -0.291 0.142 88.2% 
3x7 0.007 0.002 0.012 -0.032 0.046 -0.136 0.161 44.8% 
3x8 -0.012 -0.017 -0.006 -0.048 0.029 -0.193 0.167 56.4% 
4x5 0.064 0.059 0.069 0.026 0.099 -0.102 0.248 11.8% 
4x6 0.035 0.030 0.040 -0.003 0.076 -0.156 0.262 28.0% 
4x7 0.074 0.069 0.079 0.034 0.109 -0.105 0.265 10.6% 
4x8 -0.028 -0.033 -0.023 -0.067 0.009 -0.203 0.164 68.2% 
5x6 0.067 0.062 0.072 0.034 0.103 -0.097 0.277 11.6% 
5x7 0.137 0.132 0.142 0.100 0.173 -0.044 0.299 0.8% 
5x8 -0.086 -0.091 -0.081 -0.123 -0.047 -0.276 0.093 94.4% 
6x7 0.044 0.038 0.049 0.000 0.085 -0.102 0.207 25.0% 
6x8 -0.027 -0.032 -0.022 -0.065 0.009 -0.188 0.128 69.4% 
7x8 -0.060 -0.065 -0.055 -0.098 -0.020 -0.257 0.132 84.2% 
 
The range and confidence interval (with confidence level of 95%) of each main and 
two-way interaction effect are shown in Figure 6.2; while the range and the first and 
third quartiles of each main and two-way interaction effect are shown in Figure 6.3. In 
the diagrams, the vertical thin line represents the range of 500 individual estimates of 
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the effects while the rectangular box indicates the 95% confidence interval or the first 
and third quartiles. 
 
Due to the large sample size (i.e., 500), it is easy to conclude that the average main 
and two-way interaction effects are statistically significant (i.e., zero is not included in 
the confidence interval). As Table 6.6 shows, 33 out of 36 main and interaction effects 
are statistically significant from zero. However, the confidence interval only focuses 
on the interval within which the ‘true’ mean is likely to lie, rather than the extent of 
the dispersion or variation of individual estimates. In the context of investigating the 
effectiveness of MRSA intervention policies, the distribution and variation of 
individual effects are probably more important to the understanding of the impact of 
experimental factors on transmission dynamics. For example, for the two-way 
interaction effect between factors 2 and 3, although the confidence interval shows the 
main effect is statistically significant and positive (0.01 to 0.02), a big proportion of 
individual effects (41.8%) are actually negative and zero is within the first and third 
quartiles (-0.024  to 0.054). To illustrate the different pictures presented by quartiles 
and ranges, 24 out of 36 intervals of first and third quartiles do not contain zero (i.e., 
effects are significantly positive or negative), and only 5 out of 36 effects are all 
positive or negative across the whole range (i.e., effect are significantly positive or 
negative even in extreme cases); and for 15 out of 36 effects, more than 90% of 
individual effects are either positive or negative (see Table 6.6, and Figure 6.3).  
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Figure 6.2 Confidence interval and range of the main and two-way interaction effects 
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Figure 6.3 First and third quartiles and range of the main and two-way interaction effects 
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6.5.2 Analysis of Main Effects 
The average main effects of the eight experimental factors range from 0.093 (number 
of isolation beds) to 0.422 (transmission coefficient). Among the eight mean main 
effects, one is positive (i.e., the endemic setting) and the rest are negative. A positive 
mean main effect indicates that the average transmission ratio will increase when the 
experimental factor changes from the base to the alternative value; a negative mean 
main effect indicates that the average transmission ratio will be reduced when the 
factor changes from the base to the alternative value. The larger the value of the effect, 
the more significant of impact on the transmission ratio.  
 
All mean main effects are statistically significant. When considering the distributions 
of individual effects, for all eight experimental factors, more than 90% of the 500 
individual estimates of the effect are either positive (for the factor of endemic setting) 
or negative (for other experimental factors) which indicates that all main effects are 
consistent and robust when chance effects are considered. Notably, for five out of 
eight main effects, all 500 simulated individual effects are either below zero (for the 
factors of the screening strategy, test turnaround time, transmission coefficient and 
average length of stay) or above zero (for endemic setting) which implies that even in 
extreme circumstances, the effects of these experimental factors are robust and 
consistent.  
 
Transmission Coefficient 
The transmission coefficient has the most significant main effect among all 
experimental factors. Figure 6.4 shows that when the transmission coefficient is set at 
its base value of 0.15, the average transmission ratio is 0.925, considering all 
combinations of the other seven factors; while the average transmission ratio is 
reduced to 0.502 when the transmission coefficient is set at its alternative value of 
0.10. The average main effect is therefore -0.422 since the transmission ratio is 
decreased by 0.422 when the transmission coefficient changes from the base to the 
alternative value, considering all combinations of other factors. 
 
As the most significant main effect, not only the mean effect is statistically significant 
(95% confidence interval from -0.427 to -0.417), but also all 500 individual estimates 
are negative and range from -0.59 to -0.255. Overall, the negative main effect of the 
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transmission coefficient is very strong and consistent, and the transmission coefficient 
is the most sensitive influencing factor of MRSA transmission (i.e., a small change to 
the transmission coefficient will cause a significant change in MRSA transmission).  
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Figure 6.4 Main effect of the transmission coefficient 
 
The practical implication of the main effect is that any measures that can potentially 
reduce the transmission coefficient of MRSA will be highly effective in reducing 
MRSA transmission. The measures that may potentially reduce transmission 
coefficient include enforced hand-washing compliance by the HCWs and visitors, 
thorough ward cleaning and hygiene and other measures that have not been explicitly 
represented by the model but may reduce the transmission coefficient. However, as an 
influencing factor, the transmission coefficient is mainly determined by the type and 
the strain of the infectious disease and the general vulnerability and risk factors of the 
patients and may not be fully controlled by the hospital.  
 
The implication to the modelling of MRSA is that the choice of the value of the 
transmission coefficient as a model input will significantly affect the transmission 
dynamics. Therefore, great attention must be taken when choosing the parameter 
value. The experimental result also warrants the calibration of the transmission 
coefficient from observed data in Chapter 5, since it is possibly the best way to obtain 
a reasonable estimate of the parameter. 
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Length of Stay 
The average length of stay has the second most significant main effect. On average, 
the transmission ratio is reduced by 0.311 (from 0.869 to 0.558) when the mean length 
of stay is reduced from six to four days, considering all combinations of other 
experimental factors (see Figure 6.5). The negative mean main effect is not only 
statistically significant (95% confidence interval from -0.316 to -0.305) but also 100% 
of all 500 individual estimates are negative (range from -0.498 to -0.122). Overall, the 
main effect is strong and consistent, and the length of stay is a very sensitive 
influencing factor of MRSA transmission.  
 
0.869
0.558
0.450
0.550
0.650
0.750
0.850
0.950
6 4
Length of Stay (days)
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 R
at
io
 
Figure 6.5 Main effect of the length of stay 
 
The negative main effect of the length of stay implies that MRSA transmission can be 
reduced if the patients’ lengths of stay are shortened. In the short term, the hospital 
may not generally reduce a patient’s length of stay simply due to infection control 
purpose. However, in the long term, it is possible to reduce the average length of stay 
in the hospital by applying new drugs and healthcare technologies or by changing 
hospital policies. As long as the same level of service is maintained, hospitals 
generally have the intention to reduce length of stay since it can both reduce the 
healthcare cost and increase the hospital capacity. The experimental result shows that 
another good ‘side effect’ of reduced length of stay is the reduction of MRSA 
transmissions.  
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The sensitivity of length of stay on MRSA transmission also demonstrates the 
necessity to represent patients’ lengths of stay correctly in the model, since a small 
difference of lengths of stay may cause a big impact on the transmission of MRSA. 
As a particular strength of the proposed model, empirical distributions are applied 
during model validation and fitted parametric distribution is used during model 
experimentation; and in both cases, the length of stay is modelled separately for 
primary case patients and non-primary case patients. 
 
Test Turnaround Time 
The test turnaround time has the third most significant main effect and it is the most 
effective intervention policy among three policies tested. On average, the transmission 
ratio is reduced by 0.291 (from 0.859 to 0.568) when the test turnaround time is 
shortened from four days to one day, considering all combinations of other 
experimental factors (see Figure 6.6). The negative mean main effect is statistically 
significant (95% confidence interval from -0.296 to -0.286) and, furthermore, 100% 
of all 500 individual estimates of the main effects are negative with a range from        
-0.451 to -0.132. Overall, the main effect is strong and consistent, and reducing test 
turnaround time (i.e., introducing rapid screening test) is the single most effective 
intervention policy to reduce MRSA transmission. 
 
0.859
0.568
0.450
0.550
0.650
0.750
0.850
0.950
4 1
Test Turnaround Time (days)
Tr
an
sm
is
si
on
 R
at
io
 
Figure 6.6 Main effect of the test turnaround time 
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The main effect of the test turnaround time has a clear and practical implication that 
the adoption of rapid screening test with shorter test turnaround time can significantly 
reduce MRSA transmission in the hospital setting. Rapid PCR screening tests have 
been developed in recent years which can provide reliable MRSA results within one 
day or even shorter. The experimental results show that the rapid test can significantly 
reduce MRSA transmission. In theory, the hospital should adopt screening test with 
the shortest possible turnaround time. In reality, the cost factor has to be considered 
since the rapid screening test is currently more expensive. The hospital may also 
reduce the test turnaround time by reducing the time spent to transport the samples to 
and from the laboratory and by reducing the delay in reporting the test results.  
 
Effectiveness of Decolonisation Treatment 
The effectiveness of decolonisation treatment has the next most significant main 
effect (see Figure 6.7). On average, the transmission ratio is reduced by 0.187 (from 
0.807 to 0.620) when the effectiveness of the treatment is reduced from 0.5 (i.e., the 
infectivity of the colonised patient under decolonisation treatment is reduced by 50%) 
to 0.1 (i.e., the infectivity is reduced by 90%). The mean negative effect is statistically 
significant (95% confidence interval from -0.192 to -0.182), and a majority of the 
individual estimates of the effect are negative (99.8% or 499 out of 500 individual 
estimates). In short, the main effect is strong and consistent, and the effectiveness of 
decolonisation treatment is a very sensitive influencing factor.  
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Figure 6.7 Main effect of the effectiveness of the decolonisation treatment 
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The significant main effect of the effectiveness of decolonisation treatment implies 
that MRSA transmission can be reduced if the decolonisation treatment can 
significantly reduce the infectivity of the patient under treatment. The potential 
methods that may increase the effectiveness of the treatment include adopting new 
drugs and protocols to treat MRSA patients and enforced barrier precautions for 
patients under treatment. However, the effectiveness of the treatment is mainly 
determined by the nature of the treatment itself and it may be difficult to control by 
the hospital. Attention must also be paid when new antibiotics drugs are used to treat 
MRSA, since excessive usage of antibiotics may encourage the bacteria to develop 
even greater antibiotic resistance. 
 
Endemic Setting 
The endemic setting, i.e., the proportion of patients colonised with MRSA on 
admission, also has a significant main effect. On average, the transmission ratio is 
increased by 0.177 (from 0.625 to 0.802) when the endemic setting is reduced from 
10% to 2% (see Figure 6.8).  Endemic setting has the only positive main effect among 
all experimental factors. The positive mean effect is statistically significant (95% 
confidence interval from 0.172 to 0.182) and all 500 hundred individual estimates are 
positive. Overall, the positive main effect of the endemic is significant and consistent, 
and the endemic setting is a sensitive influencing factor of MRSA transmission. 
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Figure 6.8 Main effect of the endemic setting with transmission ratio as the model 
response 
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The model response used for the factorial design is the transmission ratio, which 
measures the relative ratio of the number of secondary cases to the number of primary 
cases, rather than the absolute number of secondary cases. When there are similar 
numbers of primary cases, the two model responses will give the same conclusion. 
However, when the number of primary cases is different, which is directly related to 
the endemic setting, the two model responses may provide contradictory conclusions 
(see Section 3.8.3 for detailed discussion).  
 
Figure 6.9 shows the main effect of the endemic setting using the absolute number of 
secondary cases, rather than the transmission ratio, as the model response. As 
expected, the main effect is significantly negative; the average number of secondary 
cases is reduced sharply by 79 cases (from 106.4 to 27.4) when the endemic setting is 
reduced from 10% to 2%. Such a significant negative effect is mainly caused by the 
different number of primary cases associated with different levels of endemic setting. 
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Figure 6.9 Main effect of the endemic setting with the number of secondary cases as 
the model response 
 
The significant main effect of endemic setting may have limited practical implications 
since the hospital may not control the factor, especially in the short term. However, if 
pre-admission screening tests are carried out (i.e., screening patients for MRSA before 
they are admitted to the hospital), it is possible to reduce the endemic setting by 
decolonising these patients before their admissions. The main effect of the endemic 
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setting indicates that, given a fixed total patient population, when fewer colonised 
patients are admitted to the ward from outside, the average number of secondary cases 
incurred by one primary case will increase but the total number of secondary cases 
will decrease sharply.  
 
Proportion of Transmission within Bay 
The experimental factor of the proportion of transmission within the ward bay has a 
significant main effect (see Figure 6.10). On average, the transmission ratio is reduced 
by 0.151 (from 0.789 to 0.638) when the proportion is increased from 10% (most 
transmissions come from the whole ward due to global interactions) to 90% (most 
transmission come from within the same bay due to local interactions). The negative 
mean main effect is statistically significant (95% confidence level from -0.156 to -
0.146) and a majority of individual estimates of the effect are negative (99.6% or 498 
out of 500 individual estimates of the effect). Overall, the main effect is strong and 
consistent, and the proportion of transmission within the ward bay is a sensitive 
influencing factor of MRSA transmission. 
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Figure 6.10 Main effect of the proportion of transmission coming from within the 
same bay 
 
The significant main effect of the proportion of transmission within the bay implies 
that MRSA transmission can be reduced if a higher proportion of transmission is 
caused by the local environment within each ward bay rather than the global 
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environment of the whole ward. If the ward has isolation rooms, the significant effect 
implies that MRSA transmission can be reduced if the isolation room can be perfectly 
isolated from the rest of the ward.  
 
The measures that may potentially increase the proportion of transmission within the 
ward bay include discouraging contacts between patients from different ward bays, 
physical improvement of ward facilities (e.g., dedicate toilet for each ward bay and 
isolation room) and strict protocols for isolation. However, the factor is mainly 
determined by the inherent transmission routes of MRSA and the physical layout of 
the ward, and is difficult to be totally controlled by the hospital.  
 
Screening Strategy 
The screening strategy has a significant main effect and it is the second most effective 
intervention policy. On average, the transmission ratio is reduced by 0.148 (from 
0.787 to 0.64) when the screening strategy changes from admission screening only to 
admission screening plus four day repeat screening (see Figure 6.11). The negative 
mean main effect is statistically significant (95% confidence interval from -0.152 to -
0.143) and all 500 individual estimates of the effect are negative. Overall, the negative 
main effect of the screening strategy is strong and consistent, and the introduction of 
more frequent screening test is an effective intervention policy for reducing MRSA 
transmission. 
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Figure 6.11 Main effect of the screening strategy 
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The practical implication of the significant negative main effect of the screening 
strategy is that the introduction of repeat screening test is a very effective policy to 
reduce MRSA transmission, given that the hospital has already introduced admission 
screening. However, more frequent screening tests may require enormous resources 
(e.g., additional laboratory capacity and technicians, increased work-load of nurses, 
logistics and communication challenges). Therefore, the additional costs associated 
with more frequent screening tests need to be considered.  
 
Number of Isolation Beds 
The number of isolation beds has a significant main effect and it is an effective 
intervention policy. On average, the transmission ratio is reduced by 0.093 (from 0.76 
to 0.667) when the number of isolation beds in the ward is increased from zero to six 
(see Figure 6.12). The mean main effect is statistically significant (95% confidence 
level from -0.098 to -0.088) and a majority of individual estimates of the effect are 
negative (94.6% or 473 out of 500 individual estimates of the effect). Overall, the 
main effect is strong and consistent, and increasing the number of isolation beds is an 
effective intervention policy to reduce MRSA transmission. 
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Figure 6.12 Main effect of the number of isolation beds 
 
The practical implication of the significant main effect is that providing more 
isolation beds is an effective intervention policy for reducing MRSA transmission. 
However, the experimental results show that this policy is not as effective as the 
policies of adopting rapid screening test and introducing more frequent screening tests. 
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In reality and in the model, not all isolation beds are solely for the purpose of MRSA 
isolation and this may partially explain the relative ineffectiveness of this policy. In 
practice, extra financial costs of providing more isolation beds and the negative 
impacts on patients’ welfare under isolation (e.g., reduced quality of care due to 
isolation and increased stress from isolation) need to be considered as well. 
 
6.5.3 Analysis of Two-way Interaction Effects 
The main effect can only reveal the average effect of each experimental factor on the 
model response. Two-way interaction effects, on the other hand, can reveal potential 
interactions between two experimental factors, i.e., how the level of one experimental 
factor will affect the effectiveness of the other experimental factor. If the two-way 
interaction effect is significantly different from zero, it indicates that the effectiveness 
of one factor is significantly dependant on the level of the other factor. Such 
information will provide valuable information to help hospital management make 
better informed decisions, especially when more than one intervention policy and 
influencing factor are considered at the same time. 
 
Compared to main effects, two-way interaction effects have a smaller magnitude. 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show that two-way interaction effects are in general much closer 
to the zero horizontal line than main effects. Table 6.6 shows that while more than 
90% of individual effects are either negative or positive for all eight main effects; 
more than 90% of individual effects are either negative or positive for only 7 out of 28 
two-way interaction effects. It is not possible to discuss each of the 28 two-way 
interaction effects in detail, instead, only some significant or practically important 
effects are further investigated. 
 
Transmission Coefficient and Length of Stay 
The most significant two-way interaction is between the transmission coefficient and 
the average length of stay (see Figure 6.13). The mean interaction effect is statistically 
significant (95% confidence interval from 0.132 to 0.142), and nearly all individual 
estimates of the effect are positive (99.2%, or 496 out of 500 individual estimates of 
the effect). Figure 6.13 shows that when the average length of stay is at its base value 
of six days, the average transmission ratio is reduced by 0.559 (from 1.148 to 0.589) 
as the transmission coefficient changes from 0.15 to 0.10, considering all combination 
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of the other six experimental factors; while when the length of stay is at its alternative 
value of four days, the average transmission ratio is only reduced by 0.285 (from 
0.701 to 0.416), considering all combination of other experimental factors. It is 
obvious that MRSA transmission is reduced more sharply by a lower transmission 
coefficient when the length of stay is longer. In another word, the effectiveness of 
transmission coefficient on reducing MRSA transmission depends on the level of the 
average length of stay. By definition, half of the difference between 0.559 and 0.285, 
or 0.137, is the two-way interaction effect between the two factors.  
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Figure 6.13 Two-way interaction effect between the transmission coefficient and the 
length of stay 
 
It is difficult to control either the transmission coefficient or the patients’ lengths of 
say. However, when it is possible to influence the two factors, the two-way interaction 
effect demonstrates how the two factors interact. The significant interaction effect 
between the two factors implies that, if possible, it is more effective to reduce the 
average length of stay where the transmission coefficient is high (e.g., in intensive 
care units or hospital wards where patients are more vulnerable to MRSA 
transmission).  The effect also implies that, if possible, it is more effective to reduce 
the transmission coefficient where the patients’ average length of stay is long.  
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Screening Strategy and Length of Stay 
The second most significant two-way interaction is between the screening strategy 
and the average length of stay (see Figure 6.14). The mean interaction effect is 
statistically significant and a majority, or 95.2%, of all 500 individual estimates of the 
effect are positive. Figure 6.14 shows that when the average length of stay is six days, 
the average transmission ratio is reduced by 0.25 (from 0.994 to 0.581) as the 
screening strategy is changed from admission screening only to admission screening 
plus four day repeat screening, considering all combinations of other factors. When 
the average length of stay is four days, the average transmission ratio is only reduced 
slightly by 0.045 (from 0.581 to 0.536). Half of the difference between 0.25 and 0.045, 
or 0.103, is the two-way interaction effect between the two factors.  
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Figure 6.14 Two-way interaction effect between the screening strategy and the length 
of stay 
 
The clear practical implication of the significant two-way interaction effect is that it is 
more effective to introduce repeat screening test in the hospital wards where the 
patients’ average length of stay is long. For hospital wards where the patients’ average 
length of stay is short, introducing repeat screening test may not significantly reduce 
MRSA transmission. Therefore, when resources are limited, repeat screening test 
should firstly be applied to those wards with longer patients’ lengths of stay. 
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Test Turnaround Time and Transmission Coefficient 
The next significant two-way interaction is between the test turnaround time and the 
transmission coefficient (see Figure 6.15). The mean effect is statistically significant 
and a majority, or 95.4%, of all 500 individual estimates of the effect are positive. 
Figure 6.15 shows that when the transmission coefficient is 0.15, the average 
transmission ratio is reduced by 0.385 (from 1.117 to 0.732) as the test turnaround 
time is reduced from four days to one day. When the transmission coefficient is 0.10, 
the average transmission ratio is reduced less sharply by 0.198 (from 0.601 to 0.404). 
Half of the difference between 0.385 and 0.198, or 0.094, is the two-way interaction 
effect between the two factors.  
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Figure 6.15Two-way interaction effect between the test turnaround time and the 
transmission coefficient 
 
The practical implication of the interaction effect is that a rapid screening test (with a 
shorter test turnaround time) is more effective in the hospital units where the 
transmission coefficient is high. Therefore, when it is not possible to apply rapid 
screening test in the whole hospital, the limited resource should be allocated to places 
like intensive care units and hospital wards where patients are particular vulnerable to 
MRSA. 
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Transmission Coefficient and Endemic Setting 
The next significant two-way interaction is between the transmission coefficient and 
the endemic setting (see Figure 6.16). The mean effect is statistically significant and a 
majority, or 94.4%, of all 500 individual estimates of the effect are negative. Figure 
6.16 shows that when the endemic setting is 10%, the average transmission ratio is 
reduced by 0.337 (from 0.793 to 0.457) as the transmission coefficient is reduced 
from 0.15 to 0.10; while when the endemic setting is 2%, the average transmission 
ratio is reduced more sharply by 0.508 (from 1.056 to 0.548). Half of the difference 
between 0.337 and 0.508, or -0.086, is the two-way interaction effect between the two 
factors. Since the hospital only has limited control over the transmission coefficient 
and the endemic setting, the significant interaction effect between the two factors may 
have limited practical implications.  
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Figure 6.16 Main Two-way interaction effect between the transmission coefficient and 
the endemic setting 
 
Test Turnaround Time and Length of Stay 
The next significant and interesting two-way interaction is between the test 
turnaround time and the average length of stay (see Figure 6.17). The mean effect is 
statistically significant and a majority, or 93.2%, of all 500 individual estimates of the 
effect are positive. Figure 6.17 shows that when the average length of stay is six days, 
the average transmission ratio is reduced by 0.372 (from 1.055 to 0.683) as the test 
turnaround time is reduced from four days to one day. When the average length of 
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stay is four days, the average transmission ratio is reduced less sharply by 0.21 (from 
0.663 to 0.453). Half of the difference between 0.372 and 0.21, or 0.081, is the two-
way interaction effect between the two factors. 
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Figure 6.17 Two-way interaction effect between the test turnaround time and the 
length of stay 
 
The practical implication of the interaction effect is that a rapid screening test is more 
effective in hospital units where the patients’ average length of stay is long. Therefore, 
like the implementation of repeat screening tests, when it is not possible to adopt rapid 
screening tests in the whole hospital, the limited resource should be allocated to 
hospital units where the patients’ average length of stay is long. 
 
Screening Strategy and Transmission Coefficient 
The next significant two-way interaction is between the screening strategy and the 
transmission coefficient (see Figure 6.18). The mean effect is statistically significant 
and a majority, or 92%, of all 500 individual estimates of the effect are positive. 
Figure 6.18 shows that when the transmission coefficient is 0.15, the average 
transmission ratio is reduced by 0.228 (from 1.039 to 0.811) as the screening strategy 
is changed from admission screening only to admission screening plus four day repeat 
screening. When the transmission coefficient is 0.10, the average transmission ratio is 
only reduced by 0.067 (from 0.536 to 0.469). Half of the difference between 0.228 
and 0.067, or 0.08, is the two-way interaction effect between the two factors.  
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Figure 6.18 Two-way interaction effect between the screening strategy and the 
transmission coefficient 
 
The practical implication of the interaction effect is that the introduction of repeat 
screening test is more effective in the hospital units where the transmission coefficient 
is high. Therefore, like the policy of adopting rapid screening test, when it is not 
possible to introduce repeat screening test in the whole hospital, the limited resource 
should be allocated to places like intensive care units and hospital wards where 
patients are particular vulnerable to MRSA. 
 
Number of Isolation Beds and m 
The mean two-way interaction effect between the number of isolation beds and the 
factor m (i.e., the proportion of transmission coming from within the same bay) is 
statistically significant and a majority, or 88.2%, of all 500 individual estimates of the 
effect are negative (see Figure 6.19). This interaction effect includes two experimental 
factors that have not been discussed so far in the analyses of two-way interaction 
effects. Figure 6.19 shows that when the factor of m is 0.1, the average transmission 
ratio is only slightly decreased by 0.025 (from 0.801 to 0.777) as the number of 
isolation beds increased from zero to six. When m is 0.9, the average transmission 
ratio is reduced significantly by 0.161 (from 0.719 to 0.557). Half of the difference 
between 0.025 and 0.161, or -0.068, is the two-way interaction effect between the two 
factors.  
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Figure 6.19 Two-way interaction effect between the number of isolation beds and the 
proportion of transmission within bay 
 
The practical implication of the interaction effect is that adding extra isolation beds is 
only effective when the isolation room can be perfectly isolated from the rest of the 
ward (i.e., the value of factor m is high). When the isolation room can not be 
effectively isolated from the rest of the ward, adding extra isolation beds may be not 
effective in reducing MRSA transmission.  
 
 
6.6 Model Experimentation: Response Surface Design 
The limitation of the factorial design is that only two levels are tested for each 
experimental factor and therefore linearity is implicitly assumed. In order to study the 
experimental factors in more detail and capture the potential non-linear relationships 
between experimental factors and the model response and the non-linear interactions 
among different experimental factors, response surface design is applied.  
 
It is practically not possible to carry out response surface design for each pair of 
experimental factors. Instead, three pairs of experimental factors, which all show 
significant two-way interaction effects and have potential practical implications, are 
selected. Other pairs of experimental factors can be studied using the same method. 
The selected pairs of experimental factors are:  
• The screening strategy and the average length of stay; 
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• The test turnaround time and the average length of stay; and 
• The number of isolation beds and the proportion of transmission within the 
ward bay. 
 
The average length of stay and the number of isolation beds, which are included in the 
response surface design, may implicitly change the ward occupancy, especially when 
they take extreme values. In order to exclude the impact of different levels of ward 
occupancy on MRSA transmission, the ward occupancy is fixed at 90% in every 
design point of the response surface design. The constant ward occupancy level is 
achieved by adjusting the patient arrival rate according to Equation 6.1. Equation 6.2 
shows how the patient arrival rate is calculated for each scenario in the response 
surface design. 
 
(Patient Arrival Rate) = (Number of Beds in Ward) × (Average Ward Occupancy)  ⁄ 
(Average Length of Stay)        (6.2) 
 
Screening Strategy and Length of Stay 
There is a significant two-way interaction effect between the screening strategy and 
the mean length of stay. The interaction between the two factors also has practical 
implications since the screening strategy can be controlled by the hospital and the 
patients’ lengths of stay can be easily measured. In the response surface design, five 
screening strategies will be tested: no screening at all, admission screening only, 
admission screening and weekly repeat screening, admission screening and four day 
repeat screening, and admission screening and daily repeat screening. The mean 
length of stay will be set at five levels: two, four, six, eight and ten days. Overall, the 
design matrix consists of 25 design points and the mean transmission ratio of each 
design point is estimated based on 500 replications (see Table 6.7).  The response 
surface is shown in Figure 6.20. 
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Table 6.7 Response surface design matrix between the screening strategy and the 
length of stay 
Screening strategy  
No 
screening  
Admission 
screening 
only 
Admission 
and weekly 
screening 
Admission 
and four 
day 
screening 
Admission 
and daily 
screening 
2 0.505 0.373 0.37 0.369 0.361 
4 1.295 0.692 0.651 0.633 0.593 
6 2.5 1.147 0.939 0.85 0.768 
8 4.445 2.063 1.178 1.042 0.928 
The 
average 
length 
of stay 
(days) 10 7.249 3.624 1.429 1.186 1.024 
 
 
 
Figure 6.20 Response surface between the screening strategy and the length of stay 
 
The response surface shows that overall transmission ratio is lower with more 
frequent screening test and shorter average length of stay. Strong interactions and 
non-linear relationships between the two factors and the transmission ratio are also 
uncovered. When the average length of stay is fixed, the transmission ratio drops 
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sharply when the screening strategy changes from no screening to just admission 
screening; the reduction of transmission ratio is significantly smaller when the 
screening strategy changes from admission screening and four day screening to 
admission screening and daily screening. For example, when the average length of 
stay is 6 days, the transmission ratio is reduced significantly by 1.353 (from 2.5 to 
1.147) or 54.1% when the admission screening is introduced, while the transmission 
ratio is reduced only slightly by 0.082 (from 0.85 to 0.768) or 9.6% when four day 
repeat screening is replaced by daily repeat screening.  
 
Furthermore, the non-linear relationship between the screening strategy and the 
transmission ratio is more apparent when the mean length of stay is longer (e.g., 6, 8 
or 10 days) rather than shorter (e.g., 2 or 4 days). A practical explanation is that, while 
the change from no screening at all to just admission screening may make a big 
difference under any level of length of stay, making the screening test more frequent 
(e.g., from four day repeat screening to daily repeat screening) will only be effective if 
patients stay in the ward long enough. For example, when the average length of stay is 
8 days, the transmission ratio is reduced significantly when no screening is replaced 
by admission screening (from 4.445 to 2.063) and when admission screening is 
replaced by admission and weekly repeat screening (from 2.063 to 1.178). However, 
when the average length of stay is 4 days, while the transmission ratio is still reduced 
significantly when no screening is replaced by admission screening (from 1.295 to 
0.692), the ratio is not reduced significantly when weekly repeat screening is 
introduced (from 0.692 to 0.651). When the screening strategy changes from weekly 
to four day or from four day to daily repeat screening, the effect on the transmission 
ratio is relatively not significant regardless of the level of mean length of stay (see the 
last three columns of Table 6.7 and Figure 6.20). It is not possible to identify these 
findings from the previous factorial design where only two levels are tested for each 
factor. 
 
The practical implication of the response surface analysis is that, if a hospital does not 
have any pre-emptive screening test for MRSA, it is very effective to reduce MRSA 
transmission by even just introducing admission screening. When admission 
screening is already in practice, the introduction of repeat screening will only 
significantly reduce MRSA transmission if the average length of stay is long relative 
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to the interval of the repeat screening. When repeat screening is already available, 
making the repeat screening more frequent may not significantly reduce MRSA 
transmission even when the average length of stay is long. The experimental results 
support the NHS’s recent screening policy which makes admission screening (for 
elective patients) compulsory for NHS hospitals in the UK. 
 
Test Turnaround Time and Length of Stay 
There is a significant two-way interaction effect between the test turnaround time and 
the length of stay which also has meaningful practical implications since test 
turnaround time represents an important intervention policy. In the response surface 
design, the turnaround time of the test will be set at six different levels from zero to 
five days and the average length of stay will be set at five levels: two, four, six, eight 
and ten days. Overall, the design matrix consists of 30 design points (see Table 6.8) 
and the response surface is shown in Figure 6.21. 
 
Table 6.8 Response surface design matrix between the test turnaround time and the 
length of stay 
Test turnaround time (days)  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 0.256 0.322 0.372 0.41 0.435 0.451 
4 0.41 0.525 0.637 0.721 0.8 0.876 
6 0.52 0.697 0.852 1.008 1.147 1.266 
8 0.614 0.822 1.038 1.24 1.527 1.673 
The 
average 
length 
of stay 
(days) 10 0.663 0.949 1.216 1.477 1.794 2.125 
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Figure 6.21 Response surface between the test turnaround time and the length of stay 
 
The response surface shows that the overall transmission ratio is lower with faster 
screening test and shorter average length of stay. When the average length of stay is 
fixed, the transmission ratio is reduced rather linearly with the decrease of the test 
turnaround time; the speed of decrease, however, is faster when the average length of 
stay is longer. For example, when the average length of stay is eight days, the 
transmission ratio is reduced steadily by 1.059 (from 1.673 to 0.614) as the test 
turnaround time is shortened from five to zero days; when the average length of stay 
is two days, the transmission ration is reduced rather linearly only by 0.195 (from 
0.451 to 0.256). This result complies with the two-way interaction effect of the two 
factors (see Figure 6.17).  
 
When the test turnaround time is fixed, a non-linear relationship between the average 
length of stay and the transmission ratio can be spotted. The response surface shows 
that although the transmission ratio increases with longer average length of stay, the 
rate of the increase is diminishing or slowing. For example, when the test turnaround 
time is fixed at two days, the transmission ratio is increased by 0.265 (from 0.372 to 
0.637) or 71.2% when the average length of stay increases from two to four days; 
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while the transmission ratio is only increased by 0.178 (from 1.038 to 1.216) or 17.1% 
when the average length of stay increases from eight to ten days. Such a diminishing 
increasing rate is also seen when the test turnaround time is set at other levels.  
 
The practical implication of the response surface design is that MRSA transmission 
can be reduced significantly if the turnaround time of the screening test can be 
reduced under any level of length of stay, although the effectiveness is more 
significant with longer length of stay. The linear relationship between the test 
turnaround time and the transmission ratio means, regardless of the current test 
turnaround time, reducing the test turnaround time further (e.g., from four to three 
days or from two to one days) can always expect a significant reduction of MRSA 
transmission. This complies with and strengthens the finding from the main effect 
analysis that test turnaround time is the single most significant intervention policy 
(among the policies tested) to reduce MRSA transmission in the hospital setting. 
 
Number of Isolation Beds and m 
The last two experimental factors to be further explored by response surface design 
are the number of isolation beds and the proportion of the transmission coming from 
within the same bay, or m. The hospital can control the provision of isolation facilities 
and the two factors have natural connections since the factor of m is also the indicator 
of how isolated is the isolation room to the rest of the ward. In the response surface 
design, the number of isolation beds will be set at five different levels: zero, two, four, 
six and eight isolation beds. The factor of m will be set at six levels: 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 
0.8 and 1. Overall, the design matrix consists of 30 design points (see Table 6.9) and 
the response surface is shown in Figure 6.22. 
 
Table 6.9 Response surface design matrix between the number of isolation beds and 
the proportion of transmission within the bay 
The number of isolation beds (beds)  
0 2 4 6 8 
0 1.489 1.486 1.452 1.476 1.45 
0.2 1.465 1.419 1.402 1.367 1.343 
0.4 1.455 1.334 1.296 1.251 1.187 
0.6 1.411 1.289 1.214 1.134 1.076 
0.8 1.33 1.199 1.132 1.044 0.982 
Proportion 
of 
transmission 
within bay 
and isolation 
room (m) 1 1.24 1.125 1.038 0.95 0.895 
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Figure 6.22 Response surface between the number of isolation beds and the 
proportion of transmission within the bay 
 
The main and two-way interaction effects demonstrate that the transmission ratio is 
lower with more isolation beds and higher proportion of transmission coming within 
the same bay. The response surface shows in detail how the effectiveness of providing 
isolation beds is dependent on the level of m. When m is zero (i.e., all transmissions 
are caused by the ward level interactions and isolating patients can not prevent MRSA 
from spreading), the transmission ratio remains fairly stable (ranges from 1.45 to 
1.489 with no clear upward or downward trends) when the number of isolation beds 
changes between zero and eight. When m is one (i.e., all transmission are caused by 
local contacts within the same bay and patients in isolation can neither acquire nor 
spread MRSA), the transmission ratio is reduced sharply from 1.24 to 0.895 as the 
number of isolation beds increases from zero to eight. When m takes values between 
zero and one, the transmission ratio is also reduced significantly as the number of 
isolation room increases, and the reduction in the transmission ratio is more evident 
with higher value of m. From another perspective, when there are no isolation beds in 
the ward, the transmission ratio decreases slightly from 1.489 to 1.24 as m increases 
from zero to one. However, as isolation beds are introduced, the transmission ratio is 
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reduced more sharply as m increases from zero to one. For example, when six 
isolation beds are added, the transmission ratio is reduced significantly from 1.476 to 
0.95, as m increases from zero to one.  
 
The non-linearity relationship between the number of isolation beds and the 
transmission ratio is also demonstrated by the response surface. For example, when m 
is set at 0.6, 0.8 and 1, as the number of isolation beds increases from zero to eight, 
the transmission ratio will firstly drop quickly as the first two isolation beds are added, 
then the transmission ratio decreases slowly when additional isolation beds are 
provided (see Table 6.9 and Figure 6.22). For example, when m is 0.6, the 
introduction of the first two isolation beds reduces the transmission ratio by 0.122 
(from 1.411 to 1.289), the introduction of the next two isolation beds (i.e., from two to 
four isolation beds) reduces the ratio by 0.075 (from 1.289 to 1.214), and the 
transmission ratio is only reduced slightly by 0.058 (from 1.134 to 1.076) when the 
number of isolation beds increases from six to eight.  
 
The practical implication of the response surface design is that the more effective 
isolation can prevent MRSA transmission from spreading (i.e., the value of m is closer 
to one), the more effective of the intervention policy of adding more isolation beds. 
Another practical implication is that it is more effective to provide the first few 
isolation beds than providing additional isolation beds when some isolation beds are 
already available in the ward. Therefore, when the total number of isolation facilities 
that can be provided is fixed (probably due to a constrained budget), it is more 
effective to make sure that every hospital unit has a few isolation beds (i.e., isolation 
facilities are distributed among the hospital) rather than a few hospital units have an 
excessive number of isolation facilities. 
 
 
6.7 Summary  
 
6.7.1 Indications to the Management of MRSA 
According to the results from the model experimentation, the following conclusions 
and indications are generalised regarding the effective management of MRSA in the 
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hospital setting. The indications focus on the intervention polices that the hospital 
management may actually control. 
 
Rapid Screening Test 
The factor of the test turnaround time has the most significant main effect among the 
three intervention polices tested. In general, MRSA transmission can be significantly 
reduced by the introduction of rapid screening test in the hospital setting. 
 
The effectiveness of rapid screening tests is dependent on the level of other factors 
including the transmission coefficient and the average length of stay. When it is not 
possible to apply rapid screening tests in the whole hospital, the limited resource 
should be allocated to places like ICUs and hospital wards where patients are 
particularly vulnerable to MRSA and where the patients’ average length of stay is 
long. Furthermore, the response surface design shows that, regardless of the current 
level of the length of stay, reducing the test turnaround time further can always result 
in a significant reduction of MRSA transmission. 
 
Pre-emptive Screening Test 
Screening strategy has the second most significant main effect among the factors 
representing intervention policies. Like the policy of the rapid screening test, the 
effectiveness of the screening strategy is also dependent on the average length of stay 
and the transmission coefficient. A number of screening strategies (including no pre-
emptive screening at all) are tested by the response surface design. The analysis 
shows that the choice of the most effective screening strategy is highly dependent on 
the current practice of screening strategy and the patients’ average length of stay. 
 
Providing Isolation Facilities 
The factor of the number of isolation beds also has a significant main effect, although 
it is not as effective as the factors of the test turnaround time and the screening 
strategy. The effectiveness of proving more isolation beds is significantly dependent 
on the proportion of transmission coming within the same ward bay, or m. 
Experimental results show that adding extra isolation beds is only effective when the 
isolation room can be perfectly isolated from the rest of the ward (i.e., the value of m 
is high). The response surface design demonstrates that it is more effective to provide 
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the first few isolation beds than providing additional isolation beds when some 
isolation beds are already in place.  
 
6.7.2 Limitations of Methods 
The main experimental design method used for the research is fractional factorial 
design. The method only tests two levels of each experimental factor and assumes 
linear relationships between the experimental factor and the model response.  
 
As only two levels of each factor are tested and the effectiveness of the experimental 
factor is determined by changing the value from the base to the alternative level, the 
choice of the levels will significantly affect the experimental results. If the two levels 
selected are too close, the effectiveness of the factor may be underestimated. The 
effectiveness may also be overestimated if the two levels chosen are too further apart. 
In this study, the base and alternative levels of each experimental factor are carefully 
selected so that the difference between the two levels of each factor is significant 
while not unrealistic and unachievable in practice. In order to ensure the 
comparability of the effectiveness across all experimental factors, the same relative 
differences between the two levels of each factor is maintained. Despite the efforts to 
choose the most appropriate levels for experimental factors, the experimental results 
from the factorial design will have limitations and need to be interpreted by always 
referencing the selected base and alterative levels of each factor. 
 
The linearity assumption of the factorial design may also affect the interpretation of 
the experimental results. It is possible that the impact of the experimental factor on the 
model response is non-linear, as demonstrated by the response surface design (e.g. 
between screening strategy and transmission ratio). Under such circumstances, the 
factorial design may only provide a rough picture of the relationship between the 
factor and the model response, while hiding the true non-linear relationship which 
may have important practical implications. For example, the factorial design shows 
that replacing admission screening with four day repeat screening will significantly 
reduce MRSA transmission; while the detailed response surface design shows that 
much of the reduction may be achieved by only replacing with weekly repeat 
screening. In practice, the weekly repeat screening may be less costly than the four 
day repeat screening. Due to the linearity assumption, results from the factorial design 
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may need to be further refined by an experimental design method that allows for non-
linear relationships to be disclosed (e.g. response surface design). 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Model Extensions 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the MRSA model proposed in the previous chapters will be extended 
to study the transmission dynamics when two competing infectious diseases are 
explicitly modelled simultaneously, when multiple hospital units and HCWs are 
represented, and when the wider community is included. The main purpose of this 
model extension is to explore the possibility and ability of ABS to study MRSA and 
potentially other types of HAIs in a wider context. 
 
In the first attempt to extend the model, apart from MRSA, the infectious disease of 
Clostridium difficile (C. difficile) is also explicitly modelled. Therefore, a patient may 
have either MRSA or C. difficile or both of them during the hospital ward stay. The 
two infectious diseases may compete for scarce infection control resources such as 
isolation facilities. In the second model extension, the original single ward model is 
extended to include three hospital units and HCWs are explicitly represented as agents. 
Therefore, the transmission dynamics among different hospital units and the role of 
HCWs can be studied. In the last model extension, not only the hospital ward but also 
the wider community, where the patients are admitted from and discharged to, is 
represented. The interactions between the hospital and its community are modelled 
and, as a result, the wider and longer term transmission dynamics of MRSA can be 
investigated.  
 
 
7.2 Competitive Infections 
In reality, more than one type of infectious disease may be present in the hospital 
environment. When infection control resources are limited (e.g., isolation facilities), 
patients who are colonised with one type of infectious disease may compete for these 
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scarce resources with patients who are colonised with other types of infections. For 
example, a patient who requires isolation due to MRSA colonisation may not be 
isolated if the isolation facility is occupied by a patient who is colonised with C. 
difficile. Such competition may affect the transmission dynamics of both infectious 
diseases.  
 
No previous modelling studies have represented two types of HAIs in a single model. 
The model extension in this section attempts to explicitly model two competing 
infections (MRSA and C. difficile) in a single model and test how the competition 
between the two infections for isolation facilities may affect the transmission 
dynamics of both infections. Without clinical evidence, the extension model assumes 
that the transmissions of two infections are independent.  
 
7.2.1 Clostridium difficile 
C. difficile is a spore-forming Gram-positive anaerobic bacillus that was first isolated 
from stools of neonates in 1935 (Barbut and Petit 2001). Among healthy people, the 
asymptomatic carriage rate is about 3%; and the carriage rates are higher in patients 
with previous hospitalisation (10-25%) or in patients who have previously received 
antibiotics (10-20%) (Bartlett 1994). The clinical presence of C. difficile may range 
from mild diarrhoea to life-threatening pseudomembranous colitis and possible 
perforation. Currently, C. difficile is the leading cause of nosocomial infectious 
diarrhoea in adults and it is responsible for large outbreaks (Cartmill et al. 1994). C. 
difficile infection may increase the length of stay of an adult patient by 8 days 
(Spencer 1998) and an extra cost of about £4,107 (Wilcox et al. 1996).  
 
More than 90% of C. difficile infections occur after or during antibiotic treatment. 
Antibiotics act by disrupting the normal colonic flora, allowing C. difficile to establish 
itself in the colon and proliferate. The antibiotics most likely to incur C. difficile are 
the broad-spectrum antibiotics that have a large impact on the normal intestinal flora 
which include penicillin, cephalosporin and clindamycin. A combination of antibiotics 
and long duration of the course increases the risk of developing C. difficile (Barbut 
and Petit 2001). Other risk factors of C. difficile include age, ICU admission, 
chemotherapy and length of stay. 
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Patients with symptomatic or asymptomatic C. difficile can both contaminate their 
immediate hospital environment and the spores may persist for several months on 
surfaces. Contamination is found to be significantly higher in hospital units with 
symptomatic patients than with asymptomatic patients (McFarland et al. 1990). 
Transmission of C. difficile can occur by direct contact with contaminated surfaces 
and via the hands of HCWs. In general, transmission of C. difficile from patient to 
patient is easy and spores play a key role since they can survive several months in the 
environment.  
 
Dedicated intervention polices to prevent and control C. difficile may include the 
restrictive use of antibiotics (especially those that are considered at high risk for C. 
difficile infection), pre-emptive screening tests, isolation and treatment of infected 
patients. General measures to prevent and control HAIs should also be implemented 
to reduce the transmission of C. difficile in the hospital setting (see Section 1.2.3). 
Treatment of asymptomatic patients was not recommended by some studies (Johnson 
et al. 1992). 
 
7.2.2 Model Modifications 
Previous modelling studies have focused on MRSA or C. difficile. There has been no 
study that attempts to represent the two infectious diseases simultaneously in the same 
model. In the first model extension, the original model which focuses only on MRSA 
will be extended to include a second infectious disease, i.e., C. difficile. The two 
infectious diseases will compete for scarce hospital resources and may potentially 
interact with each other in other ways (e.g., the presence of MRSA may increase the 
risk of acquiring C. difficile and vice versa).  
 
The main modifications to the original MRSA model are to add additional states and 
state transitions of C. difficile since, a patient agent will have two separate and parallel 
state transitions in the extended model, one regarding MRSA colonisation status and 
the other regarding C. difficile colonisation status. Another modification to the 
original model is that isolation beds in the modified model will be solely designated to 
patients who are identified as colonised with either MRSA or C. difficile. Compared 
to the original MRSA model, the parameter which represents the possibility that 
isolation beds may be used with a purpose other than controlling MRSA is discarded. 
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By doing this, the utilisation of the isolation beds can be more realistically represented 
and monitored. Other additional assumptions of the extended model include: 
• On admission, a patient is either colonised with C. difficile or not; 
• Screening tests of C. difficile are carried out only on admission and there are 
no repeat screening tests (which means secondary cases of C. difficile can not 
be detected); 
• Patients who are detected as colonised with C. difficile by admission screening 
tests will be isolated if isolation beds are available; 
• There is no decolonisation treatment for C. difficile following detection; 
• Once MRSA is successfully cleared by decolonisation treatment, the patient, if 
he/she stays in an isolation bed, will not be transferred back to a ward bay if 
colonisation of C. difficile has been detected; and 
• Detected C. difficile positive patients have reduced transmissibility compared 
to undetected patients colonised with C. difficile. 
 
Regarding the states and state transmissions of C. difficile, the colonisation status of a 
patient is either colonised or susceptible and the detection states include undetected 
and detected. A primary case patient of C. difficile (i.e., colonised with C. difficile on 
admission) will change the detection state from undetected to detected if an admission 
screening test is performed and when the positive result is reported. Following 
detection, the patient may be isolated if an isolation bed is available, and if so, the 
patient will remain in isolation until discharge. A C. difficile susceptible patient may 
acquire the infection during the ward stay and any resulting secondary case will 
remain undetected during the rest of the ward stay (since there are no repeat screening 
tests). The main states and state transitions of a patient regarding both MRSA (which 
are the same as Figure 4.2) and C. difficile (the right-hand side of the diagram) are 
illustrated in Figure 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1 Patient main states and state transitions of MRSA and C. difficile 
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Additional input parameters, their default values and the sources of the default values 
are shown in Table 7.1. Most of the input parameter values are based on previous 
studies. The proportion of patients who have already been colonised with C. difficile 
on admission and the transmission coefficient of C. difficile, or 1C , are assumed to be 
10% and 0.2 respectively (Barbut and Petit 2001). The turnaround time of the 
screening tests of C. difficile is assumed to be 3 days (Samore et al. 1994). The 
effectiveness of C. difficile detection, or 1k , is set at 0.4 which assumes that detection 
may reduce 60% of the infectivity of a colonised patient. The reduced infectivity may 
be due to enhanced barrier precautions. 
 
Table 7.1 Additional model input parameters for model extension of competitive 
infections 
Parameter Default value Symbol Source 
Proportion of C. difficile colonisation 
on admission 
10%  Barbut and Petit 2001 
Test turnaround time of C. difficile 
screening test (days) 
3  Samore et al. 1994 
Transmission coefficient of C. difficile 0.2 1C  Barbut and Petit 2001 
Effectiveness of C. difficile detection 
on reducing infectivity 
0.4 1k  Assumption 
 
The way to calculate the transmission probabilities of C. difficile is the same as 
MRSA in the original model (see Section 4.5.1 and Table 4.1) where the pairwise 
action assumption, modified based on the mass action assumption, is applied. In each 
time slice, pairs of susceptible and colonised C. difficile patients are formed and 
evaluated separately and independently, and the transmission probability of the 
susceptible patient in the pair is estimated. Apart from the transmission coefficient of 
C. difficile, or 1C , the transmission probability is affected by the detection state of the 
colonised patient in the pair (detected patient has reduced infectivity represented by 
the parameter of 1k ) and the relative location of the two patients (within the same 
ward bay or not). The modified equations for calculating the rate of C. difficile 
colonisation of the susceptible patient are given in Table 7.2. The transmission 
probability can then be calculated based on Equation 3.3. Due to the lack of clinical 
evidence, the extended model assumes that the transmissions of MRSA and C. 
difficile are independent. 
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Table 7.2 Equations for calculating the rate of C. difficile colonisation of the 
susceptible patient 
Scenarios  Colonised 
patient 
Susceptible 
patient 
Transmission probability 
1 Undetected Same bay 
t
n
m
n
mCt
wardbay
∆⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−⋅=∆ 1
1
1
)( 11λ  
2 Undetected Other 
bays/Isolation tn
mCt
ward
∆⋅−
−⋅=∆
1
1)( 11λ  
3 Detected  Same bay 
t
n
m
n
mkCt
wardbay
∆⋅⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−⋅⋅=∆ 1
1
1
)( 111λ
4 Detected  Other 
bays/Isolation tn
mkCt
ward
∆⋅−
−⋅⋅=∆
1
1)( 111λ  
 
 
7.2.3 Model Experimentation 
 
Comparison between the Original and the Extended Model 
As a type of scarce and expensive hospital resource, isolation beds are required by 
both MRSA and C. difficile patients in the extended model. Therefore, when the total 
demand for isolation beds exceeds the supply at any time, the two infectious diseases 
may compete with each other. In order to demonstrate the competition for the 
isolation beds and how the competition affect the utilisation of isolation beds and the 
transmission ratios of both infectious diseases, comparisons are made between the 
original model where isolation beds are solely for isolating MRSA patients and the 
extended model where isolation beds can be used for either MRSA or C. difficile 
patients. Please note the parameter of the availability of isolation beds in original 
model is discarded to make it comparable with the extended model which also does 
not include the parameter (see Section 7.2.2). 
 
By changing the number of isolation facilities from zero to ten, Table 7.3 shows the 
average number of patients isolated due to MRSA in the original model. For the 
extended model, the table reports the average number of patients isolated due to 
MRSA and C. difficile, and the average total number of patients been isolated. Each 
mean value is estimated from 500 replications with each replication lasts for 415 days 
(50 days warm-up and 365 days for data collection).  
 
Model Extensions 
 
 179
Table 7.3 Average number of patients isolated in the original and the extended models 
Original model Extended model Number of 
isolation 
beds 
Isolated (MRSA) Isolated 
(MRSA) 
Isolated (C. 
difficile) 
Isolated 
(total) 
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 29.5 19.9 26.5 46.4 
2 48.8 37.5 47.2 84.7 
3 58.1 49.8 61.7 111.5 
4 62.5 57.4 70.5 127.9 
5 64.1 60.7 74.4 135.1 
6 65.5 63.3 76.3 139.6 
7 65.6 63.4 78.0 141.4 
8 65.2 64.4 78.2 142.6 
9 65.0 63.6 77.4 141.0 
10 65.1 64.0 78.0 141.9 
 
Figure 7.2 illustrates the comparison diagrammatically by showing the number of 
patients isolated due to MRSA in the original and the modified model, and the total 
number of patients isolated in both models with different numbers of isolation beds. 
For the original model, the number of patients isolated due to MRSA and the total 
number of patients isolated are represented by the same line (the black line). For the 
modified model, the difference between the number of patients isolated due to MRSA 
(the dotted line at the bottom) and the total number of patients isolated (the dotted line 
on the top) represents the number of patients isolated due to C. difficile. 
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Figure 7.2 Comparison of the number of patients isolated between the original and 
the extended model 
 
The results demonstrate that, given the same number of isolation beds (except zero 
which means no isolation at all), the average total number of patients isolated is 
significantly higher in the extended model than the original model (compare the 
dotted line on the top and the black line in Figure 7.2). The reason is that the isolation 
facilities are more fully utilised by serving the patients colonised with both MRSA 
and C. difficile rather just for MRSA patients.  
 
Apart from demonstrating the impact of including a competitive infection on the 
utilisation of isolation beds, the impact on the transmission ratio of MRSA is also 
investigated. By changing the number of isolation facilities from zero to ten, Table 7.4 
and Figure 7.3 show the average transmission ratios of MRSA in the original and the 
extended model.  
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Table 7.4 Average transmission ratios of MRSA in the original and the extended 
models 
Number of 
isolation beds 
Transmission ratio of 
MRSA (original model)
Transmission ratio of 
MRSA (extended model) 
0 1.022 1.017 
1 0.879 0.930 
2 0.808 0.870 
3 0.734 0.789 
4 0.711 0.741 
5 0.695 0.700 
6 0.687 0.695 
7 0.695 0.694 
8 0.679 0.691 
9 0.686 0.690 
10 0.693 0.684 
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Figure 7.3 Comparison of the transmission ratios of MRSA between the original and 
the extended model 
 
The results demonstrate that, when only a few isolation beds are available, the average 
transmission ratio of MRSA is significantly higher in the extended model than the 
original model. As the number of isolation beds increases further, the difference of the 
transmission ratios between the original and extended model becomes smaller. This 
difference is demonstrated in Figure 7.3 by the initial bigger gap between the two 
lines with few isolation beds and then the merging of the two lines as the number of 
isolation beds increases further. The reason that the transmission ratio of MRSA is 
higher in the extended model with limited isolation beds is that fewer detected MRSA 
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patients are isolated due to the competition with C. difficile (see Figure 7.2). As the 
isolation facility increases, most detected MRSA patients will be isolated and the two 
lines begin to merge.   
 
Full Factorial Design 
Using the extended model of competitive infections, a simple full factorial design is 
used to study the impact of three key input parameters on the transmission dynamics 
of MRSA and C. difficile. The experimental factors are the transmission coefficient of 
MRSA (TCM), the transmission coefficient of C. difficile (TCC) and the number of 
isolation beds (ISO). The two model responses are the transmission ratio of MRSA 
and the transmission ratio of C. difficile. The base and alternative values of each 
experimental factor is given in Table 7.5 and the design matrix which contains eight 
design points (i.e., 823 = ) is shown in Table 7.6.  
 
Table 7.5 Experimental factors and their base/alterative values for the model 
extension of competitive infections 
Experimental factor Index Base value (-) Alternative value (+)
Transmission coefficient of MRSA 1 0.15 0.1 
Transmission coefficient of C. difficile 2 0.25 0.15 
Number of Isolation beds (beds) 3 1 5 
 
Table 7.6 Full factorial design matrix and model experimentation results for the 
model extension of competitive infections 
Design 
point 
Factor 1 2 3 Mean transmission 
ratio (MRSA) 
Mean transmission 
ratio (C. difficile) 
 TCM TCC ISO   
1 - - - 1.023 1.277 
2 + - - 0.580 1.267 
3 - + - 1.028 0.549 
4 + + - 0.581 0.553 
5 - - + 0.775 1.125 
6 + - + 0.433 1.136 
7 - + + 0.775 0.463 
8 + + + 0.441 0.475 
 
For each of the eight design points in the full factorial design, the model is run 500 
replications with each lasting 415 days (50 days for warm-up and 365 days for data 
collection). The mean transmission ratios of MRSA and C. difficile are reported in 
Table 7.6. The average main and two-way interaction effects of the three experimental 
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factors on MRSA and C. difficile transmission ratios are estimated and given in Table 
7.7 and 7.8. Apart from the mean, the dispersion and variation of the individual 
effects based on 500 replications are shown in Figure 7.4 and 7.5 in terms of first and 
third quartiles and the range.  
 
Table 7.7 Average main and two-way interaction effects on MRSA transmission ratio 
for the model extension of competitive infections  
 Factor 1 2 3 
 TCM TCC ISO 
Factor 1 X   
Factor 2 0.001 X  
Factor 3 0.054 0.000 X 
Main effect -0.392 0.004 -0.197 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Quartiles and range of main and two-way interaction effects on MRSA 
transmission ratio for the model extension of competitive infections 
 
Table 7.8 Average main and two-way interaction effects on C. difficile transmission 
ratio for the model extension of competitive infections  
 Factor 1 2 3 
 TCM TCC ISO 
Factor 1 X   
Factor 2 0.004 X  
Factor 3 0.007 0.030 X 
Main effect 0.004 -0.691 -0.112 
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Figure 7.5 Quartiles and range of main and two-way interaction effects on C. difficile 
transmission ratio for the model extension of competitive infections 
 
As expected, the transmission coefficient of MRSA has the most significant main 
effect on the transmission ratio of MRSA itself (i.e., the main effect is -0.392 which 
means the transmission ratio of MRSA can be reduced by 0.392 when the 
transmission coefficient of MRSA is reduced from 0.15 to 0.1) and the transmission 
coefficient of C. difficile has the most significant main effect on the transmission ratio 
of C. difficile itself (i.e., the main effect is -0.691 which means the transmission ratio 
of C. difficile can be reduced by 0.691 when the transmission coefficient of C. difficile 
is reduced from 0.25 to 0.15). The results of the main effects also demonstrate that the 
change of the transmission coefficient of MRSA has no significant impact on the 
transmission ratio of C. difficile (i.e., the main effect is 0.004) and the change of 
transmission coefficient of C. difficile also has no significant impact on the 
transmission ratio of MRSA (i.e., 0.004). This complies with the assumption of the 
extended model that the transmissions of two infections are independent. Finally, as 
expected, the number of isolation beds has a significant impact on both the 
transmission ratios of MRSA and C. difficile (i.e., the main effects are -0.197 and -
0.112 respectively which means the transmission ratio of MRSA can be reduced by 
0.197 and the transmission ratio of C. difficile by 0.112 when the number of isolation 
beds increases from one to five). The main effects of each of the three experimental 
factors on the two model responses (i.e., transmission ratios of MRSA and C. difficile) 
are shown in Figure 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8.  
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Figure 7.6 Main effects of MRSA transmission coefficient on transmission ratios of 
MRSA and C. difficile 
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Figure 7.7 Main effects of C. difficile transmission coefficient on transmission ratios 
of MRSA and C. difficile 
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Figure 7.8 Main effects of the number of isolation beds on transmission ratios of 
MRSA and C. difficile 
 
7.2.4 Conclusions 
The model extension discussed in this section is the first attempt to model more than 
one infectious disease simultaneously in one model. By including a competitive 
infection, the competition between the two infections on scarce isolation resources 
and its impact on isolation utilisation and transmission dynamics can be studied.  
 
The comparison results between the original and extended model show that the 
inclusion of a second infectious disease will significantly influence the utilisation of 
isolation facilities, both regarding the overall utilisation and the breakdown utilisation 
for each type of infection. The degree of the impact also depends on whether the 
isolation facilities are limited or abundant relative to the demand. Generally speaking, 
the scarcer the isolation resource is, the bigger the impact on the utilisation of the 
isolation beds and on the transmission dynamics of both infections. The conclusion 
should apply to other infection prevention and control resources such as nurses and 
special equipments. 
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7.3 Transmission Dynamics with Multiple Hospital Units and 
Healthcare Workers 
The original MRSA model represents a single hospital unit and only patients are 
explicitly represented as agents. Since the MRSA empirical study is carried out on the 
ward basis and data are not available to describe or infer transmissions among 
different hospital wards, the original model does not include multiple hospital units 
and the potential interactions among them. Only the patient’s MRSA colonisation 
status is monitored during the MRSA study and no data are collected about HCW’s 
colonisation status, their contact patterns with patients, and their hand-washing 
frequency and efficacy. Therefore, it is not possible to model HCWs explicitly in the 
original model. To explore these modelling options, an extended model which 
includes three hospital units and explicitly represents HCWs is developed based on 
the original model. The extended model is mainly configured with hypothetical data. 
The main purpose of the model extension, however, is to demonstrate the ability and 
flexibility of ABS to model HAIs in these contexts. 
 
7.3.1 Model Modifications 
In reality, HAIs may not only be transmitted within a single hospital unit, but also 
between different hospital wards of the same hospital. The transmission among 
hospital units are normally facilitated by transiently colonised HCWs who may care 
for patients from different hospital units.  
 
In the extended model, it is assumed that the scaled-down hospital has three hospital 
units. The ward layout of the three units is assumed to be the same as the hypothetical 
test ward defined in Chapter 6. It is also assumed that there are two types of HCWs. 
The activity of the first type of HCW is confined to a single hospital unit (e.g., nurses 
dedicated to a ward) and the activity of the second type of HCW involves all three 
hospital units (e.g., doctors who may contact patients in all hospital units). To focus 
on the role of HCWs in the transmission of MRSA, it is assumed that the only 
transmission route of MRSA is by cross transmission via transiently colonised HCWs. 
Therefore, both types of HCWs may transmit MRSA within the same hospital unit, 
while the second type of HCW may also transmit MRSA between different hospital 
units. Other assumptions of the extended model include: 
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• HCWs can only acquire MRSA colonisation through contact with colonised 
patients (i.e., there is no transmission among HCWs); 
• Patients can only acquire MRSA colonisation through contact with colonised 
HCWs (i.e., patient can not acquire MRSA colonisation directly from other 
colonised patients); 
• HCWs may only be transiently colonised and, once colonised, will be 
decolonised with a fixed rate through hand-washing;  
• The numbers of both types of HCWs are fixed;  
• Each patient each day needs a fixed number of contacts from HCWs, and the 
intervals between two successive contacts follow an exponential distribution;  
• A proportion of the patient-HCW contacts is with Type 2 HCWs; 
• Isolation can totally prevent transmission between HCWs and patients who are 
isolated;  
• Patients who are receiving decolonisation treatment are less likely to transmit 
MRSA to HCWs; 
• Patient may not move between different hospital units (they may still move 
within the ward). 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the transmission dynamics of MRSA in a hospital with three 
hospital units. The figure shows that Type 1 HCWs interact locally with patients in 
the same ward; while Type 2 HCWs interact globally with every patient in the 
hospital. For each type of HCW, there are two states: colonised and susceptible. 
HCWs may acquire colonisation from contacts with colonised patients and may clear 
MRSA through hand-washing. For patient agents, most states and state transitions are 
the same as the original MRSA case study model (see Figure 4.2). The main 
difference is that patient in the extended model may only acquire MRSA colonised 
through contacts with colonised HCWs. The main states and state transitions of 
MRSA of the three types of agents (i.e., patient agents, Type 1 HCWs and Type 2 
HCWs) are illustrated in Figure 7.10. 
 
Model Extensions 
 
 189
 
Figure 7.9 Transmission dynamics of MRSA in multiple hospital units 
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Figure 7.10 Main states and state transitions of MRSA of patients and HCWs in multiple hospital units 
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The new input parameters and their default values are given in Table 7.9. It is 
assumed that there are five Type 1 HCWs in each ward and five Type 2 HCWs in the 
whole hospital. On average, each patient in the ward requires five contacts per day 
with HCWs, among which 20% is assumed to be with Type 2 HCWs. The 
transmission probability of both patient-HCW and HCW-patient contacts is 0.1 which 
means there is a 10% chance that each contact may result in a successful transmission 
of MRSA, given that either the HCW or the patient is colonised with MRSA at the 
time of evaluation. For colonised HCWs, the hand-washing rate or the decolonisation 
rate is 14 times per day (Coope et al. 1999). 
 
7.9 Additional model input parameters for model extension with multiple hospital 
units and healthcare workers 
Parameter Value Source 
Number of HCWs (Type 1) 5 Assumption 
Number of HCWs (Type 2) 5 Assumption 
Patient-HCW contact rate 5 / day Cooper et al. 1999 
Proportion of contacts with Type 2 HCWs 20% Assumption 
Patient-HCW contact transmission probability 0.1 Cooper et al. 1999 
HCW-patient contact transmission probability 0.1 Cooper et al. 1999 
Hand-washing rate (decolonisation rate) 14 / day Cooper et al. 1999 
 
The extended model adopts the host-vector model (see Section 3.7.1) to represent 
MRSA transmission. For each patient who stays in the ward, the time delay for the 
next contact with a HCW is sampled from an exponential distribution with the mean 
delay determined by the average contact rate specified in Table 7.9. When the 
scheduled contact is due, the model determines whether the contact is with Type 1 
HCWs or Type 2 HCWs. Then, the patient will contact with a random HCW of the 
selected type. During evaluation, if the patient is colonised with MRSA but not in 
isolation and the HCW is not colonised with MRSA, then the HCW has a 10% chance 
of acquiring MRSA (the chance is reduced if the patient is under decolonisation 
treatment). If the HCW is colonised with MRSA and the patient is not colonised with 
MRSA and not in isolation, then the patient has a 10% chance of acquiring MRSA. 
For other situations (e.g., both the patient and the HCW are colonised with MRSA or 
both are not colonised with MRSA), the colonisation statuses of both the patient and 
the HCW will not change. 
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7.3.2 Model Experimentation 
The extended model can be applied to study some intervention policies and 
experimental factors that are not possible in the original model. The three 
experimental factors that are to be tested include the number of Type 1 HCWs (or the 
HCW-patient ratio), the hand-washing rate (or the HCW decolonisation rate) and the 
transmission probability of each patient-HCW contact. During model experimentation, 
500 replications will be carried out for each scenario with each lasting 415 days (50 
days warm-up followed by 365 days for data collection). The average transmission 
ratio during the simulation period is used as the model response. Apart from the three 
experimental factors, all other input parameter values are set at default values 
according to Tables 6.2 and 7.9. 
 
In the first scenario, the number of Type 1 HCWs (who only care for patients in the 
same unit) in each hospital unit changes from 5 to 15 (i.e., the total number of Type 1 
HCWs in the hospital changes from 15 to 45). Consequently, the HCW-patient ratio 
changes from 1:5 to 3:5 assuming that on average 25 patients stay in each ward. 
Figure 7.11 shows the average transmission ratios of the hospital for different 
numbers of Type 1 HCWs. The figure demonstrates that as the number of Type 1 
HCWs in each hospital unit increases from 5 to 15, the average transmission ratio 
decreases from around 0.16 to about 0.06. The results indicate that MRSA 
transmission ratio may be reduced if more Type 1 HCWs who only serve the patients 
in a single ward are provided.  
 
A possible explanation for the relationship is that when more Type 1 HCWs are 
deployed in the ward, on average, the number of patients contacted by each Type 1 
HCW is reduced (as the total number of contacts required by a patient is fixed) and 
therefore it is less likely that the HCW may act as a vector to spread MRSA in the 
ward. The fact that Type 1 HCWs only serve patients in a single hospital unit and can 
not transmit MRSA among different wards may also explain the result. 
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Figure 7.11 Average transmission ratios with different numbers of HCWs  
 
For the second scenario, the hand-washing rate or decolonisation rate of HCWs 
changes from 10 times per day to 20 times per day. Figure 7.12 shows the average 
transmission ratios of the hospital under different hand-washing rates. The figure 
demonstrates that as the hand-washing rate increases from 10 to 20 times per day, the 
average hospital transmission decreases from around 0.23 to about 0.09. The results 
indicate that MRSA transmission ratio will be reduced if the HCWs can wash their 
hands more frequently to clear potential MRSA colonisation.  
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Figure 7.12 Average transmission ratios with different hand-washing rates  
 
For the last scenario, the transmission probability of each patient-HCW contact 
changes from 0.05 to 0.15. Figure 7.13 shows the average transmission ratios of the 
hospital under different transmission probabilities. As expected, the figure 
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demonstrates that as the transmission probability increases from 0.05 to 0.15, the 
average hospital transmission increases sharply from around 0.04 to around 0.45. 
Compared to the first two scenarios tested, it appears that transmission probability is 
the most significant factor that affects the transmission dynamics of MRSA. 
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Figure 7.13 Average transmission ratios with different transmission probabilities 
 
7.3.3 Conclusions 
The purpose of the model extension is to demonstrate that ABS has the ability and 
flexibility to represent not only a single hospital unit and patient agents, but also a 
whole hospital with multiple units and HCW agents. In the extended model, the 
scaled-down hypothetical hospital has three hospital units and three types of agents, 
i.e., patients, Type 1 HCWs who only have contacts with patients in a single hospital 
unit and Type 2 HCWs who may have contacts with patients in the whole hospital. 
The transmission of MRSA in the extended model is represented by the host-vector 
model where each successful transmission between two patients is facilitated by a 
colonised HCW as the vector. The extended model is used to test some experimental 
factors which are not possible to evaluate in the original model. The results from the 
model experimentation demonstrate that MRSA transmission may be reduced with 
more Type 1 HCWs, more frequent hand-washing by HCWs, and lower transmission 
probabilities per contact. 
 
The representation of multiple hospital units and HCWs as explicitly agents require 
dependable input data on the extent of transmission between different hospital units, 
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the colonisation status, hand-washing frequency and efficacy of HCWs, and the 
contact structure between HCWs and patients. In reality, it is difficult to obtain these 
data from observation. These issues may limit the practical application of this type of 
model, especially if the model is used to make quantitative predictions.  
 
In future work, a full scale hospital can be represented with more hospital units, each 
of which may have different ward layout and different intervention policies. More 
proactive and intelligent behaviour rules of HCWs (e.g., reduced hand-washing 
frequency during busy time) in the extended model can also be added. The contact 
structure between patients and HCWs can be more realistically represented with the 
support of observed data. For example, each HCW may have a specific working shift 
and be responsible for a certain area of the ward; and some patients may require more 
HCW contacts than others.  
 
 
7.4 Transmission Dynamics including the Community 
 
7.4.1 Model Modifications 
Many previous MRSA modelling studies have explicitly considered the community 
around, extend to, or served by the hospital and the interactions between the 
community and the hospital (Cooper et al. 2004; Robotham et al. 2006). However, 
these models are mainly mathematical compartmental models and the patients in the 
hospital are not represented as individuals or agents who have attributes, states and 
complex behaviour rules. In the model extension, the original MRSA model which 
only focuses on the transmission in a hospital ward will be extended to include the 
wider community and to represent the interactions between the hospital and the 
community. The purpose of the model extension is to demonstrate that ABS models, 
like mathematical compartmental models, can also efficiently represent the 
community and the wider and longer term transmission dynamics of HAIs beyond the 
boundary of the hospital. 
 
By considering the wider community where the patients are admitted from and where 
they are discharged to, the proportion of patients who have already been colonised 
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with MRSA on admission (to the hospital ward) can be dynamically linked to the 
prevalence of MRSA in the community which, in turn, is partially dependent on the 
transmission dynamics of MRSA within the hospital ward (i.e., new secondary cases 
of MRSA in the hospital ward will increase the community reservoir of MRSA 
colonised patients, and successful decolonisation treatment in the hospital ward will 
reduce the size of the reservoir). Within the community, MRSA may be cleared with a 
natural clearance rate. Other assumptions of the extended model include: 
• There is no MRSA transmission in the community which complies with the 
assumptions of previous models; 
• The hospital may have several hospital wards (see Section 7.3), however, the 
extended model assumes that the scaled-down hospital has only one ward and, 
consequently, the size of the community is also scaled down proportionally; 
• The total number of people in the community is constant and all hospital 
admissions come from the community and all discharged patients go back to 
the community; 
• At the beginning of the simulation, the hospital ward is empty and a certain 
proportion of the people in the community is colonised with MRSA (the initial 
reservoir); and 
• Every person in the community has equal probability of being admitted to the 
hospital ward which means, on average and in the long term, the proportion of 
colonised patients on admission equals to the proportion of colonised people in 
the community. 
 
In the extended model, a person may be either in the hospital as a patient or in the 
community. If the person stays in the hospital, the main states and state transitions, the 
behaviour rules, and the way MRSA transmission is modelled will remain the same as 
the original model (see Chapter 4).  
 
A person in the community has two states: colonised and susceptible. A colonised 
person in the community may change colonisation status to susceptible by natural 
clearance of MRSA defined by a parameter γ. Depending on the colonisation status of 
a patient when he/she is discharged from the hospital, the patient will return to the 
community as either colonised (in case the discharge colonisation status is colonised) 
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or susceptible (in case the discharge colonisation status is susceptible). When a person 
in the community is admitted to the hospital ward, depending on their colonisation 
status, the person will enter the hospital as either a colonised patient (if the 
community colonisation status is colonised) or a susceptible patient (if the community 
colonisation status is susceptible). A patient’s main states and the state transitions of 
MRSA in the hospital ward and the community are illustrated in Figure 7.14. 
 
The additional input parameters, their default values and the sources of the default 
values are shown in Table 7.10. The initial hospital ward is empty and the initial 
numbers of colonised and susceptible people in the community are assumed to be 70 
and 1,500 respectively. It means the size of the scaled-down community is 1,570 and 
the initial prevalence of MRSA (i.e., the proportion of people colonised with MRSA) 
in the community is 4.7% which complies to the observed proportion of patients 
colonised with MRSA on admission in the case study (see Table 6.2). By assuming 
that every person in the community has an equal probability of being admitted to the 
hospital, the probability of a primary case admission in the hospital is C/(C+S) and 
the probability of a non-primary case admission is S/(C+S) where C and S represent 
the number of colonised and susceptible people in the community at the time of 
admission.  
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Figure 7.14 Patient main states and state transitions of MRSA in the hospital ward and the community 
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7.10 Additional model input parameters for model extension with community 
Parameter Value Symbol Source 
Initial number of colonised people in 
the community 
70 0C  Assumption 
Initial number of susceptible people in 
the community 
1500 0S  Assumption 
Natural clearance rate of MRSA 0.0027 γ Robotham et al. 2006 
 
Due to the large number of people and the relatively simple states and state transitions 
of each person in the community, the numbers of colonised and susceptible people in 
the community are represented as two integer variables rather than fully-developed 
individual agents.  
 
When a person in the community is admitted to the hospital, a new patient agent is 
created and enters the hospital, and either the number of colonised or the number of 
susceptible people in the community (depending on the colonisation status of the 
admitted patient) is reduced by one (i.e., C to C-1 or S to S-1). When a patient is 
discharged from the hospital, the patient agent is disposed of and leaves the hospital, 
and either the number of colonised or the number of susceptible people in the 
community (depending on the colonisation status of the discharged patient) is 
increased by one (i.e., C to C+1 or S to S+1).  
 
Regarding the natural clearance of MRSA in the community, for each time interval 
(i.e., one day), the expected number of people in the community that should clear 
MRSA is calculated by multiplying the number of colonised people in the community 
at the time of evaluation and the natural clearance rate, or C⋅γ . Then, by random 
sampling, a Poisson distribution (where the mean of the distribution is set at C⋅γ  
during the time interval) is used to decide the number of people that actually cleared 
MRSA during the time interval. Essentially, people in the community are grouped 
into two homogeneous compartments in the extended model and the method has been 
applied by previous mathematical compartmental models (Cooper et al. 2004; 
Robotham et al. 2006). 
 
7.4.2 Model Experimentation 
For each scenario during the model experimentation, the extended model is run for 10 
years (3650 days or about 521 weeks) to demonstrate the long term trend of MRSA 
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prevalence in the community. The community prevalence, which is the proportion of 
people in the community that are colonised with MRSA, is less subject to randomness 
and chance effects compared to the hospital prevalence due to the relatively large 
sample size in the community. The community prevalence is collected every week 
during the 10-year simulation period. Three scenarios are constructed to explore the 
long term impact of MRSA interventions within the hospital on the community 
prevalence.  
 
In the first scenario, only the admission screening test is performed in the hospital and 
there is no repeat screening test. The interventions of isolation and decolonisation 
treatment are still in place but will only apply to primary case patients since secondary 
case patients can no longer be detected (by repeat screening tests). The extended 
model is run for 10 replications with each lasting for 10 years. The changes of 
community prevalence are shown in Figure 7.15. The ten thin lines represent the 
community prevalence of each replication and the thick line represents the average 
change of the community prevalence based on all replications. The average trend line 
shows clearly a steady increase in the community MRSA prevalence in the next 10 
years (from around 4% to around 11%). It indicates that the hospital intervention 
policy has failed to contain MRSA and the community reservoir gradually builds up 
during the simulated years. 
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Figure 7.15 Change of weekly MRSA prevalence in the community (scenario 1) 
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In the second scenario, the intervention policies adopted by the hospital are the same 
as the hypothetical test ward in Chapter 6 which means not only admission screening 
test but also four day repeat screening test are performed. Since repeat screening tests 
are carried out, isolation and decolonisation treatment may now apply to both primary 
case and secondary case patients. The individual and the average changes (10 thin 
lines and one thick line) of weekly community prevalence during the next 10 years are 
shown in Figure 7.16. The average trend line shows that the community prevalence of 
MRSA is fairly stable at the initial level for a few years and then slightly decreases to 
about 2.5% by the end of year 10. It indicates that, in the long term, the intervention 
policy in the hospital may maintain or slightly reduce the MRSA prevalence in the 
community. 
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Figure 7.16 Change of weekly MRSA prevalence in the community (scenario 2) 
 
In the last scenario, the hospital adopts more aggressive intervention policies. 
Compared to the second scenario, the interval of the repeat screening test is reduced 
from four days to only one day while the rest of the interventions remain unchanged. 
The individual and the average changes of weekly community prevalence during the 
next 10 years are shown in Figure 7.17. The average trend line shows clearly that the 
community prevalence of MRSA steadily decreass in the next 10 years (from around 
4 percent to less than 0.15%). It is a clear indication that the aggressive intervention 
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policy will, on average, significantly reduce the MRSA prevalence in the community 
in the next few years. 
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Figure 7.17 Change of weekly MRSA prevalence in the community (scenario 3) 
 
Figure 7.18 compares the average changes of the community MRSA prevalence under 
the three scenarios tested. The diagram demonstrates how different MRSA 
intervention policies may affect the community prevalence of MRSA in the long term.  
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Figure 7.18 Comparison of the change of weekly MRSA prevalence in the community 
with different hospital interventions 
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7.4.3 Conclusions 
Previous mathematical compartmental models have studied the wider transmission 
dynamics of MRSA including both the hospital and its wider community. The purpose 
of the model extension is to demonstrate that ABS can also efficiently incorporate the 
community population and capture the long-term feedback relationship between the 
hospital and the community. In the extended model, due to the large size of the 
community, people in the community are grouped into two compartments and 
represented as integer variables; while patients in the hospital ward are still 
represented as fully-developed agents who have multiple attributes and states, and 
complex behaviour rules. The extended model demonstrates that MRSA intervention 
policies adopted by the hospital may have significant long term impacts on the 
community MRSA prevalence. The limited model experimentation indicates that it is 
possible to reduce MRSA prevalence in the wider community in the long term by 
consistently implementing aggressive intervention policies within the hospital. All 
experimental results from the extended model comply with the results from previous 
models. 
 
The hospital and the community are scaled-down in the extended model. It might be 
worthwhile to represent a complete hospital with many different hospital wards and 
the overall community of the hospital. People in the community may have more 
attributes and states to represent different readmission rates to the hospital. With the 
support of clinical evidence, transmission of MRSA in the community may also be 
embedded. Furthermore, the size of the community may be dynamic and people 
(colonised or susceptible) may move between different communities. Despite of the 
limitations, the model extension demonstrates the ability and flexibility of ABS to 
model the wider transmission dynamics of MRSA when hospital community is 
included. 
 
 
7.5 Summary 
Three model extension exercises have demonstrated the flexibility, ability and 
potential of ABS to model HAIs in different situations. The original MRSA model is 
extended to consider two competitive infections (i.e., MRSA and C. difficile), to 
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include HCW agents and represent the transmission of MRSA among multiple 
hospital units, and to include the wider community population. For each model 
extension, the modifications to the original model are discussed regarding additional 
model assumptions, structures and parameters. Various model experimentations are 
also performed to gain new insights that can not be studied by the original MRSA 
model. The extended models are not configured with observed data so it has limited 
value in terms of recommending effective intervention policies. 
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the work performed in the thesis. It outlines the problem 
situation and literature review of the subject and revisits the research objectives and 
questions. Then, the chapter reflects how each research objective has been met, and 
discusses whether and to what extent each research question has been answered. 
Finally, the limitations of the work are discussed and the future work is proposed. 
 
 
8.2 Problem Situation and Literature Review 
HAIs, such as MRSA and C. difficile, can lead to severe morbidity and mortality 
among hospital patients and place heavy burdens on healthcare resources. Hospitals 
and public health authorities around the world are trying to find the most cost-
effective strategies and policies to prevent and control HAIs. Popular intervention 
policies to prevent and control HAIs include the Search-and-Destroy strategy (e.g., 
pre-emptive screening tests followed by isolation and decolonisation treatment) and 
some general policies such as hand-washing by HCWs, ward cleaning and education 
of hospital staff. Compared to infectious diseases mainly transmitted in the 
community, HAIs have some distinctive features including rapid patient turnover, 
small patient population size, the existence of asymptomatic carriers and the 
endemicity of some HAIs in the hospital setting. These special features may affect the 
choice of modelling methods to describe and study HAIs.  
 
Many previous studies have applied different types of modelling techniques to study 
the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases in the hospital setting. Most of the 
studies used mathematical compartmental models in which patients or HCWs are 
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grouped into different compartments depending on the colonisation status or other risk 
factors. Within each compartment, patients and HCWs do not have individual 
identities and are assumed to be homogeneous. Early compartmental models were 
often solved deterministically by analytical methods, while recent models have been 
increasingly evaluated stochastically through the Monte Carlo random sampling 
technique. There were a few existing studies to investigate HAIs by individual-based 
models in which each patient or HCW is explicitly represented and the transmission 
of the infectious disease is modelled on an individual basis. However, these models 
have not explored the full potential and flexibility provided by the individual-based 
approach and still retained many restrictive assumptions of mathematical models such 
as exponentially distributed lengths of stay and full ward occupancy. The scope of 
previous models ranged from a single hospital unit to the whole hospital together with 
its community. 
 
ABS is a bottom-up rather than top-down modelling approach which means the 
overall system behaviour emerges from and is determined by locally defined agents 
who interact with other agents and with the system environment. An agent, ranging 
from a simple reactive agent to a sophisticated intelligent and adaptive agent, may 
have various attributes and multiple states associated with it, and behaviour rules to 
govern its state transitions. ABS has been widely applied to many domains from 
business and management to social science. A few studies have applied ABS to model 
the transmission of community infectious diseases. However, there has been no 
previous research to apply ABS to study the transmission dynamics of HAIs. 
 
The review of existing modelling studies of HAIs and the introduction of ABS 
provide the research opportunity to study HAIs using the technique of ABS. To fulfil 
this general objective, the thesis aims to investigate the feasibility and value of using 
ABS to provide a flexible and robust modelling approach to support the modelling 
and management of HAIs, to provide a general framework of applying ABS to the 
modelling and management of HAIs, to test and validate the use of ABS on a MRSA 
study, and to quantify the effectiveness and test the robustness of various MRSA 
intervention polices and indicate the best practices to the management of MRSA in 
the hospital setting. 
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8.3 Summary of Research 
 
8.3.1 Agent-based Simulation as a Decision Supporting Tool to the Modelling 
and Management of Hospital-acquired Infections 
The first research objective is to investigate the value and feasibility of using ABS to 
provide a robust and flexible modelling approach to support the modelling and 
management of HAIs. The corresponding research questions are whether, why and 
when ABS is a useful technique to the modelling and management of HAIs.  
 
In order to facilitate the discussion of advantages of ABS relative to other modelling 
methods, a taxonomy of the potential modelling techniques that can be applied to 
study HAIs was proposed in Chapter 3. In the taxonomy, modelling techniques were 
classified as either cohort/aggregate level models where patients were grouped into 
different compartments or individual level models where each patient was explicitly 
represented and may have heterogeneous attributes. Cohort/aggregate models include 
mathematical compartmental models, Markov models and SD models. They can be 
deterministic or stochastic and, in both cases, may be solved analytically or evaluated 
numerically. Individual level models include ABS, DES and general individual-based 
models. Although they have distinctive features, they do share some properties (e.g., 
patients are represented as heterogeneous individuals), and they may have overlaps 
with each other (e.g., ABS and DES may both have the capability of event-
scheduling). Most individual level models are stochastic in nature and are evaluated 
numerically through computer simulation. 
 
Based on the proposed taxonomy, the advantages and disadvantages of ABS relative 
to cohort/aggregate models and other types of individual-based models were 
discussed and the justification of using ABS was explained. The relative advantages 
of ABS (and other types of individual-based models) relative to cohort/aggregate 
models include the ability to represent individual patients and HCWs, and their 
attributes, risk factors and states; to represent spatial location and movements; to relax 
restrictive assumptions; to represent sufficient detail and complexity; to make reliable 
quantitative predictions; to be transparent and easily understood; and to collect 
individual-based statistics. The relative disadvantages of ABS compared to 
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cohort/aggregate models include the absence of rigorous mathematical expressions, 
the fact that they are less parsimonious and data demanding, more time is required for 
model coding and their relatively slow running speed.  
 
ABS and DES are both individual-based simulation techniques and they have many 
similarities. In order to compare the two methods in the context of HAI modelling, 
their differences were investigated in detail (see Section 3.4.2). Compared to DES, the 
relative advantages of ABS are that it is a more natural choice to represent patients 
and infection transmission process, a more powerful tool to represent patient 
behaviour rules, patient spatial location and movements and multiple concurrent state 
changes, and is more transparent. The relative disadvantages of ABS include fewer 
and less user-friendly software packages and the fact that it is less effective in 
representing queuing systems.  
 
Apart from the theoretical analysis, the justification of applying ABS to the study of 
HAIs may be further strengthened by building the same prototype model using 
software packages of different modelling methods such as ABS, DES and system 
dynamics. The process of the building of the models can then be reflected and 
compared, and the model results can be compared. The exercises may require 
considerable extra time and effort, but could provide more detailed insights into the 
advantages and disadvantages of ABS relative to other modelling methods. The 
conclusions from the theoretical comparisons between ABS and other methods may 
also be tested by the modelling exercises. 
 
The rest of the thesis discussed the main methodological issues and described a 
framework of applying ABS on HAI modelling. A MRSA case study model was later 
developed and validated based on the empirical study. The MRSA model was further 
extended to include a competitive infection, multiple hospital units and HCW agents, 
and the wider community of the hospital. These discussions further demonstrate the 
feasibility and flexibility of applying ABS to describe and study HAIs. In short, the 
thesis has investigated and demonstrated the value and feasibility of using ABS as a 
robust and flexible modelling approach to the support of modelling and management 
of HAIs.  
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8.3.2 Application of Agent-based Simulation to the Modelling and Management 
of Hospital-acquired Infections 
The second research objective is to provide a general framework of applying ABS to 
the modelling and management of HAIs and to test and validate the use of ABS on a 
MRSA study. The corresponding research questions are how ABS can be applied as a 
general framework to the modelling and management of HAIs and how ABS can be 
applied to model a MRSA study and be properly validated. The research objective and 
questions are mainly dealt with in the methodology, model description and model 
validation chapters (Chapters 3, 4 and 5). 
 
General Framework 
The aim of the methodology chapter is to address the key methodological issues and 
set out a framework of applying ABS to the modelling and management of HAIs. The 
ABS model adopts a hierarchical structure which consists of two levels. The higher 
level of the model structure represents the system environment (e.g., the whole 
hospital or a specific hospital ward) where the patient agents stay, and the lower level 
of the model represents individual patient or HCW agents and how agents interact 
with other agents and with the system environment.  
 
In the proposed framework, individual patient agents may have different attributes 
(e.g., age, gender, vulnerability, infectivity), multiple concurrent streams of states 
(e.g., states regarding colonisation status, detection status and location) and, more 
importantly, behaviour rules to govern the state transitions (e.g., rules for infection 
transmission). Due to the application of ABS, patients’ lengths of stay can be sampled 
from any types of parametric or empirical distribution, and may depend on the 
characteristics of the patient; patient may have multiple concurrent state changes; and 
ward occupancy can be determined by model dynamics and bed availability and may 
fall below 100%. 
 
The hierarchical overall model structure and the representation of patient agents by 
attributes, states and behaviour rules are typical characteristics of ABS models in 
general. The framework is a natural way to represent the transmission of HAIs in the 
hospital setting. It also brings the flexibility and advantages provided by the agent-
based approach. 
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Representing the infection transmission process is another important methodological 
issue of modelling HAIs which was discussed in detail in the methodology chapter. 
Three different ways to model infection transmission were discussed: the host-vector 
model structure, the classical mass action assumption, and the proposed pairwise 
action assumption which modifies the mass action assumption to suit individually 
represented patients (see Section 3.7).  
 
As an individual-based modelling approach, ABS model is able to represent 
distinctive characteristics of each patient which may affect the chance of the patient 
acquiring HAIs (if the patient is susceptible) or transmitting the HAIs (if the patient is 
colonised). Ideally, the chosen method to represent infection transmission should be 
able to incorporate such individual variability so that the advantage of ABS can be 
realised. Among the three methods discussed, the host-vector model structure and the 
pairwise mass action assumption can both allow for patient heterogeneity, with the 
former suitable when HCWs or other vectors are explicitly modelled and the latter 
appropriate when only patients are represented. The pairwise action assumption was 
later applied to the empirical MRSA model. 
 
Individual patients’ vulnerability and infectivity are relatively easy to be represented 
by the transmission probability equations. The relative adjacencies between patients, 
which may also affect transmission probability, are not straightforward to be 
embedded in the model. It may not be feasible to model the exact distance between 
each pair of patients in the model. Instead, it is recommended that the ward bay 
location of each patient is kept so that the model knows whether two patients are in 
the same local environment at any time. The model can then treat global and local 
interactions differently. The way to represent patient locations and how relative 
adjacency between patients may affect transmission probability may be improved by 
using other methods. However, it is important that the location information is 
reflected by the ABS model. 
 
A combination of an event-driven and time-slicing time advance mechanisms are 
adopted. Event-driven method should be used for most modelled activities since it is 
efficient and time between events can be sampled from any types of continuous 
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distributions. However, to avoid potential problems caused by scheduling future 
events of susceptible patients concerning acquiring colonisation, the infection 
transmission process is modelled using the time-slicing mechanism (see Section 3.7.5).  
 
The experimental factors and model responses, and the choice of experimental design 
methods were also discussed as part of the general modelling framework. 
 
MRSA Case Study 
Based on the framework proposed in the methodology chapter, an ABS model to 
study the transmission of MRSA in the hospital setting was developed in Chapter 5. 
The building of the model was originally part of a MRSA research project funded by 
the Department of Health and carried out in Birmingham Heartland Hospital (Hardy 
et al. 2007). The scope of the ABS model is a single hospital ward divided into bays, 
with some isolation rooms. The only type of agent represented by the model is the 
patient.  
 
The model tries to represent the details of the corresponding empirical study. The 
wards in the model have the same layout as in the actual hospital and most patient 
characteristics in the model are based on empirical patient-level data collected during 
the study. The key interventions and operation rules that were implemented in the 
study hospital were all incorporated into the model. The proposed MRSA model 
allows many intervention policies and influencing factors to be tested, some of which 
have not been represented before such as test turnaround time, screening strategy, and 
the proportion of transmission coming from the bay.  
 
Many detailed model dynamics, which have not been represented before, have been 
captured by the MRSA model. For example, the model is able to explicitly represent 
the delay between the time when the screening sample is taken and when the test 
result is reported. The model may be further improved by adding more detailed model 
dynamics that are relevant to the transmission dynamics of MRSA. For example, the 
accuracy of the screening tests can be allowed for so that tests of different sensitivity 
and specificity can be compared. However, such improvement will require additional 
model inputs and may change the model structure. 
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The MRSA model was validated against observation (including the transmission ratio, 
the number of secondary cases, and the time to detection) applying a calibration-
validation process where the parameter to be calibrated is the transmission coefficient 
(see Section 5.3.1). It is possible to improve model validation and gain more 
confidence on the model by comparing additional model responses with the 
corresponding observations if empirical data are available. 
 
8.3.3 MRSA Infection Control in the Hospital 
The last research objective is to quantify the effectiveness and test the robustness of 
various MRSA intervention policies and indicate the best practices to the management 
of MRSA in the hospital setting. The corresponding research questions are how to 
quantify the effectiveness of various MRSA intervention policies, how robust are 
these intervention policies considering various influencing factors, and what are the 
best practices for the management of MRSA in the hospital setting. The model 
experimentation chapter (Chapter 6) aims to answer these questions. 
 
After reasonable confidence in the model was gained through validation, the model 
was systematically explored by two formal experimental design methods: fractional 
factorial design with resolution V and the response surface design. The experimental 
factors tested through model experimentation, in the order of controllability, include 
test turnaround time, screening strategy, number of isolation beds, effectiveness of 
decolonisation treatment, transmission coefficient, proportion of transmission within 
bay, average length of stay and endemic setting. It is the first time a number of MRSA 
interventions (e.g., test turnaround time) have been systematically studied by formal 
experimental design methods. 
 
The main experimental design method is the fractional factorial design where each 
experimental factor was set on two levels, base level and alternative level, and the 
main effects and two-way interaction effects of the eight experimental factors were 
systematically evaluated. In order to reduce the number of design points and 
consequently computational time and efforts, a fractional factorial design with 
resolution V is chosen over the full factorial design (see Section 6.2.1). 
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Due to the limitations of the factorial design (e.g., linearity assumption), a response 
surface design was applied to explore the non-linear effects of two experimental 
factors on the model response, and the non-linear interactions between the two factors. 
Response surface design experiments were performed between the screening strategy 
and the average length of stay, the test turnaround time and the average length of stay, 
and the number of isolation beds and the proportion of transmission coming within 
bay.  
 
The practical implications and indications to the hospital management were 
summarised in Section 6.7.1. The conclusions from the model experiments can help 
the hospital to better manage the prevention and control of MRSA. The effectiveness 
of three intervention policies (i.e. the test turnaround time, the screening strategy and 
the number of isolation beds) and their interactions with other factors should be of 
particular interest to the hospital management as the hospital has much control over 
these policies. Among the interventions tested, test turnaround time and screening 
strategy have not been systematically investigated in such a detail by previous 
modelling studies. The research gives strong support to the introduction of rapid 
screening tests and more frequent screening tests. Providing more isolation facilities is 
also shown to be an effective policy; however, its effectiveness is highly dependent on 
how effective the isolation is. 
 
 
8.4 Limitations 
The thesis proposed a general framework of applying ABS model to the modelling 
and management of HAIs. In theory, the framework applies to any type of HAIs and 
any hospital environment. However the case study which implemented the framework 
is based on an empirical MRSA study in a UK hospital and all hospital wards 
involved in the research project are surgical wards. Therefore, the hypothetical test 
ward used for model experimentation may not represent hospitals outside the UK or 
hospital units other than surgical wards. However, the main experimental factors were 
systematically tested on difference levels (i.e., base and alternative levels during 
fractional factorial design and more levels during response surface design) during 
model experimentation, which means the experimentation has considered different 
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scenarios other than the default settings of the test ward. As a result, the conclusions 
drawn from the model experimentation should be able to apply to other types of 
hospital units and hospitals outside the UK.  
 
In the proposed framework, ABS model could either represent just patient agents, or 
both patient and HCW agents. Due to the lack of understanding of the underlying 
transmission routes and the lack of reliable observed data, the current MRSA model 
only explicitly considers patient agents. As a result, some intervention policies, such 
as hand-washing frequency and compliance rate, HCW allocation rules and HCW-
patient ratio can not be explicitly and easily represented and tested by the MRSA 
model. Preliminary attempts have been made to extend the MRSA case study model 
to include multiple hospital units and HCW agents (see Section 7.3). In the extended 
model, it is assumed that the only transmission route is cross transmission by 
transiently colonised HCWs who may either serve a single hospital unit or serve 
multiple hospital units. The extended model was not configured with and validated 
against observed data and no systematically model experimentation was carried out. 
Another limitation of the extended model is that the behaviour rules of HCW agents 
have not been fully explored by the ABS approach. The model extension also 
demonstrated the additional data requirements when HCW agents are modelled. Such 
requirements may prohibit the use of the patient-HCW model structure. 
 
The original MRSA model which only focuses on a single HAI within a hospital ward 
was also extended to include a competitive infection (i.e., C. difficile), and to include 
the wider community (see Section 7.2 and 7.4). However, the modifications to the 
original model were moderate without the backing of observed data and without 
formal model validation and experimentation. The model extension attempt to include 
the wider community also demonstrated the potential problem of apply the ABS 
model when large number of individuals need to be represented (e.g., the community). 
The extended model got over this problem by representing the number of people in 
the community as integer variables while retaining agent structure within the hospital. 
Another limitation of the extended model is that no transmission is assumed within 
the community. 
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The proposed MRSA model focused on the effectiveness of different intervention 
policies only from the perspective of clinical benefits of reduced MRSA transmission 
ratio or reduced number of MRSA secondary cases. In reality, hospital management 
decisions or, in general, decisions made by public health authorities, such as the NHS 
and the National Institute of Clinical Excellence in the UK, compare alternative 
intervention policies not only on the ground of clinical effectiveness but also on the 
ground of costs associated with the policy. For example, the experimental results 
indicated that a screening test with shorter test turnaround time and more frequent 
screening tests will significantly reduce the transmission ratio of MRSA in the 
hospital setting. The conclusion is robust and convincing on the grounds of clinical 
effects; however, faster and more frequent screening tests are associated with a higher 
cost than the slower convention culture tests and less frequent screening tests. In 
reality, the clinical benefits and the corresponding costs have to be balanced so that an 
economically feasible management decision can be made. 
 
 
8.5 Future Work 
Firstly, future work may be carried out to configure the current MRSA model with 
observed data from other empirical MRSA studies that are based on non-UK hospital 
or other types of hospital ward other than surgical wards. It is likely that a different 
hypothetical test ward may be created with a different estimated transmission 
coefficient. Similar model experimentations (e.g., factorial design and response 
surface design) can be carried out and the conclusions from the experiments can be 
compared with the conclusions from this research. Although the configuration of the 
test ward and the transmission coefficient may be different, it is expected that general 
conclusions about the effectiveness of different intervention policies should be similar 
to this research.  
 
In future work, if reliable data about the contacts between HCWs and patients and the 
colonisation status of the HCWs are available, the current MRSA model may be 
modified to explicitly represent HCWs. In the modified model, the hand-washing 
frequency and compliance rate may be embedded in the model as intervention policies. 
With the support of reliable clinical evidence and observed data, the model may also 
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embed other important factors which may significantly affect MRSA transmission 
such as the accuracy of the screening test (e.g., the sensitivity and specificity).  
 
With the support of empirical data, the transmission dynamics of two competitive 
infections and the transmission dynamics among multiple hospital units can be 
represented in more detail than what has been done for the extensions of the MRSA 
model. For example, interactions between the two competitive infections may be 
represented by the model. Regarding the model extension to include the wider 
community, future work may represent the wider transmission dynamics of MRSA in 
a region which consists of one or more hospitals (each with multiple hospital units) 
and the overall community. MRSA transmission within the community may be 
modelled with the support of clinical evidence. People in the community can be 
further classified not only by the MRSA colonisation status, but also by other factors 
such as readmission rate to the hospital. The community size may also be dynamic 
considering immigration and emigration. 
 
Another important and practical future work is to extend the current research by 
including the cost-effectiveness analysis of various intervention policies. With the 
help of cost-effectiveness analysis, hospital management and public health authorities 
can make better informed decisions as to whether and how to implement specific 
intervention policies.  
 
One of the special features of ABS is to represent intelligent agents who can make 
active decisions. In future work, the patient and HCW agents (if they are represented 
by the model), especially the HCW agents, may be designed to be more active and 
intelligent by embedding more flexible and adaptive behaviour rules that represent the 
real decision making process of the real world. For example, when the workload 
increases (e.g., hospital ward occupancy is high), HCWs may wash their hands less 
frequently; and when a series of secondary MRSA transmissions are detected, the 
hospital may enforce more aggressive short-term intervention policies such as 
temporarily ward closure, strict hand-washing and contact precaution protocols. The 
future work can further demonstrate that ABS is a powerful and flexible method to 
model HAIs. 
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8.6 Summary 
The thesis represents the first attempt to apply the modelling method of ABS to study 
the transmission dynamics and intervention policies of HAIs in general and MRSA in 
particular. Based on the proposed taxonomy of potential methods for modelling HAIs, 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of ABS compared to other methods, in 
particular mathematical compartmental models and DES, are investigated. The 
comparison provides a theoretical justification to the application of ABS on modelling 
HAIs. 
 
The main methodological issues of using ABS to study HAIs are discussed, including 
the representation of patient agents and the modelling of the infection transmission 
process. In an ABS model, the lengths of stay of patients can be sampled from any 
types of parametric or empirical distribution, the patient may have multiple concurrent 
streams of state changes, and the ward occupancy may vary and fall below 100%. 
Depending on whether vectors (e.g., HCWs) are explicitly represented, an ABS model 
can use either a host-vector model structure or mass action assumption to model 
infection transmission. Pairwise action assumption, which is modified from mass 
action assumption, is proposed to suit the needs of ABS models. The assumption 
allows for individual vulnerability and infectivity, and the spatial adjacency in the 
transmission probability equations. A general framework of how ABS can be applied 
to model and study various types of HAIs are proposed. The framework not only 
guides the building of the empirical MRSA model in the thesis, but also is design in a 
way that can be universally applicable to study any types of infectious disease in the 
hospital setting (e.g., C. difficile).  
 
The building of the MRSA model and the subsequently validation of the model are 
based on an empirical research study carried out in the Birmingham Heartlands 
Hospital. Compared to previous models, the MRSA model is more realistic and 
captures the recent development in the clinical studies of MRSA. In the model, each 
patient agent has unique vulnerability and infectivity. The hospital unit is divided into 
different ward bays and isolation rooms and patient may move among these locations. 
The occupancy of the unit may vary over time and the patient’s length of stay is 
sampled from empirical or gamma distribution. The model has embedded the 
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turnaround time and the frequency of the screening tests, and the duration, the 
effectiveness and the success rate of decolonisation treatment. These intervention 
policies have been evaluated by clinical study in recent years but have not been 
investigated by previous modelling studies. The MRSA model is configured with and 
validated against observed data.  
 
Once a reasonable level of confidence has been placed in the model through the 
validation process, formal experimental design methods, including fractional factorial 
design and response surface design, are applied to systematically investigate the 
effectiveness of various intervention policies and potential interactions among 
different polices. The model results strongly support the use of rapid screening tests to 
reduce MRSA transmission in the hospital setting. The model results show that 
reducing the test turnaround time can result in a significant reduction of MRSA 
transmission. Regarding screening strategies, admission screening is found to be very 
effective to curb MRSA transmission. When admission screening is in place, adding 
repeat screening may further reduce transmission; however, the effectiveness of more 
frequent repeat screening depends on patients’ lengths of stay. Isolating MRSA 
colonised patients is also found to be an effective policy. However, the effectiveness 
of isolation is significantly dependent on how effective isolation can prevent the 
transmission to and from the isolation facility. These implications and indications can 
help hospitals and public health authorities to effectively manage MRSA in the 
hospital setting.  
 
Finally, the MRSA model is extended to explore a series of situations that have not 
been considered by the original model. The model is extended to include a 
competitive infection, C. difficile, to include multiple hospital units and HCWs, and to 
include the wider community. The model extensions further demonstrate the 
flexibility and benefits of applying ABS on HAI modelling. 
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Appendix A 
 
 
Representation of other Types of Agents 
 
 
 
Apart from patient agents, other types of agents may need to be represented in the 
ABS model. These agents may include HCWs and other human (e.g., visitors) or non-
human (e.g., common toilets) objects which are vectors for the transmission of HAIs. 
 
A.1 Representation of HCW Agents 
Transiently or permanently colonised HCWs are thought to be the main vector for the 
transmission of many infectious diseases in the hospital setting (Cooper et al. 1999; 
Bootsma et al. 2006). Some, but not all, previous HAI studies explicitly have 
represented HCWs in the models. It is worthwhile to represent HCW agents in the 
model if (1) the assumption that the HCW is an important vector is justified for the 
infectious disease under study, and (2) data regarding the contact frequency and 
structure between HCWs and patients, the probability of transmission per contact, 
hand-washing rate/compliance and the efficacy of hand-washing in eradicating the 
pathogen are available through observation, previous studies or reasonable 
assumption. 
 
Like patient agents, a HCW agent will have attributes, states and behaviour rules and 
collectively they define the HCW agent. The attributes of a HCW that may potentially 
affect or be associated with infection transmissions may include: 
• The schedule of the HCW’s working shift such as the starting and finishing 
time of each shift; 
• The number of patients or the areas of the hospital or hospital unit that the 
HCW is responsible for;  
• The contact pattern with patients such as the frequency and the nature of the 
contact (e.g., high risk contact involving patient’s body fluid); 
• The hand-washing rate/compliance and the efficacy of the hand-washing; and 
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• Attributes that may affect HCW’s vulnerability and infectivity. 
 
The states of a HCW are normally simpler than that of the patients in a HAI model. 
These states can be classified into the following categories of state changes: 
• Colonisation status: the HCW in a HAI model normally has only two states 
regarding colonisation status which are susceptible and colonised; and 
• Working status: if working shift is represented, the HCW can have two states 
representing the working status which are at work and off work. 
 
Potential behaviour rules which govern how HCW’s state changes from one to 
another; and how the HCW interacts with patient agents and with the environment can 
be classified into the following categories: 
• Colonisation/decolonisation rules. These rules describe how the HCW’s state 
changes from susceptible to colonised and from colonised to susceptible (e.g., 
via hand-washing); 
• Rules of transmitting infectious disease to susceptible patients. These rules 
describe how a colonised HCW transmits the pathogen to susceptible patients; 
and 
• Contact rules between HCWs and patients. These rules describe the contact 
structure and frequency between HCWs and patients. 
 
The behaviour rules of HCWs are not necessarily reactive but can be more flexible 
and proactive since HCWs, unlike patients, may control their own behaviours and not 
necessarily comply with regulations and principles (e.g., hand-washing rules and 
barrier precautions). Depending on the dynamic environment setting, HCWs may vary 
their behaviours accordingly (e.g., when the workload is increased, it is less likely that 
HCWs will comply with hand-washing rules). Therefore, if HCWs are explicitly 
represented in the ABS model, proactive and adaptive rules may be considered when 
designing their behaviour rules.  
 
A.2 Representation of Other Types of Agents 
Besides patients and HCWs, other types of agents may also be incorporated into the 
model if they are assumed to be important vectors (e.g., visitors) for the transmission 
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of the pathogen under study and if data are readily available. The representation of 
these types of agents is similar but normally simpler than the representation of HCW 
agents.  
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Appendix B 
 
 
Preliminary Comparison with Previous Models 
 
 
 
B.1 Introduction 
Before the full-scale ABS model was built, two preliminary tests were performed to 
use ABS models to replicate the assumptions and results of two previous MRSA 
studies adopting mathematical compartmental models. ABS models were built based 
on the same assumptions and were configured with same data in these studies. Then, 
the results from the ABS models are compared with the results from the previous 
studies.  
 
The main purpose of the pilot tests was to demonstrate that ABS can be at least as 
good as the existing mathematical compartmental models to describe and study 
MRSA transmission dynamics even without further exploring the advantages and 
distinctive features of ABS. Another aim was to test and get familiar with the software, 
Anylogic®, before it was used to develop the models for the research study. 
 
B.2 Test Agent-based Simulation Model on Previous Studies – Part I   
 
B.2.1 Assumptions and Input Parameters 
The first model to be tested by ABS model is proposed by Cooper et al. (1999). The 
mathematical compartmental model focused on a single hospital unit, explicitly 
considered both patients and HCWs and classified each of them as either susceptible 
or colonised. The main assumptions of the model include: 
• Only a single hospital unit is modelled, the dynamics between different wards 
within the hospital and the dynamics between the hospital and the community 
are ignored; 
• Patient-to-patient cross transmission via transiently colonised HCWs is 
assumed to be the only transmission route of MRSA; 
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• 100% bed occupancy and constant numbers of patients and HCWs;  
• Detection of positive patients is assumed to be a random process with a fixed 
rate; 
• Identified positive patients are assumed to be removed from the ward 
immediately and will no longer transmit the pathogen; 
• Homogeneous patients and HCWs regarding vulnerability, infectivity and 
other risk factors; 
• Transiently colonised HCWs can get rid of MRSA through hand-washing with 
100% efficacy; 
• Colonised patients will not be decolonised during the hospital stay. 
 
Figure B.1 shows the flow diagram of the model and Table B.1 shows the main input 
parameters and their default values taken by the model. 
 
 
Figure B.1 Flow diagram of the model proposed by Cooper et al. (1999) 
 
Table B.1 Input parameters and default values of the model proposed by Cooper et al. 
(1999) 
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B.2.2 Compare Results 
An ABS model is built in Anylogic® to replicate the assumptions of the model. Then 
the same model experimentations are conducted with the same parameter values (as 
the previous modelling study) and the results of the ABS model are compared with 
the results from the original mathematical model. 
 
Scenario 1: Changing Transmissibility 
In this scenario, the transmissibility (transmission probability from patient to HCWs 
and from HCWs to patient per contact) varies from 0 to 0.3. For each level of 
transmissibility, the ABS model is run 100 times and the mean and the 5th and 95th 
percentiles are calculated regarding the ward prevalence. Ward prevalence in the 
study represents the proportion of days in the ward that at least one patient is 
colonised with MRSA.  
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Figure B.2 Comparison between the ABS model and the original model by changing 
transmissibility (the upper diagram shows the model outputs of the original model 
(source: Cooper et al. 1999); the lower diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS 
model) 
 
Figure B.2 compares the model outputs between the ABS model and the original 
model. The upper diagram, obtained from the original paper, shows the ward-level 
prevalence from the original model and the lower diagram shows the ward-level 
prevalence from the ABS model. Under both models, the mean ward prevalence 
increases from around 10% to around 80% as the transmissibility changes from 0 to 
0.3. As in the original model, the ABS model also captures the S-shape increase of the 
mean ward prevalence, i.e., the mean ward prevalence increases slowly at the 
beginning, accelerates in the middle, and levels off in the end. Furthermore, the 5th 
and 95th percentiles of the ward-level prevalence in the ABS model also match that of 
the original model. 
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Scenario 2: Changing Probability of Colonisation at Admission 
In this scenario, the probability of colonisation at admission varies from 0.01 to 0.1. 
Each probability is tested on three levels of transmissibility (low 0.07, medium 0.1 
and high 0.13). For each combination of the colonisation probability and 
transmissibility, the ABS model was run 100 times and the mean and the 5th and 95th 
percentiles (when the transmissibility is set at 0.1) are calculated regarding the ward 
prevalence.  
 
Figure B.3 compares the model outputs between the ABS model and the original 
model. The upper diagram, obtained from the original paper, shows the ward-level 
prevalence of the original model and the lower diagram shows the ward-level 
prevalence of the ABS model. The two models present similar results. Using both 
models, the mean ward-level prevalence increases as the probability of colonisation at 
admission increases from 2% to 10%, regardless of the levels of transmissibility. Both 
models also demonstrate that, given a certain probability of colonisation at admission, 
the ward-level prevalence will always be higher with higher level of transmissibility 
(i.e., the mean ward-level prevalence line representing high level of transmissibility is 
above the line representing the medium level transmissibility which, in turn, is above 
the line representing the low level transmissibility). The 5th and 95th percentiles of 
the mean ward-level prevalence under medium transmissibility of the ABS model also 
match that of the original model. 
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Figure B.3 Comparison between the ABS model and the original model by changing 
probability of colonisation at admission (the upper diagram shows the model outputs 
of the original model (source: Cooper et al. 1999); the lower diagram shows the 
model outputs of the ABS model) 
 
Scenario 3: Changing Detection Rate 
In this scenario, the mean time for detection of colonised patients varies from 5 days 
to 35 days (i.e., detection rate from 0.2 to 0.0286). Each detection rate is tested on 
three levels of transmissibility (low 0.07, medium 0.1 and high 0.13). For each 
combination of the colonisation probability and detection rate, the ABS model was 
run 100 times and the mean and the 5th and 95th percentiles (when the 
transmissibility is set at 0.1) are calculated regarding the ward prevalence.  
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Figure B.4 Comparison between the ABS model and the original model by changing 
detection rate (the upper diagram shows the model outputs of the original model 
(source: Cooper et al. 1999); the lower diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS 
model) 
 
Figure B.4 compares the model outputs between the ABS model and the original 
model. The upper diagram, obtained from the original paper, shows the ward-level 
prevalence of the original model and the lower diagram shows the ward-level 
prevalence of the ABS model. The two models present similar results. Using both 
models, the mean ward-level prevalence increases in general as the mean time to 
detection changes from 5 to 35 days, regardless of the levels of transmissibility. Both 
models also demonstrate that, given a certain mean time to detection, the ward-level 
prevalence will always be higher with higher level of transmissibility. In both models, 
when the time to detection reaches 35 days, the mean ward-level prevalence is around 
40%, 20% and 15% respectively under high, medium and low level of transmissibility. 
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The 5th and 95th percentiles of the mean ward-level prevalence under medium 
transmissibility of the ABS model also match that of the original model. 
 
B.2.3 Conclusions 
In all the three scenarios tested, the results of ABS model all closely match that of the 
compartmental mathematical model proposed by Cooper et al. (1999). It demonstrates 
that ABS can replicate the assumptions and results of the previous MRSA model 
which considers both HCWs and patients in a single hospital unit. The speed of the 
ABS model is about 10 seconds for 100 replications with each replication lasting for 
365 days on a standard personal desktop computer. 
 
 
B.3 Test Agent-based Simulation Model on Previous Studies – Part II 
 
B.3.1 Assumptions and Input Parameters 
The second model to be tested by ABS model is proposed by Robotham et al. (1999). 
The mathematical compartmental model represented the whole hospital and its 
community, and divided the patients into eight different compartments. The main 
assumptions of the model include: 
• The model contains the hospital and the community and only patients are 
explicitly represented in the hospital; 
• Transmission only occurs within the hospital and there is no explicit 
assumptions of how MRSA is transmitted (applying mass action assumption). 
• Patients colonised with MRSA can have three statuses: isolated (ISO), 
detected but not isolated (DNISO) and undetected (UI). As a result, observed 
hospital prevalence is ISO+DNISO while real hospital prevalence is 
ISO+DNISO+UI; 
• Isolation can totally prevent MRSA transmission, and DNISO and UI patients 
are equally infectious; 
• Discharged patients first enter the community group with higher re-admission 
rate (C1) and they will move to the second community group with lower re-
admission rate (C2) after a delay; 
• Positive patients (hospital and community) have equal recovery rate; 
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• For random screening strategy, after a patient is admitted, the average interval 
of screening is 1/φ (i.e., the screening rate is φ); and 
• For admission screening strategy, a proportion (ω) of patients is screened on 
admission and there is no further screening carrying out afterwards. 
 
Figure B.5 shows the flow diagram of the model and Table B.2 shows the main input 
parameters and their default values taken by the model. 
 
      
 
Figure B.5 Flow diagrams of the model proposed by Robotham et al. (2006).   
(a) Random screening; (b) On-admission screening. 
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Table B.2 Input parameters and default values of the model proposed by Robotham et 
al. (2006) 
 
 
B.3.2 Compare Results 
The ABS model is built in Anylogic® to replicate the assumptions of the model. Then 
the same model experimentations are conducted with the same parameter values (as 
the previous modelling study) and the results of the ABS model are compared with 
the results of the original mathematical model. Due to the large number of people in 
the community (i.e., around 170,000 people), only patients in the hospital (i.e., 1000 
patients) are represented individually as agent while the different groups of people in 
the community are represented as global integer variables. 
 
Scenario 1: Real prevalence of hospital and community without isolation facility 
In this scenario, the real prevalence of the hospital and community without isolation 
facility will be compared. The ABS model runs for ten replications and each lasts for 
1800 days. Figure A.6 compares the real hospital prevalence between the ABS model 
and the original mathematical model and Figure A.7 compares the community 
prevalence between the ABS model and the original model. 
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Figure B.6 The comparison of hospital prevalence between the ABS model and the 
original model (the upper diagram shows the model outputs of the original model 
(source: Robotham et al. 2006); the lower diagram shows the model outputs of the 
ABS model) 
 
In Figure B.6, the upper diagram shows the change of real hospital prevalence of the 
original model from ten replications. The lower diagram shows the change of real 
hospital prevalence of the ABS model from ten replications. The two models present 
similar results. Although there are variations among the ten replications, the results 
from both models demonstrate that the real hospital prevalence increases sharply in 
the first 200 days from nearly zero to around 300 cases (the capacity of the hospital is 
1000). In both models, the real hospital prevalence only increases slightly between 
200 days and 800 days and gradually levels off at around 400 cases after 800 days. 
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Figure B.7 The comparison of community prevalence between the ABS model and the 
original model (the upper diagram shows the model outputs of the original model 
(source: Robotham et al. 2006); the lower diagram shows the model outputs of the 
ABS model) 
 
In Figure B.7, the upper diagram shows the change of community prevalence of the 
original model from ten replications. The lower diagram shows the change of 
community prevalence of the ABS model from ten replications. The two models 
present similar results. Although there are variations among the ten replications (the 
variation in the ABS model appears to be bigger than the original model), the increase 
of the community prevalence is more sharply in the first two years and more smoothly 
afterwards. After around 1500 days, the community prevalence appears to level off at 
around 14,000 cases (the size of the community is around 170,000). 
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Scenario 2: Observed prevalence of hospital 
In this scenario, the observed prevalence of the hospital under two screening strategies 
(random screening and on-admission screening) will be compared. The ABS model 
runs for ten replications and each lasts for 1800 days. Figure B.8 compares the 
observed hospital prevalence between the ABS model and the original mathematical 
model when random screening strategy is adopted. Figure B.9 compares the observed 
hospital prevalence between the ABS model and the original model when on-
admission screening strategy is adopted. 
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Figure B.8 The comparison of observed hospital prevalence between the ABS model 
and the original model with random screening strategy (the upper diagram shows the 
model outputs of the original model (source: Robotham et al. 2006); the lower 
diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS model) 
 
Assuming the random screening strategy is adopted, the upper diagram in Figure B.8 
shows the change of observed hospital prevalence of the original model from ten 
replications and the lower diagram shows the change of observed hospital prevalence 
of the ABS model from ten replications. The two models present similar results. 
Although there are variations among the ten replications, the results from both models 
demonstrate that the observed hospital prevalence increases sharply at first, more 
smoothly later and gradually levels off at around 150 cases after about 800 days. 
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Diagram B.9 The comparison of observed hospital prevalence between the ABS model 
and the original model with on-admission screening strategy (the upper diagram 
shows the model outputs of the original model (source: Robotham et al. 2006); the 
lower diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS model) 
 
Assuming the on-admission screening strategy is adopted, the upper diagram in 
Figure B.8 shows the change of observed hospital prevalence of the original model 
from ten replications and the lower diagram shows the change of observed hospital 
prevalence of the ABS model from the ten replications. The two models present 
similar results. Although there are variations among ten replications, the results from 
both models demonstrate that the observed hospital prevalence increases sharply at 
first, more smoothly later and gradually levels off at around 80 cases after about 1200 
days. 
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Scenario 3: Comparison between random and on-admission screening with 
isolation  
In this scenario, the performance of random and on-admission screening strategy will 
be compared when an isolation ward is introduced. The comparison will be carried 
out based on the number of undetected positive patients and the number of patients in 
the isolation ward. Figures B.10 and B.11 compare the undetected hospital prevalence 
between the ABS and the original model with random screening strategy and with on-
admission screening strategy respectively. Figure B.12 and B.13 compare the number 
of isolation patients between the ABS and the original model with random screening 
strategy and with on-admission screening strategy respectively. 
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Figure B.10 The comparison of undetected hospital prevalence between the ABS 
model and the original model with random screening strategy (the upper diagram 
shows the model outputs of the original model (source: Robotham et al. 2006); the 
lower diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS model) 
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Assuming the random screening strategy is adopted, the upper diagram in Figure A.10 
shows the change of undetected hospital prevalence of the original model from ten 
replications and the lower diagram shows the change of undetected hospital 
prevalence of the ABS model from ten replications. Although there are variations 
among the ten replications, the results from both models demonstrate that the 
undetected hospital prevalence remains very low (few cases in a hospital with 1000 
beds) through out the whole simulation period.  
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Figure B.11 The comparison of undetected hospital prevalence between the ABS 
model and the original model with on-admission screening strategy (the upper 
diagram shows the model outputs of the original model (source: Robotham et al. 
2006); the lower diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS model) 
 
Assuming the on-admission screening strategy is adopted, the upper diagram in 
Diagram A.11 shows the change of undetected hospital prevalence of the original 
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model from ten replications and the lower diagram shows the change of undetected 
hospital prevalence of the ABS model from ten replications. Although there are 
variations among the ten replications, the results from both models are comparable 
and demonstrate that the undetected hospital prevalence increases sharply at first, 
more smoothly later and gradually levels off at around 300 cases after about 1000 
days. 
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Figure B.12 The comparison of the number of isolation patients between the ABS 
model and the original model with random screening strategy (the upper diagram 
shows the model outputs of the original model (source: Robotham et al. 2006); the 
lower diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS model) 
 
Assuming the random screening strategy is adopted, the upper diagram in Figure A.12 
shows the change of isolation patients of the original model from ten replications and 
the lower diagram shows the change of isolation patients of the ABS model from ten 
replications. There are huge variations among the ten replications in both models. The 
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results from both models demonstrate that the number of patients in isolation varies 
from zero to the maximum capacity of the isolation beds and does not follow any 
particular pattern through out the whole simulation period. In practice, both models 
indicate that the isolation facility can meet the demand of the isolation requests in 
most occasions. 
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Figure B.13 The comparison of the number of isolation patients between the ABS 
model and the original model with on-admission screening strategy (the upper 
diagram shows the model outputs of the original model (source: Robotham et al. 
2006); the lower diagram shows the model outputs of the ABS model) 
 
Assuming the on-admission screening strategy is adopted, the upper diagram in 
Figure B.13 shows the change of isolation patients of the original model from ten 
replications and the lower diagram shows the change of isolation patients of the ABS 
model from ten replications. There are variations among the ten replications in both 
models and the results from both models demonstrate that the number of patients in 
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isolation increases from zero to the full capacity of the isolation room at first. Then, 
the isolation room remains almost fully occupied for the rest of the simulation period 
in both models (which indicates the demand for isolation is constantly higher than the 
isolation capacity). 
 
B.3.3 Conclusions 
In all the scenarios tested, the results of ABS model all closely match that of the 
mathematical compartmental model proposed by Robotham et al. (2006). It 
demonstrates that ABS can replicate the assumptions and results of the previous 
MRSA model which considers not only the patients in the hospital but also the 
feedback relationship between the hospital and the community. The speed of the ABS 
model is about 30 seconds for ten replications with each lasting for 1800 days on a 
standard personal desktop computer. 
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Appendix C 
 
 
Data Cleaning for the MRSA Case Study 
 
 
 
C.1 Data Collection and Storage 
According to the research plan, the pre-crossover period was between 1st January 
2006 and 31st August 2006 during which Ward A, B, C and D adopted the rapid PCR 
screening test and Ward E, F and G adopted the conventional culture screening test. 
The post-crossover period was between 1st September 2006 and 30th April 2007 
during which each ward changed the screening test method. Observed data were 
collected throughout the sixteen-month study period as well as for two months before 
the pre-crossover period started (to test the data collection procedure and train the data 
input staff) and for one month after the post-crossover period finished (to collect the 
follow up data). 
 
Observed data regarding MRSA screening tests, both PCR tests and culture tests, are 
stored in a single Microsoft Office Excel® file. Each screening test was recorded in 
the file regarding the identification of the patient (e.g., patient number and patient 
surname), the ward the patient belongs to, the type of the screening test (e.g., 
admission screening or repeat screening, and PCR test or culture test) and the time the 
sample is collected and received by the laboratory. 
 
All the rest of the observed data of the research study were stored in two separate 
Microsoft Office Access® files. The structures of the two databases are identical. One 
file is used for storing the data for Ward A, B, C and D during the whole study period 
and the other file for storing the data for Ward E, F and G during the whole study 
period. The main tables in the database and the key information recorded in each table 
are listed below. These main tables and other complementary tables are linked 
together as a relational database. 
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• “Patients” table: the key information stored in this table includes patient 
number, patient name, and the age and sex of the patient; 
• “In-Patient” table: the key information stored in this table includes patient 
number, the MRSA status of the patient (e.g., the date MRSA is identified), 
follow-up interventions for MRSA positive patient (e.g., date of starting 
decolonisation treatment, date of starting isolation and reasons for not 
receiving treatment and not been isolated), potential risk factors of the patient 
regarding MRSA (e.g., whether the patient has been admitted to ICU, whether 
the patient has been used invasive devices, whether the patient got operation, 
and whether the patient got wounds, ulcers and diabetic) and where the patient 
is admitted from; and 
• “WardMovement” table: the key information stored in this table includes the 
admission and discharge dates of each patient in the hospital ward, the status 
of discharge (i.e., alive or dead) and the destination of discharge. 
 
 
C.2 Data Cleaning 
Since the screening sample information (stored in an Excel file) and the rest of the 
observed data (stored in two Access files) are kept in different files, the first task for 
data cleaning is to link the two sources of information together. The method is to 
create two new tables in the existing two Access files to represent  the screening 
information (which comes from the Excel screening sample file) and link the new 
screening sample tables with existing tables. By doing so, the screening sample 
information of a patient is linked to the rest of the information of the same patient. 
 
Due to the large scale of the research study and the big size of the dataset, there would 
be inevitably many human errors and inconsistencies among the original data. Once 
the two Access files include all the observed data (including screening sample 
information) of the research study, a series of data cleaning tasks were performed to 
eliminate any input errors and inconsistencies of the data. The original Excel and 
Access files were available from the hospital in July 2007 and the two final cleaned 
Access databases (one for Ward A to D and the other for Ward E to F) were finished 
by October 2007.  
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Screening Sample Table Cleaning 
One of the main tasks of data cleaning is to link each screening sample record with its 
corresponding ward admission record. In theory, a patient admission may not be 
associated with any screening sample (e.g., the patient stays too short to have any 
screening sample been taken) but any screening sample must belong to a particular 
patient admission and to one of the study wards. If a screening sample can not be 
associated with any patient admission records, the screening sample records were 
either corrected by seeking further information or deleted if there was no explanation.  
 
In the original screening sample file, the type of each screening sample is recorded 
(e.g., admission screening and repeat screening). During data cleaning, the type of 
each sample is checked by comparing the date the sample is taken with the 
corresponding ward admission date (from the ward movement table). If the screening 
sample is taken within two days of admission, the screening sample is labelled as 
admission screening; otherwise, it is labelled as repeat screening. 
 
In practice, if a patient is screened for MRSA, more than one sample may be taken at 
the same time (e.g., from the nose and the wound). Under such circumstances, 
multiple screening sample records will exist for the same patient on the same day. If 
all the samples give the same result (which happens in most cases), only one 
screening sample record was retained. 
 
Inconsistencies between Screening Sample Table and In-Patient Table regarding 
MRSA Status 
In some cases the screening sample table shows that the screening sample is positive 
for a patient while the same patient in the in-patient table is not marked as MRSA 
positive. There were also cases that a patient in the in-patient table is marked as 
MRSA positive while the patient does not have any positive screening sample record 
in the screening sample table. Under such circumstances, careful further review was 
conducted to determine whether the record in the in-patient table was wrong or a 
screening sample record was missing in the screening sample table. Then, the records 
in the relevant tables were modified accordingly. 
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Ward Movement Table Cleaning 
The admission and discharge dates stored in the ward movement table were used to 
calculate the ward length of stay of each patient. If the length of stay is negative or 
excessively long (i.e., more than 100 days), further review was conducted. In most 
cases, the dubious cases were successfully modified according to the clinical records 
through further review. 
 
Other Data Cleaning Activities 
All data that were associated with patients whose discharge date is before 1st January 
2006 (the starting date of the pre-crossover period) or whose admission date is after 
30th April 2007 (the finishing date of the post-crossover period) were excluded from 
the final databases.  
 
After performing the data cleaning activities, the final two Access databases are used 
to estimate the values of various input parameters for the model. 
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Appendix D 
 
 
The Relative Risks of ICU Admission and Applying Invasive 
Device 
 
 
 
In epidemiology, relative risk indicates the risk of acquiring an infectious disease in a 
group of people who were exposed to a risk factor, relative to a group who were not 
exposed to it (Stewart 2002). In this study, the disease represents the MRSA 
colonisation and the risk factors include ICU admission and invasive device 
application (e.g., catheters). A 2x2 table is useful to define and calculate the relative 
risk (see Table D.1).  
 
Table D.1 A 2x2 table for defining and calculating relative risk 
Acquire the infectious disease?  
Yes No Total 
Yes a b a + b 
No c d c + d 
Exposed 
to the 
risk 
factor? 
Total a + c b + d a + b + c + d 
 
In Table D.1, the total number of patients exposed to the risk factor is (a + b), among 
which a represents the number of patients who have acquired the infectious disease 
and b represents the number of patients who have not. The total number of patients 
who have not exposed to the risk fact is (c + d), among which c represents the number 
of patients who have acquired the infectious disease and d represents the number of 
patients who have not. Accordingly, the total number of patients who have acquired 
the infectious disease, regardless of the risk factor, is (a + c); while (b + d) represents 
the number of patients who have not acquired the disease. 
 
Relative risk is calculated by dividing the probability of acquiring the infectious 
disease among the patients who are exposed to the risk factor by the probability of 
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acquiring the disease among the patients who are not exposed to the risk factor. 
Mathematically, it is calculated as follows: 
)/(
)/(
dcc
baaRR +
+=                    
where RR represents the relative risk and the rest of the variables are defined in Table 
D.1. 
 
If the relative risk is bigger than one, there is an increased risk of acquiring the 
infectious disease if the patient is exposed to the risk factor; while if the relative risk 
is less than one, there is a decreased risk of acquiring the disease if the patient is 
exposed to the factor. 
 
In order to calculate the relative risk of ICU admission and invasive device 
application, three tables are constructed (see Table D.2 to D.4). The values in the 
tables are counted directly from the observed data from the research study. Since 
patients who are already colonised with MRSA (i.e., primary cases) are unlikely to 
acquire MRSA again during the ward stay, the primary case patients are excluded 
from the estimation of the relative risk. Compared to patients who are neither 
admitted to ICU nor applied invasive devices, the relative risk of patients who are 
admitted to ICU but not applied invasive devices is 4.6, the relative risk of patients 
who are not admitted to ICU but applied invasive devices is 2.33, and the relative risk 
of patients who are both admitted to ICU and applied invasive devices is 6.23. 
 
Table D.2 Relative risk of patients who are admitted to ICU but not applied invasive 
devices 
Acquire MRSA?  
Yes No Total 
ICU admission but no 
invasive devices 
application 
17 115 132 
No ICU admission and 
no invasive devices 
application 
75 2601 2676 
Risk 
factor 
Total 92 2716 2808 
Relative risk 4.60 
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Table D.3 Relative risk of patients who are not admitted to ICU but applied invasive 
devices 
Acquire MRSA?  
Yes No Total 
Invasive devices 
application but no ICU 
admission 
551 7891 8442 
No ICU admission and 
no invasive devices 
application 
75 2601 2676 
Risk 
factor 
Total 626 10492 11118 
Relative risk 2.33 
 
Table D.4 Relative risk of patients who are admitted to ICU and applied invasive 
devices 
Acquire MRSA?  
Yes No Total 
ICU admission and 
invasive devices 
application 
442 2090 2532 
No ICU admission and 
no invasive devices 
application 
75 2601 2676 
Risk 
factor 
Total 263 2754 3017 
Relative risk 6.23 
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Appendix E 
 
 
Empirical Distributions for the Lengths of Stay 
 
 
 
During the model validation, all fourteen scenarios apply empirical distributions to 
represent patients’ actual lengths of stay. For each scenario, two empirical 
distributions are constructed from the observed data: one for the lengths of stay of 
non-primary case patients (i.e., patients who are not colonised with MRSA on 
admission) and the other for the lengths of stay of primary case patients (i.e., patients 
who have already been colonised with MRSA on admission).  
 
Table E.1 to E.28 show the details of these step-wise empirical distributions. Each of 
the 14 scenarios has two tables: the first table represents the lengths of stay for non-
primary case patients and the second for primary case patients. The second column of 
each table shows the length of stay that was recorded in the database. The third 
column shows the observed frequency of that length of stay. The fourth column 
represents the observed frequency in terms of percentage. The fifth column, based on 
the fourth column, shows the cumulative percentages. The last column shows how the 
recorded length of stay is represented in the model. For example, for the third row in 
Table E.1 (with index 2), it means, among all non-primary case patients during the 
pre-crossover period for ward A, there are 105 patients whose length of stay is 
recorded as one day; since the total number of non-primary case patients in the 
scenario is 1058 (the last row in the table), 105 patients represents 9.924% (105/1058) 
of all non-primary case patients in the scenario; the cumulative percentage is 11.72% 
which indicates that 11.72% of non-primary case patients have a length of stay equals 
or less than one day; and if the recorded length of stay is one day, then it is 
represented as a uniform distribution between zero and two days in the model.  
 
The reason for using the uniform distribution to represent the short lengths of stay is 
that the hospital only records the date of admission and discharge without specifying 
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the exact time of the day (e.g., hours and minutes) the patient is admitted or 
discharged. So if the recorded length of stay is one day (i.e., the discharge date is one 
day after the admission date), in extreme cases, the patients may have a length of stay 
close to zero (e.g., the patient is admitted close midnight and discharged rightly after 
midnight) or may have a length of stay close to two days (e.g., the patient is admitted 
rightly after midnight and discharged the following day close to midnight). Since the 
simulation model assumes continuous time, the actual length of stay of the patient will 
be sampled from a uniform distribution between zero and two days (the mean length 
of stay is still one day).  
 
Not all recorded lengths of stay are individually represented in the empirical 
distribution; some days are aggregated to reduce the number of bins. The rule applied 
in this study is that if a recorded length of stay has a percentage less than 2%, the 
length of stay will be grouped with an adjacent longer length of stay so that their 
combined percentage exceeds 2%. Normally, a long range of length of stay is grouped 
together at he right tail of the empirical length of stay distribution, since there are only 
a few scattering cases of extremely long lengths of stay in each scenario (e.g., in pre-
crossover period of ward C, the last step of the empirical length of stay ranges from 
43 days to 112 days and only contains 16 cases out of a total of 1105 cases). It is 
assumed that a uniform distribution is not ideal but probably a simple solution as a 
reasonable rough estimate. This drawback may be mitigated, to some extent, by 
multiple replications of the simulation run. 
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Table E.1 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (pre-
crossover period for ward A) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 19 1.796% 1.796% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 105 9.924% 11.720% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 119 11.248% 22.968% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 130 12.287% 35.255% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 100 9.452% 44.707% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 94 8.885% 53.592% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 89 8.412% 62.004% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 75 7.089% 69.093% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 57 5.388% 74.480% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 47 4.442% 78.922% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 50 4.726% 83.648% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 30 2.836% 86.484% uniform(10,12) 
13 (12,13) 32 3.025% 89.509% uniform(11,14) 
14 (14,15) 28 2.647% 92.155% uniform(13,16) 
15 (16,18) 22 2.079% 94.234% uniform(15,19) 
16 (19,22) 22 2.079% 96.314% uniform(18,23) 
17 (23,30) 22 2.079% 98.393% uniform(22,31) 
18 (33,74) 17 1.607% 100.000% uniform(32,75) 
Sum  1058 100%   
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.2 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (pre-
crossover period of ward A) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 3 5.556% 5.556% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 4 7.407% 12.963% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 6 11.111% 24.074% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 4 7.407% 31.481% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 7 12.963% 44.444% uniform(3,5) 
6 (5,6) 5 9.259% 53.704% uniform(4,7) 
7 7 4 7.407% 61.111% uniform(6,8) 
8 8 3 5.556% 66.667% uniform(7,9) 
9 9 3 5.556% 72.222% uniform(8,10) 
10 12 4 7.407% 79.630% uniform(11,13) 
11 (13,17) 3 5.556% 85.185% uniform(12,18) 
12 (20,21) 3 5.556% 90.741% uniform(19,22) 
13 (24,29) 3 5.556% 96.296% uniform(23,30) 
14 (31,35) 2 3.704% 100.000% uniform(30,36) 
Sum  54 100%   
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.3 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (post-
crossover period for ward A) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 28 2.737% 2.737% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 123 12.023% 14.761% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 123 12.023% 26.784% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 97 9.482% 36.266% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 98 9.580% 45.846% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 88 8.602% 54.448% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 74 7.234% 61.681% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 57 5.572% 67.253% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 69 6.745% 73.998% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 38 3.715% 77.713% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 34 3.324% 81.036% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 21 2.053% 83.089% uniform(10,12) 
13 12 24 2.346% 85.435% uniform(11,13) 
14 13 22 2.151% 87.586% uniform(12,14) 
15 (14,15) 35 3.421% 91.007% uniform(13,16) 
16 (16,18) 24 2.346% 93.353% uniform(15,19) 
17 (19,21) 22 2.151% 95.503% uniform(18,22) 
18 (22,26) 23 2.248% 97.752% uniform(21,27) 
19 (27,53) 21 2.053% 99.804% uniform(26,54) 
20 (62,97) 2 0.196% 100.000% uniform(61,98) 
Sum  1023 100.000%   
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.4 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (post-
crossover period of ward A) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 1 3 17.647% 17.647% uniform(0,2) 
2 2 1 5.882% 23.529% uniform(1,3) 
3 4 4 23.529% 47.059% uniform(3,5) 
4 7 1 5.882% 52.941% uniform(6,8) 
5 9 2 11.765% 64.706% uniform(8,10) 
6 10 2 11.765% 76.471% uniform(9,11) 
7 12 1 5.882% 82.353% uniform(11,13) 
8 16 1 5.882% 88.235% uniform(15,17) 
9 20 1 5.882% 94.118% uniform(19,21) 
10 26 1 5.882% 100.000% uniform(25,27) 
Sum  17 100%   
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.5 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (pre-
crossover period for ward B) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 117 11.619% 11.619% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 431 42.800% 54.419% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 150 14.896% 69.315% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 76 7.547% 76.862% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 62 6.157% 83.019% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 41 4.071% 87.090% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 26 2.582% 89.672% uniform(5,7) 
8 (7,8) 33 3.277% 92.949% uniform(6,9) 
9 (9,10) 21 2.085% 95.035% uniform(8,11) 
10 (11,15) 21 2.085% 97.120% uniform(10,16) 
11 (17,45) 22 2.185% 99.305% uniform(16,46) 
12 (47,93) 7 0.695% 100.000% uniform(46,94) 
Sum  1007 100%   
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.6 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (pre-
crossover period of ward B) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 1 8 36.364% 36.364% uniform(0,2) 
2 (2,4) 4 18.182% 54.545% uniform(1,5) 
3 (5,8) 2 9.091% 63.636% uniform(4,9) 
4 9 2 9.091% 72.727% uniform(8,10) 
5 (12,14) 2 9.091% 81.818% uniform(11,15) 
6 (24,31) 2 9.091% 90.909% uniform(23,32) 
7 (43,46) 2 9.091% 100.000% uniform(42,47) 
Sum  22 100.000%   
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.7 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (post-
crossover period for ward B) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 377 18.204% 18.204% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 1201 57.991% 76.195% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 185 8.933% 85.128% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 94 4.539% 89.667% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 50 2.414% 92.081% uniform(3,5) 
6 (5,6) 57 2.752% 94.833% uniform(4,7) 
7 (7,9) 52 2.511% 97.344% uniform(6,10) 
8 (10,29) 42 2.028% 99.372% uniform(9,30) 
9 (30,81) 13 0.628% 100.000% uniform(29,82) 
Sum  2071 100%   
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.8 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (post-
crossover period of ward B) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 7 28.000% 28.000% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 11 44.000% 72.000% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 1 4.000% 76.000% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 2 8.000% 84.000% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 2 8.000% 92.000% uniform(3,5) 
6 25 2 8.000% 100.000% uniform(24,26) 
Sum   25 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.9 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (pre-
crossover period for ward C) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 52 4.706% 4.706% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 214 19.367% 24.072% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 196 17.738% 41.810% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 106 9.593% 51.403% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 95 8.597% 60.000% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 64 5.792% 65.792% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 61 5.520% 71.312% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 33 2.986% 74.299% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 34 3.077% 77.376% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 24 2.172% 79.548% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 28 2.534% 82.081% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 24 2.172% 84.253% uniform(10,12) 
13 (12,13) 28 2.534% 86.787% uniform(11,14) 
14 (14,15) 28 2.534% 89.321% uniform(13,16) 
15 (16,19) 27 2.443% 91.764% uniform(15,20) 
16 (20,23) 28 2.534% 94.298% uniform(19,24) 
17 (24,31) 24 2.172% 96.470% uniform(23,32) 
18 (32,43) 23 2.081% 98.551% uniform(31,44) 
19 (44,111) 16 1.448% 99.999% uniform(43,112) 
Sum   1105 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.10 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (pre-
crossover period of ward C) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 3 5.556% 5.556% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 4 7.407% 12.963% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 6 11.111% 24.074% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 7 12.963% 37.037% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 5 9.259% 46.296% uniform(3,5) 
6 (5,6) 5 9.259% 55.556% uniform(4,7) 
7 7 5 9.259% 64.815% uniform(6,8) 
8 (9,10) 5 9.259% 74.074% uniform(8,11) 
9 (12,16) 3 5.556% 79.630% uniform(11,17) 
10 (19,28) 5 9.259% 88.889% uniform(18,29) 
11 (31,33) 3 5.556% 94.444% uniform(30,34) 
12 (44,74) 3 5.556% 100.000% uniform(43,75) 
Sum   54 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.11 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients 
(post-crossover period for ward C) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 42 3.485% 3.485% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 267 22.158% 25.643% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 200 16.598% 42.241% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 137 11.369% 53.610% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 89 7.386% 60.996% uniform(4,5) 
6 5 75 6.224% 67.220% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 64 5.311% 72.531% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 57 4.730% 77.261% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 42 3.485% 80.747% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 32 2.656% 83.402% uniform(8,10) 
11 (10,11) 42 3.485% 86.887% uniform(9,12) 
12 (12,13) 32 2.656% 89.543% uniform(11,14) 
13 (14,16) 30 2.490% 92.033% uniform(13,17) 
14 (17,20) 29 2.407% 94.440% uniform(16,21) 
15 (21,27) 27 2.241% 96.681% uniform(20,28) 
16 (28,38) 25 2.075% 98.756% uniform(27,39) 
17 (40,115) 15 1.245% 100.001% uniform(40,116) 
Sum   1205 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.12 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (post-
crossover period of ward C) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 1 4 17.391% 17.391% uniform(0,2) 
2 2 3 13.043% 30.435% uniform(1,3) 
3 3 3 13.043% 43.826% uniform(2,4) 
4 (4,5) 2 8.696% 52.174% uniform(3,6) 
5 6 3 13.043% 65.217% uniform(5,7) 
6 (7,8) 2 8.696% 73.913% uniform(6,9) 
7 (9,11) 2 8.696% 82.609% uniform(8,12) 
8 (29,31) 2 8.696% 91.304% uniform(28,32) 
9 (35,54) 2 8.696% 100.000% uniform(34,55) 
Sum   23 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.13 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (pre-
crossover period for ward D) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 8 1.626% 1.626% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 46 9.350% 10.976% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 62 12.602% 23.577% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 51 10.366% 33.943% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 42 8.537% 42.480% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 34 6.911% 49.390% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 36 7.317% 56.707% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 16 3.252% 59.959% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 23 4.675% 64.634% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 13 2.642% 67.276% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 13 2.642% 69.919% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 14 2.846% 72.764% uniform(10,12) 
13 12 10 2.033% 74.797% uniform(11,13) 
14 13 14 2.846% 77.642% uniform(12,14) 
15 (14,15) 14 2.846% 80.488% uniform(13,16) 
16 (16,17) 17 3.455% 83.943% uniform(15,18) 
17 (18,19) 11 2.236% 86.179% uniform(17,20) 
18 (20,22) 12 2.439% 88.618% uniform(19,23) 
19 (23,28) 11 2.236% 90.854% uniform(22,29) 
20 (29,34) 11 2.236% 93.090% uniform(28,35) 
21 (35,38) 10 2.033% 95.123% uniform(34,39) 
22 (39,50) 10 2.033% 97.156% uniform(38,51) 
23 (53,76) 10 2.033% 99.189% uniform(52,77) 
24 (83,114) 4 0.813% 100.002% uniform(82,115) 
Sum   492 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.14 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (pre-
crossover period of ward D) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 1 1 7.143% 7.143% uniform(0,2) 
2 2 1 7.143% 14.286% uniform(1,3) 
3 3 2 14.286% 28.571% uniform(2,4) 
4 4 1 7.143% 35.714% uniform(3,5) 
5 6 1 7.143% 42.857% uniform(5,7) 
6 9 1 7.143% 50.000% uniform(8,10) 
7 18 1 7.143% 57.143% uniform(17,19) 
8 22 1 7.143% 64.286% uniform(21,23) 
9 23 1 7.143% 71.429% uniform(22,24) 
10 31 1 7.143% 78.571% uniform(30,32) 
11 44 1 7.143% 85.714% uniform(43,45) 
12 56 1 7.143% 92.857% uniform(55,57) 
13 84 1 7.143% 100.000% uniform(83,85) 
Sum   14 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.15 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients 
(post-crossover period for ward D) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 15 2.517% 2.517% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 90 15.101% 17.617% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 93 15.604% 33.221% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 46 7.718% 40.940% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 40 6.711% 47.651% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 41 6.879% 54.530% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 40 6.711% 61.242% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 15 2.517% 63.758% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 23 3.859% 67.617% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 17 2.852% 70.470% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 20 3.356% 73.826% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 17 2.852% 76.678% uniform(10,12) 
13 12 18 3.020% 79.698% uniform(11,13) 
14 (13,14) 17 2.852% 82.550% uniform(12,15) 
15 (15,16) 21 3.523% 86.073% uniform(14,17) 
16 (17,19) 13 2.181% 88.254% uniform(16,20) 
17 (20,23) 12 2.013% 90.267% uniform(19,24) 
18 (24,27) 13 2.181% 92.448% uniform(23,28) 
19 (28,31) 13 2.181% 94.629% uniform(27,32) 
20 (32,41) 12 2.013% 96.642% uniform(31,42) 
21 (42,58) 12 2.013% 98.655% uniform(41,59) 
22 (67,158) 8 1.342% 99.997% uniform(66,159) 
Sum   596 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.16 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (post-
crossover period of ward D) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 1 9.091% 9.091% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 4 36.364% 45.455% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 1 9.091% 54.545% uniform(1,3) 
4 17 1 9.091% 63.636% uniform(16,18) 
5 32 1 9.091% 72.727% uniform(31,33) 
6 35 1 9.091% 81.818% uniform(34,36) 
7 46 1 9.091% 90.909% uniform(45,47) 
8 66 1 9.091% 100.000% uniform(65,67) 
Sum   11 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.17 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (pre-
crossover period for ward E) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 26 3.818% 3.818% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 99 14.537% 18.355% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 119 17.474% 35.830% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 79 11.601% 47.430% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 75 11.013% 58.443% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 59 8.664% 67.107% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 54 7.930% 75.037% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 26 3.818% 78.855% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 20 2.937% 81.791% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 16 2.349% 84.141% uniform(8,10) 
11 (10,12) 18 2.643% 86.784% uniform(9,13) 
12 (13,14) 14 2.056% 88.840% uniform(12,15) 
13 (15,17) 16 2.349% 91.189% uniform(14,18) 
14 (18,21) 15 2.203% 93.392% uniform(17,22) 
15 (22,27) 14 2.056% 95.448% uniform(21,28) 
16 (30,36) 14 2.056% 97.504% uniform(29,37) 
17 (37,86) 14 2.056% 99.560% uniform(36,87) 
18 (87,145) 3 0.441% 100.001% uniform(86,146) 
Sum   681 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.18 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (pre-
crossover period of ward E) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 1 2 10.526% 10.526% uniform(0,2) 
2 2 1 5.263% 15.789% uniform(1,3) 
3 3 1 5.263% 21.053% uniform(2,4) 
4 4 1 5.263% 26.316% uniform(3,5) 
5 5 1 5.263% 31.579% uniform(4,6) 
6 6 1 5.263% 36.842% uniform(5,7) 
7 7 2 10.526% 47.368% uniform(6,8) 
8 9 1 5.263% 52.632% uniform(8,10) 
9 11 2 10.526% 63.158% uniform(10,12) 
10 12 2 10.526% 73.684% uniform(11,13) 
11 13 1 5.263% 78.947% uniform(12,14) 
12 14 1 5.263% 84.211% uniform(13,15) 
13 21 1 5.263% 89.474% uniform(20,22) 
14 43 1 5.263% 94.737% uniform(42,44) 
15 121 1 5.263% 100.000% uniform(120,122) 
Sum   19 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.19 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients 
(post-crossover period for ward E) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 22 2.899% 2.899% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 162 21.344% 24.242% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 117 15.415% 39.657% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 80 10.540% 50.198% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 69 9.091% 59.289% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 60 7.905% 67.194% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 55 7.246% 74.440% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 37 4.875% 79.315% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 31 4.084% 83.399% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 24 3.162% 86.561% uniform(8,10) 
11 (10,11) 22 2.899% 89.460% uniform(9,12) 
12 (12,13) 16 2.108% 91.568% uniform(11,14) 
13 (14,16) 18 2.372% 93.940% uniform(13,17) 
14 (17,21) 17 2.240% 96.180% uniform(16,22) 
15 (23,33) 18 2.372% 98.552% uniform(22,34) 
16 (34,81) 11 1.449% 100.001% uniform(33,82) 
Sum   759 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.20 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (post-
crossover period of ward E) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 1 6 15.385% 15.385% uniform(0,2) 
2 2 8 20.513% 35.897% uniform(1,3) 
3 3 2 5.128% 41.026% uniform(2,4) 
4 4 4 10.256% 51.282% uniform(3,5) 
5 5 3 7.692% 58.974% uniform(4,6) 
6 6 2 5.128% 64.103% uniform(5,7) 
7 7 2 5.128% 69.231% uniform(6,8) 
8 9 2 5.128% 74.359% uniform(8,10) 
9 (10,11) 3 7.692% 82.051% uniform(9,12) 
10 13 3 7.692% 89.744% uniform(12,14) 
11 (15,18) 2 5.128% 94.872% uniform(14,19) 
12 (39,51) 2 5.128% 100.000% uniform(38,52) 
Sum   39 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.21 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (pre-
crossover period for ward F) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 50 4.062% 4.062% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 228 18.522% 22.583% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 197 16.003% 38.587% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 144 11.698% 50.284% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 95 7.717% 58.002% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 75 6.093% 64.094% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 61 4.955% 69.050% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 52 4.224% 73.274% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 62 5.037% 78.310% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 40 3.249% 81.560% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 27 2.193% 83.753% uniform(9,11) 
12 (11,12) 33 2.681% 86.434% uniform(10,13) 
13 (13,14) 31 2.518% 88.952% uniform(12,15) 
14 (15,17) 33 2.681% 91.633% uniform(14,18) 
15 (18,21) 29 2.356% 93.989% uniform(17,22) 
16 (22,29) 29 2.356% 96.345% uniform(21,30) 
17 (30,36) 25 2.031% 98.376% uniform(29.37) 
18 (37,167) 20 1.625% 100.001% uniform(36,168) 
Sum   1231 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.22 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (pre-
crossover period of ward F) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 1 3.030% 3.030% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 5 15.152% 18.182% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 6 18.182% 36.364% uniform(1,3) 
4 (3,4) 4 12.121% 48.485% uniform(2,5) 
5 (5,6) 3 9.091% 57.576% uniform(4,7) 
6 (7,8) 3 9.091% 66.667% uniform(6,9) 
7 10 3 9.091% 75.758% uniform(9,11) 
8 (11,12) 2 6.061% 81.818% uniform(10,13) 
9 (13,14) 2 6.061% 87.879% uniform(12,15) 
10 (16,21) 2 6.061% 93.939% uniform(15,22) 
11 (38,55) 2 6.061% 100.000% uniform(37,56) 
Sum   33 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.23 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients 
(post-crossover period for ward F) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 46 3.830% 3.830% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 211 17.569% 21.399% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 190 15.820% 37.219% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 109 9.076% 46.295% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 102 8.493% 54.788% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 84 6.994% 61.782% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 72 5.995% 67.777% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 54 4.496% 72.273% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 58 4.829% 77.102% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 39 3.247% 80.350% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 33 2.748% 83.097% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 31 2.581% 85.679% uniform(10,12) 
13 (12,13) 46 3.830% 89.509% uniform(11,14) 
14 (14,15) 34 2.831% 92.340% uniform(13,16) 
15 (16,18) 32 2.664% 95.004% uniform(15,19) 
16 (19,23) 26 2.165% 97.169% uniform(18,24) 
17 (24,46) 25 2.082% 99.251% uniform(23,47) 
18 (51,111) 9 0.749% 100.000% uniform(50,112) 
Sum   1201 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
 
Table E.24 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (post-
crossover period of ward F) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 1 2.222% 2.222% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 8 17.778% 20.000% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 3 6.667% 26.667% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 10 22.222% 48.889% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 7 15.556% 64.444% uniform(3,5) 
6 (5,6) 6 13.333% 77.778% uniform(4,7) 
7 (7,8) 3 6.667% 84.444% uniform(6,9) 
8 9 4 8.889% 93.333% uniform(8,10) 
9 (11,33) 3 6.667% 100.000% uniform(10,34) 
Sum   45 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.25 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients (pre-
crossover period for ward G) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 12 2.614% 2.614% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 45 9.804% 12.418% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 51 11.111% 23.529% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 40 8.715% 32.244% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 27 5.882% 38.126% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 27 5.882% 44.009% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 22 4.793% 48.802% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 18 3.922% 52.723% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 12 2.614% 55.338% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 18 3.922% 59.259% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 15 3.268% 62.527% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 11 2.397% 64.924% uniform(10,12) 
13 12 16 3.486% 68.410% uniform(11,13) 
14 (13,14) 23 5.011% 73.421% uniform(12,15) 
15 15 11 2.397% 75.818% uniform(14,16) 
16 (16,17) 10 2.179% 77.997% uniform(15,18) 
17 (18,19) 12 2.614% 80.611% uniform(17,20) 
18 20 11 2.397% 83.008% uniform(19,21) 
19 (21,24) 12 2.614% 85.622% uniform(20,25) 
20 (25,28) 11 2.397% 88.019% uniform(24,29) 
21 (29,34) 12 2.614% 90.633% uniform(28,35) 
22 (35,37) 11 2.397% 93.030% uniform(34,38) 
23 (38,44) 10 2.179% 95.209% uniform(37,45) 
24 (45,50) 10 2.179% 97.388% uniform(44,51) 
25 (53,97) 10 2.179% 99.567% uniform(52,98) 
26 (101,102) 2 0.436% 100.003% uniform(100,103) 
Sum   459 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.26 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (pre-
crossover period of ward G) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 1 5.556% 5.556% uniform(0,1) 
2 2 2 11.111% 16.667% uniform(1,3) 
3 3 1 5.556% 22.222% uniform(2,4) 
4 4 2 11.111% 33.333% uniform(3,5) 
5 5 3 16.667% 50.000% uniform(4,6) 
6 7 1 5.556% 55.556% uniform(6,8) 
7 10 2 11.111% 66.667% uniform(9,11) 
8 16 1 5.556% 72.222% uniform(15,17) 
9 17 1 5.556% 77.778% uniform(16,18) 
10 21 1 5.556% 83.333% uniform(20,22) 
11 53 1 5.556% 88.889% uniform(52,54) 
12 59 1 5.556% 94.444% uniform(58,60) 
13 73 1 5.556% 100.000% uniform(72,74) 
Sum   18 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.27 Empirical distribution of length of stay for non-primary case patients 
(post-crossover period for ward G) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 0 11 2.079% 2.079% uniform(0,1) 
2 1 74 13.989% 16.068% uniform(0,2) 
3 2 68 12.854% 28.922% uniform(1,3) 
4 3 50 9.452% 38.374% uniform(2,4) 
5 4 43 8.129% 46.503% uniform(3,5) 
6 5 32 6.049% 52.552% uniform(4,6) 
7 6 23 4.348% 56.900% uniform(5,7) 
8 7 16 3.025% 59.924% uniform(6,8) 
9 8 23 4.348% 64.272% uniform(7,9) 
10 9 17 3.214% 67.486% uniform(8,10) 
11 10 17 3.214% 70.699% uniform(9,11) 
12 11 16 3.025% 73.724% uniform(10,12) 
13 (12,13) 18 3.403% 77.127% uniform(11,14) 
14 14 14 2.647% 79.774% uniform(13,15) 
15 15 16 3.025% 82.799% uniform(14,16) 
16 (16,18) 11 2.079% 84.878% uniform(15,19) 
17 (19,21) 14 2.647% 87.525% uniform(18,22) 
18 (22,25) 12 2.268% 89.793% uniform(21,26) 
19 (26,30) 12 2.268% 92.061% uniform(25,31) 
20 (31,35) 12 2.268% 94.329% uniform(30,36) 
21 (36,45) 11 2.079% 96.408% uniform(35,46) 
22 (46,53) 11 2.079% 98.487% uniform(45,54) 
23 (55,115) 8 1.512% 99.999% uniform(54,116) 
Sum   529 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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Table E.28 Empirical distribution of length of stay for primary case patients (post-
crossover period of ward G) 
Index 
Recorded 
LOS 
(days) 
Frequency Percentage (%) 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(%) 
Model LOS 
(days) 
1 1 1 7.143% 7.143% uniform(0,2) 
2 2 2 14.286% 21.429% uniform(1,3) 
3 4 1 7.143% 28.571% uniform(3,5) 
4 5 1 7.143% 35.714% uniform(4,6) 
5 8 1 7.143% 42.857% uniform(7,9) 
6 9 1 7.143% 50.000% uniform(8,10) 
7 11 1 7.143% 57.143% uniform(10,12) 
8 19 1 7.143% 64.286% uniform(18,20) 
9 28 1 7.143% 71.429% uniform(27,29) 
10 43 1 7.143% 78.571% uniform(42,44) 
11 45 1 7.143% 85.714% uniform(44,46) 
12 68 1 7.143% 92.857% uniform(67,69) 
13 104 1 7.143% 100.000% uniform(103,105) 
Sum   14 100%     
LOS: length of stay. 
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